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1. SUMMARY: The question presented is whether Texas -
may refuse free public schooling to a minor who is a u .s. 
citizen not living with his parents because he resides in a 
-Qo, ~ \~l( r \S, \Jt>e.. 
~ ) 
fu~. SC)- 1s2>ra. 
it t:-
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school district for the "primary purpose of attending 
school." 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Petitioner Roberto Mo-
r ales is an indigent minor and a citizen of the United 
States who has lived in McAllen, Texas, continuously since 
1977. Each of his parents is a citizen of Mexico who may 
not legally reside in the United States. Wishing Roberto to -learn English and to attend an American school, Roberto's 
parents sent him to live in McAllen with his adult sister, 
petitioner Oralia Martinez. 
Texas Education Code §21.031(d), however, prohibits 
children who~ do not live with their parents and 6°Je-
side in a school district for the "primary purpose of at-
tending school" from receiving free public schooling. Sec-
tion 21.031(d) states: 
"In order for a person under the age of 18 years 
to establish a residence for the purpose of at-
tending the public free schools separate and apart 
from his parent, guardian, or other person having 
lawful control of him under an order of a court, 
it must be established that his presence in the 
school district is not for the primary purpose of 
attending the public free schools. The board of 
trustees shall be responsible for determining 
whether an applicant for admission is a resident 
of the school district for purposes of attending 
the public school." 
The petitioners brought suit challenging this provision 
- -- 3 -
as facially unconstitutional. The District Court {S.D. Tex-
as; Kazen, J.) found for the respondents and the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The petitioners contend that this 
case, like Plyler and In Re: Alien Children, arises "from 
Texas' attempt to solve the problem of its underfinanced 
educational system by excluding from the public schools dis-
crete classes of children living within the borders of the 
State--illegal aliens and citizen children of aliens." The 
petitioners urge that the decision below "implies that Texas 
may welcome Roberto as a resident if he comes to work in its ~ 
fields, but may turn its back on him if he moves to obtain~ 
an education so he may someday find a better job." 
The District Court, in its findings of fact, concluded 
that: "At least one of the legislative purposes behind Sec-
- -----cw,.4 =-
tion 21.031{d) was to inhibit the migration of persons re-
, 
siding in Mexico to attend schools in the United States." 
App. B to Pet. for Cert. 15 {finding 37). The respondents 
themselves admit: 
"The Legislative Committee in the House of 
Representatives, when this legislation was en-
acted, noted ••• an alarming concern [sic] for the 
increased immigration of persons from Mexico and 
the school districts on the Texas-Mexico border. A 
study conducted in school districts located in 
thirteen counties adjacent to the Texas-Mexico 
border in 1975-1976 analyzed the problems connect-
ed with the immigration of students from Mexico 
- -
- 4 -
and stated the desire of the school district ad-
ministrators to have a statutory definition of 
'resident.'" Brief in Opposition 5. Citations to 
the record omitted. 
Texas, however, suggests that the challenged provision 
does not deprive American citizens of an education, since 
Texas would educate a child like Roberto if (1) he had "a 
reason other than its [sic] education for its [sic] presence 
in the school district," or (2) he obtained a "guardianship" 
or "other court order" appointing a resident of the district 
as his custodian {Texas points out that "even indigents now 
have access" to legal services and could obtain a guardian-
ship). Finally, Texas suggests that, in any event, a child 
like Roberto could get an education, if only he would 
"retur[n] to live with its [sic] parents." Id., at 5-6. 
Texas also takes issue with the petitioners' emphasis 
on the application of the challenged provision to the citi-
zen children of alien parents, contending that "§21. 031 {d) 
applies and is applied equally to all children alike," id., -at 6, and claiming that it is not "aimed at any suspect 
class of people," id., at 9. For example, Texas contends, 
the provision would apply to children trying to move into a 
district across town. As Texas argues, "two school districts - -- .,. 
could be in the same city, if the city, like many in Texas 
••• has more than one school district." Id., at 6 [Emphasis 
in original]. 
{ 
- -- 5 -
In answer, the petitioners point to the great dispari-
ties between wealthy and poor districts in Texas, arguing 
that Texas should not be permitted to erect legal barriers 
to prevent poor students from moving to wealthy districts if 
they are unsatisfied with the educational opportunities 
available in their own districts. The petitioners contend 
that Texas in effect is suggesting that a state may consti-
tutionally require a child to show an "acceptable" motive 
before establishing residency in a wealthy district. 
The petitioners argue that the purpose and ef feet of 
§21.03l{d) is therefore unconstitutional: to deter migration 
into Texas school districts by depriving American citizens 
wishing to do so of an essential state benefit, public edu-
cation. Because the challenged residency requirement in-
flicts a permanent deprivation, the petitioners urge that it 
is more flagrantly unconsitutional than the durational resi-
dency requirements struck down in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969), Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970), and 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250. The 
petitioners suggest that the decisions below would permit 
the statutes in these cases to "be revived through the sim-
ple expedient of changing the durational requirement to a 
motivational one, declaring those who migrate for the pur-
pose of obtaining a particular benefit to be ineligible not 
just for a year, but permanently." 
~ - -
- 6 -
The petitioners contrast Texas' emphasis on motive in 
determining domicile with the irrelevance of motive in es-
tablishing domicile for purposes of federal diversity juris-
diction. The appropriate subjective element to be cons id-
ered in determining domicile, contend the petitioners, is 
the intent to remain, abide, a make a home, not the purpose 
which motivates that intent. 
The petitioners also emphasize the importance of ele-
mentary and secondary school education, suggesting that ba-
sic education is too important to be delayed or withheld 
altogether under strict residency standards. Texas, citing 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1 (1973), responds that education is not a "fundamental 
right" protected by the Constitution. 
The petitioners also argue that the Texas statute is 
curiously tailored to accomplish legitimate ends, in that it 
applies only to children who are not living with their par-
ents. In response, Texas argues that "[t] he children in-
volved in this case are not in a natural situation, that is, 
they are not living with their parents, guardians or persons 
having custody of them under a court order." Brief in Oppo-
sition 7. 
In support of the Texas enactment, Texas advances vari-
ous state interests it serves. It suggests that an influx 
of students like Roberto would have a "detrimental effect on 
the educational standards of the Defendant School 
, - -
- 7 -
Districts." Id., at 9. Texas notes that "[ml ost of the 
children in Petitioner's category do not pay any local 
school or state taxes." Id., at 4. Moreover, without the 
challenged law, Texas' integration plans would be disrupted, 
because "white students would move to white school districts 
and black students to black school districts" without their 
parents. Id., at 9. And some students would transfer "for 
athletic reasons." Ibid. 
Texas also finds succor in the college tuition cases 
decided by this Court, citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 
441, 453-454 {1973): 
"The state can establish such reasonable criteria 
for in-state status as to make virtually certain 
that students who are not, in fact, bona fide res-
idents of the state, but who have come there sole-
ly for educational purposes, cannot take advantage 
of the in-state rates." 
In this regard, the petitioners suggest that this case 
is similar to Toll v. Moreno, No. 80-2178 {cert. granted 
Oct. 6, 1981). That case involves a state university's de-
nial of "in-state" status for purposes of tuition and fees 
to nonimmigrant aliens with G-4 visas. 
4. DISCUSSION: This case should be held for Plyler. 
There is a response. 
December 23, 1981 Cartwright Op'n in pet'n 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: tvf/5 WLd~HJ~ 
;5t.P.~fJ-I!...,~ 
~~ LA -
Re: v. Brockette ~~ No.~ -85] 2 Martinez 
9~~ 
This case was held for Nos. 80-1538, 80-1934 -- Plyler v. -
Doe, Etc. 
Petitioner is a school-age American citizen, whose 
parents are Mexican c1.t1zenswfio a :ret noc entitled to re-
side in th~ United States, and in fact live in Mexico. 
Petitioner has lived with his adult sister in McAllen, 
~exas since 1977. Section 21.03l(d) of the Texas Educa-
tion Code provides that 
9~ 
~ 
"In order for a person under the age of 18 
years to establish a residence for the purpose 
of attending the public free schools separate 
and apart from his parent ... it must be estab- l ~--
lished that his presence in the sc-bool district ~ A 
. A~,./~ is ~?t for he r'mar ur ose of attending the ~, 
V':' r ./ public ree c:::.--
- ~ n 1977, pursuant to this provision, the McAllen Scho~ 
District denied him admission because he was in McAl~_ 
for the primary purpose of attending school. The Dis~~--~ 
trict Court rejected petitioner's claims that denial 
education pursuant to this provision denied him the equal 
protection of the law, infringed on the right to travel, 
and denied him due process by creating an irrebutable 
presumption of non-residency. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed. We held the case for Plyler v. Doe (Section 
21.03l(c) was at issue in that case). 
The analysis of the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals was as follows: With respect to the right-to-
21,1.,t_ I ttC !1 "1 e cl TCJ 
7Lt.l'<;f1~-11. 15 rll..?.t,(,~ a_nd 
{a_cec:I 
~L 
cl~/{j t1-!tk~u6L Yht 
fet-P,tJ.r( rh.~u Id bL 
::,,, 
- -Pf1½- ' 
travel/equal protection claim, the courts below distin-
guished the Shapiro-Memorial Hospital line of cases by 
noting that this case does not involve a durational resi-
dence requirement, but concluded, in any event, that the 
State's interest in limiting its educational resources to 
bona fide residents justified whatever burden was placed 
on the right to travel. In this context, the court em-
phasized the fact that the statute applied not only to 
persons in petitioner's situation, but those whose par -
ents resided in other States, or indeed, other Texas 
school districts. The court found the potential finan-
cial burden on local schools of accomodating transfers 
"primarily for the purpose of using the schools" to war-
rant the prohibition. 
With respect to the Vlandis due process claim, the 
court concluded that unlike Vlandis, which held that a 
certain objective factor could not be taken as the sole 
and permanent determinant of bona fide residence, the 
question whether the student was in the county primarily 
to attend school was, in essence, a codification of the 
"ultimate universal test of residency, namely subjective 
intent." 
It is clear to me that Plyler v. Doe has no direct 
impact on this case. Indeed, the opinion of the Court in 
l 
Plyler specifically declared that a uniformli applied 
test of residen could have been applied the illegal 
~ - a 1e 1 ren in a ase. A t _oug the provision has 
I~ unusually harsh consequences on the American citizen 
children of foreign citizen parents, it applies facially 
across-the-board. Thus, I would not think that a GVR in 
light of Plyler is appropriate ~ ' 
Nevertheless, I find thi case troubfin in light, 
broadly speaking, of our con 'nuing dif · lties with un-
usual residency requirements. · 1oner is an American 
citizen, yet the effect of the decision below is to deny 
him an American-English education, precisely because a 
primary reason why he left his parents in Mexico was to 
get such an education. In addition, the District Court 
concluded that "one of the legislative purposes behind 
Section 21.03l(d) was to inhibit the migration of persons 
residing in Mexico to attend schools in the United 
States." Finally, as was conceded by the State at oral 
argument in Plyler, and as is implicit in the Texas 
scheme, the intention to remain indefinitely, which the 
courts below accurately recognized as the historical test 
of residence, and which the court below found to be re-
flected in §21.03l(d) 's "not primarily to attend school" 





dence with respect to entitlement to attend school: Even 
children temporarily in the State, so long as they are 
accdnpanied by their parents, are enti~led to attend 
school tuition-free. 
In short, my principal difficulty with this case con-
cerns the application of the statute to persons in peti-
tioner's situation--children who by the Constitution are 
citizens, but whose parents are barred from the country. 
Are they a consitutionally sp~cial case requiring special 
rules? To be sure, the questions presented in the peti-
tion for certiorari do not focus on the unique circum-
stances of petitioner, but rather mount a broader guage 
facial challenge ~ .03l(d). Nevertheless, I 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 81-857 Martinez v. Brockett 
Questions Presented 
January 8, 1983 
Texas provides that any child living with his parent, guardian 
or other person having lawful control may receive a free public 
education. If a child does not live with such a persen, ~e 
still may attend public free schools if he establishes that his 




of attending such schools. See Tex. Educ. Code. Ann. tit. 2, 
§21. 03 {d) {Vernon 1978). The petrs contend: 
2 • 
1. The state statute violates the right to travel by creating 
a motivational residency requirement; 
2. The Texas Statute creates an irrebutable presumption of 
non-residence found invalid in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 
441 {1973); and 
3. The CA erred in not considering whether less restrictive 
alternatives existed to serve the state's purpose. 
I. Background 
Petrs are United States~ itizens not living with 
their parents or legal guardians. They have chosen to live in 
a school district for the ~ rimary purpose of attending its free 
public schools and were denied tuition free schools on the 
basis of the Texas statute. In the petrs' amended complaint, 
they sought to have the statute declared unconstitutional on 
its face because it burdens the right to travel and because it 
creates an invalid irrebuttable presumption of non-residency in 
violation of due process and equal protection. 
The DC's found that one of the purposes behind the 
statute was "to inhibit the migration of persons residing in --- --------- -
Mexico to attend schools in the United States." It found 
further that the statute applied _!,o both intrastate and 
interstate transfers. Finally, it adopted Judge Reynaldo 
Garza's findings on the petrs' request for a preliminary 
injunction. He determined that the state had been "liberal" in 
finding that children living with someone other than their 




for the purpose of attending school. The DC upheld the 
regulation in the face of petrs' challenges. 
3. 
The { A affirmed. It rejected the right to travel 
challenge on the ground that the state may impose bona fide 
residency requirements as long as they are not durational. It, 
however, did not rest its holding solely on that ground. 
Instead, it decided that the challenged statute was valid 
whether judged under strict scrutiny or under a rational basis ~ 
/v~f-" test. The state has a legitimate interest in preserving the 
~ quality of its educational system and the right of its own bona 




basis. Further, the statute applies to interdistrict transfers ~ 
within the 
1
~ame county.'' The state legitimately may seek to 
~ -
restrict such transfers in order to plan for each d istrict's 
financial and staffing needs. 
The CA also rejected the appt's argument that the 
statute created an irrebutable presumption. Unlike the statute 
at issue in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the Texas 
statute does not prohibit a person from becoming a resident. -------- - ---- ,..., ...... ------ ________ ......... Instead, the CA found that "by using the definition of 




statutory criteria in one sense merely states a truism, namely 
that a person who only intends to remain in a given place 
temporarily in order to take advantage of a particular benefit 
at that location necessarily lacks the permanence to be 
classified as a resident." It noted that Texas's definition is 
in accord with the statement in Vlandis: 
• 
- -
"The state can establish such reasonable criteria for 
in-state status as to make virtually certain that 
students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of 
the State, but who have come there solely for 
educational purposes, cannot take advantage of the 
in-state rates." 412 U.S., at 453-454. 
II. Contentions 
A. Petrs' contentions 
4 • 
Petr argues that Texas's statute deprives indigent 
children of the right to an education solely because they come 
to Texas to obtain it. The statute is aimed at preventing 
children, who are U.S. citizens but whose parents do not live 
in Texas, from traveling to Texas to receive an education. 
There is no merit to the state's suggestion that because a 
child may pay tuition or because the person with whom he is 
living may become his legal guardian, there is no burden on the 
right to travel. 
It is impermissible for Texas to burden the right to 
travel by creating a residency requirement that excludes 
immigrants who travel for a particular purpose. Nor may a 
state place special burdens on children who chose to adopt a 
i.,/ 
nontraditional family living arrangement. See Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 {1977). By penalizing a child for 
living with a family member other than his parents, the state 
intrudes on protected family relationships. 
Finally, the Texas Educational Code creates an 
irrebutable presumption in violation of Vlandis v. Kline, 412 
U.S. 441 {1973). Texas conclusively presumes that a child who 
resides in a city solely to attend its schools is not a 
- -
resident. This denies the child the opportunity to show that 
he intends to remain there and establish a home. 
B. Resp's contentions 
5. 
While a state may not establish durational residency 
requirements that deny an immigrant an important state 
privilege, the state may establish bona fide residency 
one that requirements. The requirement established by Texas is 
has been sanctioned by tradition. . d ~/-Most states have impose 4-/-~ 
such a requirement and the courts have been consistent in 
upholding its validity. Because this requirement has been a 
feature of Texas common law prior to the statute's enactment, 
there is no reason to believe that the Texas legislature acted 
with impermissible motives in passing this requirement. 
The statute does not affect a family's living 
arrangements. A family may structure its living arrangements 
in any way it desires. As long as the child is not living 
apart from its parents or guardian solely to attend school, 
there is no penalty on the family's decision. 
Accordingly, Texas's law should be judged under the 
rational relationship test. The purpose of the system is to 
assure a reasonable nexus between the the children and the 
school district. This promotes local responsibility and 
participation in the schools and ensures that the local voters 
will pass bills to promote the quality of the school program. 
Absent a residency requirement, families, who live in urban 
districts that have a large minority population, could evade 
- - 6. 
desegregation efforts by sending their children across district 
lines to the more predominantly nonminority suburban schools. 
Further, the statute cuts down on athletic recruiting at the 
high school level and aids the state in planning its program 
and budgetary needs. 
~~~~~~ 
III Discussion ~~ • ~ ~/-
• ~~ e/4.~h, ~ ~ 
Because petr's amended complaint faile ~ to challenge 
the statute as applied, one issue is not raised here. The 
question of whether the statute has been applied impermissibly 
on the basis of national origin is absent. This case, however, 
does raise several issues that the previous cases have not 
these issues requires consideration 
in Plyler v. Doe, __ U.S. (1982), 
addressed. Resolution of 
of th~ cision last term 
t ~ ight to travel cases dealing with resi~ y requirements 
for higher education, and the line of case ~ irrebutable 
presumptions. 
A. Plyler v. Doe 
the State of Texas sought to exclude from 
its public scnool system illegal aliens who were residents of 
the State. The Court found that an intermediate level of 
~ was appropriate for two reasons. First, the children 
were being denied access to a basic necessity, secondary 
education. Second, they were being denied this right because 
of the status of their parents, who were in the country 
illegally. The Court found that distinguishing between those 
- -
children legally in the country and those here illegally was 
not substantially related to the State's asserted goals. 
7. 
Because the class of children defined by this statute 
differs from that in Plyler, Plyler does not require 
application of an intermediate level of scrutiny here. In 
~ 
trr Plyler, the statute distinguished between two classes of Texas 
~ 
The residents. Those who were illegal and those who were not. 
effect of the statute was to deny a class of illegal, resident 
children an education. The statute here defines the class of 
children as those children who otherwise would be with their 
parents or legal guardian outside of the Texas1 but who have 
come into the state to take advantage of its educational 
system. Thus, the Texas statute at issue in this case does not 
prevent children who reside in Texas from being educated, as it 
'--""" ~
did in Plyler. It prevents parents from sending their children 




Because of the difference in state statutes, the 





are absent here. Unlike the class of children in Plyler, the 
children here are not being punished for the sins of their 
~ ----=-- ,,,_,. .___,.,,_, -----
~ arents sj nce any child w~ o c~~a val,id intent to resid~~ 
in Texas will be provided a free public education. Second, ---
1
Texas's statute affects both state students seeking to attend / ~ 
school in districts in which their parents do not reside and 
students who seek to come from out of state to attend school. 
;? 
- - 8. 
these children presumably are not being deprived of an 
education. It would seem that the children have the option to 
stay with their parents and go to school wherever their parents 
live. Thus a parent in Louisiana might decide to send his 
child to school across the border in Texas because the Texas 
school system is better than the one in Louisiana. Denying the 
child the right to come to Texas solely to get an education 
would not deny it the right to be educated. Instead, it would 
require the child to attend school in Louisiana where his 
parents live. Concededly, the school systems in Mexico, where 
I assume most of these children come from, may be markedly 
inferior. But the children who are in Mexico will be entitled 
to whatever educational rights are accorded other children in 
that country. 
Nor does it seem that the children will be penalized 
because their parents will continue to send them to Texas 
regardless of Texas's laws to the contrary. If Texas removes 
the invitation to come into the state by refusing to provide a 
free public education to anyone who is in Texas only for that 
purpose, then it would seem that rational parents either will 
cease sending their children across the border or find some 
reason, other than education, for sending them there. 
B. The Right to Travel 
The right to travel, as it has been interpreted by 
this Court, involves the "right to migrate, 'with intent to 
settle and abide' or, as the [Shapiro] Court put it, 'to 
~ 
- - 9. 
migrate, resettle, find a new job and start a new life.'" 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 2 50, 255 (1974) 
(quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)). 
Shapiro sought to determine whether the right had been 
adbridged by considering whether the state law deterred travel 
or, alternatively, whether the state penalized the exercise of 
the right. In Memorial Hospital, the Court determined that the 
two inquiries were effectively identical. A state deters 
travel by penalizing its exercise. Thus, Memorial Hospital 
found that whenever "a classification ..• 'operates to penalize 
those persons .•• who have exercised their constitutional right 
of interstate migration,' [it] must be justified by a 
compelling state interest." See 415 U.S., at 258 (emphasis in 
original). 
~tJ-/4~ 
There appear, however, to be two limits to this rule. 
------------ c:1. 
~ , because t_b e ri~ ht, as defined and protected by the 
Court, is the right to migrate with intent to settle and abide-
_.,,,. --. - .._.. - __..___,. -- ,,. 
-i.e., the right to travel in order to establish residence in a 
-- ------------------------- - - -
new place--conditioning the receipt of benefits on a showing of 
residency would not appear to penalize the right. The cases 
are consistent with this analysis. In the right to travel 
cases, it has been conceded that the person asserting the right 
is a resident even though he has not satisfied the durational 
residency requirement imposed by the state. See Memorial 
Hospital, supra, at at 252 (state concedes indigent is "bona 
fide resident"): Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (voter 
conceded to be "bona fide resident): Shapiro, supra, at 627 
• 
- - 10. 
(effect of statute is to distinguish between two classes of 
residents, those who have and those who have not met the 
durational residency requirement). Thus, the problem in these 
cases was not that the state had imposed a legitimate residency 
requirement but that it had imposed a durational test of 
residency that prevented otherwise valid residents from 
receiving state benefits. In Memorial Hospital, the Court 
recognized that "our decision [in Shapiro] was not intended to 
'cast doubt on the validity of appropriately defined and 
uniformly applied bona fide residency requirements." 415 U.S., 
at 255. See also McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service 
Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 647 (1976) (per curiam). 
Although the Court clearly has drawn a clear line 
between durational and bona fide residence requirements, the 
reason for drawing this line is unclear. A durational 2~ 
residency requirement is one way, and a valid one, of proving 
intent to reside. The Court, however, may have struck it down 
because it was overbroad. It prohibited people who they were 
actual residents from receiving benefits. In this respect, the 
right to travel cases seem to be the other side of the coin of 
the irrebutable presumption cases that involve residency. See 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). In both cases, the 
state defined residency more broadly than necessary and, in so 
doing, impinged on a person's right to travel. 
Alternatively, the Court may have distinguished 
between the two types of requirements because durational 
residency requirements are particularly invidious ways of 
• 
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determining residency. They preclude a person who seeks to 
travel from receiving any benefits for a set period. Thus, it 
could be argued that these requirements are subject to strict 
scrutiny while other tests for residency, which do not impose 
such an invidious penalty, only have to be "appropriately 
defined and uniformly applied." This seems to be the course 
the Court has taken in such cases as McCarthy, supra. 
The latter course does not seem to be analytically 
consistent. It would seem that all requirements should be 
judged for overbreadth. If strict scrutiny is applied to all 
residency requirements, however, few could survive. It would 
seem that the safer course is to distinguish durational 
residency requirements, as the Court has done previously, and 
apply the lower standard in Memorial Hospital to the remainder-
-thus generally a bona fide residency requirement is one that 
is "appropriately defined and uniformly applied." 
The second limit the Court has placed on the right to 
travel derives from the nature of the benefit that is withheld. -----Memorial Hospital found that the denial of benefits to 
interstate travelers would penalize the right to travel only 
when the benefit withheld affects a "basic necessity of life." 
Thus, it distinguished between imposing a durational residency 
requirement for receiving lower in-state tuition for state 
universities and those affecting "necessities of life," such as 
medical services. See 415 U.S. at 260. It quoted with 
approval Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 
1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971): 
• 
- -
"While we fully recognize the value of higher 
education, we cannot equate its attainment with food, 
clothing and shelter. Shapiro involved the immediate 
and pressing need for preservation of life and health 
of persons unable to live without public assistance, 
and their dependent children. Thus, the residence 
requirement in Shapiro would cause great suffering 
and even loss of life. The durational residence 
requirement for attendance at publicly financed 
institutions of higher learning [does] not involve 
similar risks. Charging higher tuition fees to non-
resident students cannot be equated with granting of 
basic subsistence to one class of needy residents 
while denying it to an equally needy class of 
residents." 
12. 
The first limit Memorial Hospital recognized is 
applicable here. Texas allows all resident children to attend 
school within the district in which they or their parents 
reside. If a child's parent or guardian resides in a district, 
Texas law assumes, as the DC found, that the child resides 
there as well. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B40. Traditionally, 
the parent's residence has been attributed to the child on the 
theory that a minor is incapable of forming the requisite 
intent to reside. When, however, the child lives apart from 
his parents Texas requires him to show that the primary purpose 
for his presence in the school district is not to attend 
school. Thus, the question here is whether this requirement is 
"an appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide 
residency requirement." 
Texas's brief is persuasive in arguing that the 
appropriateness of its definition of residency is established 
by tradition. Texas, as well as other states, traditionally 
has required that a person who comes into a district to receive 
a particular temporary benefit must prove that he is not there 
------------,----~- ------ r 
• 
- -
only for that purpose. It seems an appropriate test of 
~
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residency to say that a person who comes to an area to receive 
a temporary benefit does not intend to reside there. This test 
was noted with approval in Vlandis: 
We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate 
interest in protecting and preserving the quality of 
its colleges and universities and the right of its 
own bona fide residents to attend such institutions 
on a preferential tuition basis •.•. The State can 
establish such reasonable criteria for in-state 
status as to make virtually certain that students who 
are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the State, 
but who have come there solely for educational 
purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-state 
rates." 412 U.S., at 453-454. 
Although Vlandis involved university rather than primary or 
secondary education, this distinction is irrelevant to this 
point. The reason that it is difficult to ascertain a 
university student's residence is that many students will come 
from out of state solely to take advantage of the state's 
university system. Accordingly, it is often difficult to 
determine whether the students are present only to take 
advantage of the state's educational opportunities or because 
they intent to make the state their domicile. See Memorial 
Hospital, supra, at 260 n. 15. This is precisely the situation 
here. Many students are coming into Texas primarily to obtain 
an education. In such circumstances, Texas has articulated a 
legitimate test of residence. This is not to say that in 
deciding whether to move to a state a person may not consider 
the benefits of moving to an area. A person, however, ~ ho 
comes to an area solely to take advantage of a temporary 







move to the state with a 
domicile. 
As to the statute's uniform applicatio~ , there would 
seem to be two issues. First, has the requirement been 
uniformly applied to those people who have sought to establish 
residency under it. The petrs' failure, however, to attack the 
statute as applied means that the Court does not have to reach 
this question. One might note, however, that both the DC and 
the CA found that the statute had been applied lip erally in _______ ...,__ -
favor of children seeking to show intent to reside. The second 
issue is whether the residency requirement is uniformly applied 
in the sense that it is consistent with the state's other 
residency requirements. This is a closer issue primarily 
because of a ~ in Plyler. See __ U.S., at n. 22. 
There the Court noted that Texas admitted at oral argument that 
it would treat a family that moved to Texas with the intent to 
be there only six months as residents. If this representation 
remains true, it means that Texas does not require an intent to 
settle indefinitely to establish residence. Thus, the fact 
that the child was there to attend school for a temporary 
period would not bar him from showing that he was a resident. 
The only saving feature of the Texas requirement is that an 
intent to come to Texas for educational purposes is 
inconsistent with an intent to establish a domicile there, 
albeit only for a temporary period. 
The second limitation that Memorial Hospital 
recognized was that the right to travel was penalized only if a 
~ 
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basic necessity of life was withheld from new residents. Thus, 
the Court distinguished between medical care and university 
education. It is possible to argue that primary and secondary 
education is not a "basic necessity of life" in the sense that 
its deprivation is life threatening. The Court, however, has 
recognized its importance repeatedly. See, e.g., Plyler, 
supra. Accordingly, even if the residency requirement is not 
"appropriately defined and uniformly applied," it would be 
possible (but difficult) to uphold the regulation on the ground 
that the statute did not deprive travelers of a basic 
necessity. 
c. Moore v. City of East Cleveland 
Petrs contend that the challenged statute violates 
Moore because it affects the way a family structures its 
relationships. They argue that this statute penalizes a party 
who does not live with his parents or legal guardian. This 
argument, however, lacks merit. ~ 
First, the petrs did not raise this claim in their 
complaint below. Although they argued that the statute 
violated due process because it created an irrebutable 
presumption, they did not argue that it violated the 
substantive due process right to structure a family. Even 
assuming that the issue is properly raised, the effect of the 
Texas statute is less sweeping than that in Moore. Here, the 
State does not prohibit a family from choosing any type of 
living arrangement. A child does not have to live with his 
~ 
-
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parents, but may live however he and his family choose. The 
only restriction is that if a child lives with people other 
than his parents, and does so for the purpose of attending 
school, then he is prohibited from taking advantage of the free 
public school system. 
This seems to be the type of regulation the Moore 
contemplated that a governmental entity could enact. As 
recognized by the DC, there is a valid state purpose and the 
regulation is aimed as narrowly as possible at achieving that 
purpose. 
D. Irrebutable Presumption 
The petrs claim that the statute creates an 
irrebutable presumption in violation of Vlandis that a person 
who comes into a district for the primary purpose of attending 
school is not a valid state resident. Their argument is that a 
person who comes to attend school may also intend to reside 
there. 
One difficulty with this argument has been discussed 
above. If a person comes to a district solely to attend school -------,------..____________ -
there, then he does not have an intent to reside there in the 
sense that he desires to establish a domicile ther. It could 
be argued that Texas's statute is not phrased in terms of "sole 
purpose." Instead, it speaks of "primary purpose." Thus, 
while a child might come into the state for the primary purpose 
of attending school, he might also have the subsidiary purpose 
of residing. This argument fails, however, in light of the 
- - 17. 
DC's findings. Judge Reynaldo Garza, in denying petrs' motion 
for a preliminary injunction, found that the Texas was 
interpreting this statute as if it referred to the child's sole 
purpose. As Judge Garza stated: ---------
"An analysis of the reports of the school districts 
submitted since the first hearing in this case shows 
that the school boa.f dS of the districts before the 
Court have been more than liberal in finding that 
certain cfi 1ld renar e noe Itv1ng away from parents and 
residing in the school district for the sole purpose 
of attending school. Such analysis shows 
conclusively that children living within the school 
districts with someone other than their parents or 
legal guardians will be admitted to school if~ 
reason exists for such situation other than that of 
attending school only." JA 20A (emphasis in 
original) . 
These findings, which subsequently were adopted by the DC, 
reflect that the Texas School Boards, which are charged with 
determining residency, have interpreted the statute to allow 
children to attend school if any other reason exists for their 
being in the district. Unless the requirement itself is 
invalid, which Vlandis indicates it is not, then this statute 
does not create an irrebutable presumption. 
Conclusion 
1~ 
1. Plyler does not control because the class of children 
defined by this statute does not require the application of 
intermediate scrutiny. This class of children is not punished 
because of their parents' acts. Any child who can show that he 
is a resident of Texas is entitled to an education. Nor does 
the statute prohibit children from receiving an education, as 
- - 18. 
the statute in Plyler did. The choice here is between being 
educated where the child otherwise would be or being educated 
in Texas. 
2. Although the past cases are not entirely consistent on this 
point, the right to travel is not penalized by conditioning the 
receipt of benefits on a residency requirement that is 
"appropriately defined and uniformly applied." Here Texas's 
requirement is one that traditionally has been accepted and 
approved by this Court. Its application is not before the 
Court because of the way the petrs framed their complaint. 
3. The petr's complaint does not raise the question of whether 
Texas's statute burdens their substantive due process right. 
The statute, however, does not burden the exercise of the 
right, serves a legitimate interest and is appropriately 
defined. 
4. As Texas has defined the statute, it is consistent with 
Vlandis. Texas allows a person who can show any other reason 
for being in the school district to attend the public schools. 
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To: Mr. Justice 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 81-857£ 
t I <:4 
Va-~~ 
L. -p ~ ~ ~ ~~ 
a-)':>-~ 
Powell 
2, , ~~ ~&!.<..A-/J~~ 
~ ~'14.P ~r~, 
rt.L~~~~ 
- /t~;-~~~~--
Martinez v. Brockett ~ ~T ~h:!.v{ 
The Virginia Statute is similar J t statute. It 
..., uerc . .-.,,. -
provides that public schools shall be free to each person of school 
age who resides within the school district. When a child lives with 
his parents, he is deemed to reside in the district in which they 
reside. When his parents are dead, the residence of person who is 
in loco parentis governs the child's residence. Alternatively, 
"when the parents of such [child] are unable to care for the [child] 
and the [child] is living, not solely for school purposes, with 
another person who (i) resides in the [school district] and (ii) is 
the court-appointed guardian, or has legal custody" of the child, 
then the residence of the person with whom the child lives is deemed 
the child's residence. Finally, a child, who is emancipated or 
self-supporting, may establish residence in a district so long as he 
does not do so "solely for school purposes." See Va. Code §22.1-3. 
The Virginia statute provides that a limited class of 
people may transfer into a school district on payment of tuition. 
See Va. Code §22.1-5. This class of people includes children who 
reside in states that have established reciprocal exchange programs 
with Virginia. The statute, however, places the decision of whether 
- - 2. 
these children will be admitted to a particular school district and 
whether they will be charged tuition in the discretion of each 
school board. Thus, a child living in the District of Columbia 
could attend the Fairfax schools without paying tuition if a 
reciprocal agreement existed between Virginia and the District, if 
Fairfax had decided to allow such transfers and if Fairfax had 
determined not to charge tuition to any children transferring to its 
schools. 
The Fairfax County School System informed the library that 
it had adopted a regulation that allowed it to request parents to 
give them more information as proof that they reside in the 
district. The research librarians did not ask if Fairfax allowed 
transfers from the District. If you wish, I can have them check on 
this point. 
The Maryland Code does not addresses the question of 
residency. Neither the research librarians nor I could find a 
statutory section dealing with this question. Additionally, petr's 
brief, which includes a survey of the state school residency 
statutes, does not list Maryland. The Maryland statutes do provide 
that with respect to Prince George's County the school district will 
require an affidavit of disclosure • This affidavit should include --- ..... the "legal residence" of the child's parents or guardians and the 
duration of their residency in the state. See Md. Code Ann. §7-102. 
This section does not define legal residence and, according to the 
librarians, the Maryland Code does not include a general definition 
of residence. There are specific definitions of residence for tax 
purposes, where it is defined as domicile, and for voting purposes. 
' 
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The only section of the state code that comes close to 
addressing the issue is §4-120. Under Maryland law, each county 
maintains its own schools. Section 4-120, however, provides that 
two counties may enter into an agreement whereby children in one 
county may attend school in the adjacent county. The sending county 
is required to pay a portion of the expenses incurred by the 
receiving county. 
As I understand from the research librarians, Montgomery 
County stated that it had no written policy with respect to proof of 
residency. According to the County, when the residency of a 
particular child is questioned, they refer the matter to the County 
lawyers who seek to ascertain some proof of residence. The County, 
however, did not specify the test that was used. The research 
librarians also inform me that a search of both Lexis and the State 
Digests reveal that there are no reported cases in Virginia or 
Maryland involving ~chool residency requirements. 
drk 01/25/83 
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Questions Presented 
January 25, 1983 
Texas provides that any child living with his parent, guardian 
or other person having lawful control may receive a free public 
education. If a child does not live with such a person, he 
still may attend public free schools if he establishes that his 
presence in the school district is not for the primary purpose 
of attending such schools. See Tex. Educ. Code. Ann. tit. 2, 
§21.03(d) (Vernon 1978). The petrs contend: 
2. 
1. The state statute violates the right to travel by creating 
a motivational residency requirement; 
2. The Texas Statute creates an irrebutable presumption of 
non-residence found invalid in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 
441 (1973); and 
3. The CA erred in not considering whether less restrictive 
alternatives existed to serve the state's purpose. 
I. Background 
Petrs are United States citizens not living with 
their parents or legal guardians. They have chosen to live in 
a school district for the primary purpose of attending its free 
public schools and were denied tuition free schools on the 
basis of the Texas statute. In the petrs' amended complaint, 
they sought to have the statute declared unconstitutional on 
its face because it burdens the right to travel and because it 
creates an invalid irrebuttable presumption of non-residency in 
violation of due process and equal protection. 
The DC's found that one of the purposes behind the 
statute was "to inhibit the migration of persons residing in 
Mexico to attend schools in the United States." It found 
further that the statute applied to both intrastate and 
interstate transfers. Finally, it adopted Judge Reynaldo 
Garza's findings on the petrs' request for a preliminary 
injunction. He determined that the state had been "liberal" in 
finding that children living with someone other than their 
parents or legal guardians were there for any reason other than 
for the purpose of attending school. The DC upheld the 
regulation in the face of petrs' challenges. 
3. 
The CA affirmed. It rejected the right to travel 
challenge on the ground that the state may impose bona fide 
residency requirements as long as they are not durational. It, 
however, did not rest its holding solely on that ground. 
Instead, it decided that the challenged statute was valid 
whether judged under strict scrutiny or under a rational basis 
test. The state has a legitimate interest in preserving the 
quality of its educational system and the right of its own bona 
fide residents to attend state schools on a preferred tuition 
basis. Further, the statute applies to interdistrict transfers 
within the same county. The state legitimately may seek to 
restrict such transfers in order to plan for each district's 
financial and staffing needs. 
The CA also rejected the appt's argument that the 
statute created an irrebutable presumption. Unlike the statute 
at issue in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the Texas 
statute does not prohibit a person from becoming a resident. 
Instead, the CA found that "by using the definition of 
residency almost universally accepted in school cases, the 
statutory criteria in one sense merely states a truism, namely 
that a person who only intends to remain in a given place 
temporarily in order to take advantage of a particular benefit 
at that location necessarily lacks the permanence to be 
classified as a resident." It noted that Texas's definition is 
in accord with the statement in Vlandis: 
"The state can establish such reasonable criteria for 
in-state status as to make virtually certain that 
students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of 
the State, but who have come there solely for 
educational purposes, cannot take advantage of the 
in-state rates." 412 U.S., at 453-454. 
II. Contentions 
A. Petrs' contentions 
4. 
Petr argues that Texas's statute deprives indigent 
children of the right to an education solely because they come 
to Texas to obtain it. The statute is aimed at preventing 
children, who are U.S. citizens but whose parents do not live 
in Texas, from traveling to Texas to receive an education. 
There is no merit to the state's suggestion that because a 
child may pay tuition or because the person with whom he is 
living may become his legal guardian, there is no burden on the 
right to travel. 
It is impermissible for Texas to burden the right to 
travel by creating a residency requirement that excludes 
immigrants who travel for a particular purpose. Nor may a 
state place special burdens on children who chose to adopt a 
nontraditional family living arrangement. See Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). By penalizing a child for 
living with a family member other than his parents, the state 
intrudes on protected family relationships. 
Finally, the Texas Educational Code creates an 
irrebutable presumption in violation of Vlandis v. Kline, 412 
U.S. 441 (1973). Texas conclusively presumes that a child who 
resides in a city solely to attend its schools is not a 
resident. This denies the child the opportunity to show that 
he intends to remain there and establish a home. 
B. Resp's contentions 
5. 
While a state may not establish durational residency 
requirements that deny an immigrant an important state 
privilege, the state may establish bona fide residency 
requirements. The requirement established by Texas is one that 
has been sanctioned by tradition. Most states have imposed 
such a requirement and the courts have been consistent in 
upholding its validity. Because this requirement has been a 
feature of Texas common law prior to the statute's enactment, 
there is no reason to believe that the Texas legislature acted 
with impermissible motives in passing this requirement. 
The statute does not affect a family's living 
arrangements. A family may structure its living arrangements 
in any way it desires. As long as the child is not living 
apart from its parents or guardian solely to attend school, 
there is no penalty on the family's decision. 
Accordingly, Texas's law should be judged under the 
rational relationship test. The purpose of the system is to 
assure a reasonable nexus between the the children and the 
school district. This promotes local responsibility and 
participation in the schools and ensures that the local voters 
will pass bills to promote the quality of the school program. 
Absent a residency requirement, families, who live in urban 
districts that have a large minority population, could evade 
6. 
desegregation efforts by sending their children across district 
lines to the more predominantly nonminority suburban schools. 
Further, the statute cuts down on athletic recruiting at the 
high school level and aids the state in planning its program 
and budgetary needs. 
III. Discussion 
Because petr's amended complaint failed to challenge 
the statute as applied, one issue is not raised here. The 
question of whether the statute has been applied impermissibly 
on the basis of national origin is absent. This case, however, 
does raise several issues that the previous cases have not 
addressed. Resolution of these issues requires consideration 
of the decision last term in Plyler v. Doe, __ U.S. __ (1982), 
the right to travel cases dealing with residency requirements 
for higher education, and the line of cases on irrebutable 
presumptions. 
A. Plyler v. Doe 
In Plyler, the State of Texas sought to exclude from 
its public school system illegal aliens who were residents of 
the State. The Court found that an intermediate level of 
scrutiny was appropriate for two reasons. First, the children 
were being denied access to a basic necessity, secondary 
education. Second, they were being denied this right because 
of the status of their parents, who were in the country 
illegally. The Court found that distinguishing between those 
children legally in the country and those here illegally was 
not substantially related to the State's asserted goals. 
7. 
Because the class of children defined by this statute 
differs from that in Plyler, Plyler does not require 
application of an intermediate level of scrutiny here. In 
Plyler, the statute distinguished between two classes of Texas 
residents. Those who were illegal and those who were not. The 
effect of the statute was to deny a class of illegal, resident 
children an education. The statute here defines the class of 
children as those children who otherwise would be with their 
parents or legal guardian outside of the Texas1 but who have 
come into the state to take advantage of its educational 
system. Thus, the Texas statute at issue in this case does not 
prevent children who reside in Texas from being educated, as it 
did in Plyler. It prevents parents from sending their children 
into Texas solely to take advantage of the educational 
opportunities there. 
Because of the difference in state statutes, the 
reasons for invoking a heightened level of scrutiny in Plyler 
are absent here. Unlike the class of children in Plyler, the 
children here are not being punished for the sins of their 
parents since any child who can show a valid intent to reside 
in Texas will be provided a free public education. Second, 
these children presumably are not being deprived of an 
education. It would seem that the children have the option to 
stay with their parents and go to school wherever their parents 
live. Thus a parent in Louisiana might decide to send his 
8. 
child to school across the border in Texas because the Texas 
school system is better than the one in Louisiana. Denying the 
child the right to come to Texas solely to get an education 
would not deny it the right to be educated. Instead, it would 
require the child to attend school in Louisiana where his 
parents live. Concededly, the school systems in Mexico, where 
I assume most of these children come from, may be markedly 
inferior. But the children who are in Mexico will be entitled 
to whatever educational rights are accorded other children in 
that country. 
Nor does it seem that the children will be penalized 
because their parents will continue to send them to Texas 
regardless of Texas's laws to the contrary. If Texas removes 
the invitation to come into the state by refusing to provide a 
free public education to anyone who is in Texas only for that 
purpose, then it would seem that rational parents either will 
cease sending their children across the border or find some 
reason, other than education, for sending them there. 
B. The Right to Travel 
The right to travel, as it has been interpreted by 
this Court, involves the "right to migrate, 'with intent to 
settle and abide' or, as the [Shapiro] Court put it, 'to 
migrate, resettle, find a new job and start a new life.'" 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974) 
(quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)). 
Shapiro sought to determine whether the right had been 
9. 
adbridged by considering whether the state law deterred travel 
or, alternatively, whether the state penalized the exercise of 
the right. In Memorial Hospital, the Court determined that the 
two inquiries were effectively identical. A state deters 
travel by penalizing its exercise. Thus, Memorial Hospital 
found that whenever "a classification ••. 'operates to penalize 
those persons •.. who have exercised their constitutional right 
of interstate migration,' [it] must be justified by a 
compelling state interest." See 415 U.S., at 258 (emphasis in 
original). 
There appear, however, to be two limits to this rule. 
First, because the right, as defined and protected by the 
Court, is the right to migrate with intent to settle and abide-
-i.e., the right to travel in order to establish residence in a 
new place--conditioning the receipt of benefits on a showing of 
residency would not appear to penalize the right. The cases 
are consistent with this analysis. In the right to travel 
cases, it has been conceded that the person asserting the right 
is a resident even though he has not satisfied the durational 
residency requirement imposed by the state. See Memorial 
Hospital, supra, at at 252 (state concedes indigent is "bona 
fide resident"); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (voter 
conceded to be "bona fide resident); Shapiro, supra, at 627 
(effect of statute is to distinguish between two classes of 
residents, those who have and those who have not met the 
durational residency requirement). Thus, the problem in these 
cases was not that the state had imposed a legitimate residency 
10. 
requirement but that it had imposed a durational test of 
residency that prevented otherwise valid residents from 
receiving state benefits. In Memorial Hospital, the Court 
recognized that "our decision [in Shapiro] was not intended to 
'cast doubt on the validity of appropriately defined and 
uniformly applied bona fide residency requirements." 415 U.S., 
at 255. See also McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service 
Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 647 (1976) (per curiam}. 
Although the Court clearly has drawn a clear line 
between durational and bona fide residence requirements, the 
reason for drawing this line is unclear. A durational 
residency requirement is one way, and a valid one, of proving 
intent to reside. The Court, however, may have struck it down 
because it was overbroad. It prohibited people who they were 
actual residents from receiving benefits. In this respect, the 
right to travel cases seem to be the other side of the coin of 
the irrebutable presumption cases that involve residency. See 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). In both cases, the 
state defined residency more broadly than necessary and, in so 
doing, impinged on a person's right to travel. 
Alternatively, the Court may have distinguished 
between the two types of requirements because durational 
residency requirements are particularly invidious ways of 
determining residency. They preclude a person who seeks to 
travel from receiving any benefits for a set period. Thus, it 
could be argued that these requirements are subject to strict 
scrutiny while other tests for residency, which do not impose 
such an invidious penalty, only have to be "appropriately 
defined and uniformly applied." This seems to be the course 
the Court has taken in such cases as McCarthy, supra. 
11. 
The latter course does not seem to be analytically 
consistent. It would seem that all requirements should be 
judged for overbreadth. If strict scrutiny is applied to all 
residency requirements, however, few could survive. It would 
seem that the safer course is to distinguish durational 
residency requirements, as the Court has done previously, and 
apply the lower standard in Memorial Hospital to the remainder-
-thus generally a bona fide residency requirement is one that 
is "appropriately defined and uniformly applied." 
The second limit the Court has placed on the right to 
travel derives from the nature of the benefit that is withheld. 
Memorial Hospital found that the denial of benefits to 
interstate travelers would penalize the right to travel only 
when the benefit withheld affects a "basic necessity of life." 
Thus, it distinguished between imposing a durational residency 
requirement for receiving lower in-state tuition for state 
universities and those affecting "necessities of life," such as 
medical services. See 415 U.S. at 260. It quoted with 
approval Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 
1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971): 
"While we fully recognize the value of higher 
education, we cannot equate its attainment with food, 
clothing and shelter. Shapiro involved the immediate 
and pressing need for preservation of life and health 
of persons unable to live without public assistance, 
and their dependent children. Thus, the residence 
requirement in Shapiro would cause great suffering 
and even loss of life. The durational residence 
requirement for attendance at publicly financed 
institutions of higher learning [does] not involve 
similar risks. Charging higher tuition fees to non-
resident students cannot be equated with granting of 
basic subsistence to one class of needy residents 
while denying it to an equally needy class of 
residents." 
12. 
The first limit Memorial Hospital recognized is 
applicable here. Texas allows all resident children to attend 
school within the district in which they or their parents 
reside. If a child's parent or guardian resides in a district, 
Texas law assumes, as the DC found, that the child resides 
there as well. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B40. Traditionally, 
the parent's residence has been attributed to the child on the 
theory that a minor is incapable of forming the requisite 
intent to reside. When, however, the child lives apart from 
his parents Texas requires him to show that the primary purpose 
for his presence in the school district is not to attend 
school. Thus~ the question here is whether this requirement is 
"an appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide 
residency requirement." 
Texas's brief is persuasive in arguing that the 
appropriateness of its definition of residency is established 
by tradition. Texas, as well as other states, traditionally 
has required that a person who comes into a district to receive 
a particular temporary benefit must prove that he is not there 
only for that purpose. It seems an appropriate test of 
residency to say that a person who comes to an area to receive 
a temporary benefit does not intend to reside there. This test 
was noted with approval in Vlandis: 
We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate 
interest in protecting and preserving the quality of 
its colleges and universities and the right of its 
own bona fide residents to attend such institutions 
on a preferential tuition basis ..•. The State can 
establish such reasonable criteria for in-state 
status as to make virtually certain that students who 
are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the State, 
but who have come there solely for educational 
purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-state 
rates." 412 U.S., at 453-454. 
13. 
Although Vlandis involved university rather than primary or 
secondary education, this distinction is irrelevant to this 
point. The reason that it is difficult to ascertain a 
university student's residence is that many students will come 
from out of state solely to take advantage of the state's 
university system. Accordingly, it is often difficult to 
determine whether the students are present only to take 
advantage of the state's educational opportunities or because 
they intent to make the state their domicile. See Memorial 
Hospital, supra, at 260 n. 15. This is precisely the situation 
here. Many students are coming into Texas primarily to obtain 
an education. In such circumstances, Texas has articulated a 
legitimate test of residence. This is not to say that in 
deciding whether to move to a state a person may not consider 
the benefits of moving to an area. A person, however, who 
comes to an area solely to take advantage of a temporary 
benefit lacks the requisite intent to become a resident--to 
move to the state with an intent to settle and make it his 
domicile. 
As to the statute's uniform application, there would 
seem to be two issues. First, has the requirement been 
14. 
uniformly applied to those people who have sought to establish 
residency under it. The petrs' failure, however, to attack the 
statute as applied means that the Court does not have to reach 
this question. One might note, however, that both the DC and 
the CA found that the statute had been applied liberally in 
favor of children seeking to show intent to reside. The second 
issue is whether the residency requirement is uniformly applied 
in the sense that it is consistent with the state's other 
residency requirements. This is a closer issue primarily 
because of a footnote in Plyler. See __ U.S., at __ n. 22. 
There the Court noted that Texas admitted at oral argument that 
it would treat a family that moved to Texas with the intent to 
be there only six months as residents. If this representation 
remains true, it means that Texas does not require an intent to 
settle indefinitely to establish residence. Thus, the fact 
that the child was there to attend school for a temporary 
period would not bar him from showing that he was a resident. 
The only saving feature of the Texas requirement is that an 
intent to come to Texas for educational purposes is 
inconsistent with an intent to establish a domicile there, 
albeit only for a temporary period. 
The second limitation that Memorial Hospital 
recognized was that the right to travel was penalized only if a 
basic necessity of life was withheld from new residents. Thus, 
the Court distinguished between medical care and university 
education. It is possible to argue that primary and secondary 
education is not a "basic necessity of life" in the sense that 
15. 
its deprivation is life threatening. The Court, however, has 
recognized its importance repeatedly. See, e.g., Plyler, 
supra. Accordingly, even if the residency requirement is not 
"appropriately defined and uniformly applied," it would be 
possible (but difficult) to uphold the regulation on the ground 
that the statute did not deprive travelers of a basic 
necessity. 
C. Moore v. City of East Cleveland 
Petrs contend that the challenged statute violates 
Moore because it affects the way a family structures its 
relationships. They argue that this statute penalizes a party 
who does not live with his parents or legal guardian. This 
argument, however, lacks merit. 
First, the petrs did not raise this claim in their 
complaint below. Although they argued that the statute 
violated due process because it created an irrebutable 
presumption, they did not argue that it violated the 
substantive due process right to structure a family. Even 
assuming that the issue is properly raised, the effect of the 
Texas statute is less sweeping than that in Moore. Here, the 
State does not prohibit a family from choosing any type of 
living arrangement. A child does not have to live with his 
parents, but may live however he and his family choose. The 
only restriction is that if a child lives with people other 
than his parents, and does so for the purpose of attending 
16. 
school, then he is prohibited from taking advantage of the free 
public school system. 
This seems to be the type of regulation the Moore 
contemplated that a governmental entity could enact. As 
recognized by the DC, there is a valid state purpose and the 
regulation is aimed as narrowly as possible at achieving that 
purpose. 
D. Irrebutable Presumption 
The petrs claim that the statute creates an 
irrebutable presumption in violation of Vlandis that a person 
who comes into a district for the primary purpose of attending 
school is not a valid state resident. Their argument is that a 
person who comes to attend school may also intend to reside 
there. 
One difficulty with this argument has been discussed 
above. If a person comes to a district solely to attend school 
there, then he does not have an intent to reside there in the 
sense that he desires to establish a domicile ther. It could 
be argued that Texas's statute is not phrased in terms of "sole 
purpose." Instead, it speaks of "primary purpose." Thus, 
while a child might come into the state for the primary purpose 
of attending school, he might also have the subsidiary purpose 
of residing. This argument fails, however, in light of the 
DC's findings. Judge Reynaldo Garza, in denying petrs' motion 
for a preliminary injunction, found that the Texas was 
17. 
interpreting this statute as if it referred to the child's sole 
purpose. As Judge Garza stated: 
"An analysis of the reports of the school districts 
submitted since the first hearing in this case shows 
that the school boards of the districts before the 
Court have been more than liberal in finding that 
certain children are not living away from parents and 
residing in the school district for the sole purpose 
of attending school. Such analysis shows 
conclusively that children living within the school 
districts with someone other than their parents or 
legal guardians will be admitted to school if~ 
reason exists for such situation other than that of 
attending school only." JA 20A (emphasis in 
original). 
These findings, which subsequently were adopted by the DC, 
reflect that the Texas School Boards, which are charged with 
determining residency, have interpreted the statute to allow 
children to attend school if any other reason exists for their 
being in the district. Unless the requirement itself is 
invalid, which Vlandis indicates it is not, then this statute 
does not create an irrebutable presumption. 
Conclusion 
1. Plyler does not control because the class of children 
defined by this statute does not require the application of 
intermediate scrutiny. This class of children is not punished 
because of their parents' acts. Any child who can show that he 
is a resident of Texas is entitled to an education. Nor does 
the statute prohibit children from receiving an education, as 
the statute in Plyler did. The choice here is between being 
18. 
educated where the child otherwise would be or being educated 
in Texas. 
2. Although the past cases are not entirely consistent on this 
point, the right to travel is not penalized by conditioning the 
receipt of benefits on a residency requirement that is 
"appropriately defined and uniformly applied." Here Texas's 
requirement is one that traditionally has been accepted and 
approved by this Court. Its application is not before the 
Court because of the way the petrs framed their complaint. 
3. The petr's complaint does not raise the question of whether 
Texas's statute burdens their substantive due process right. 
The statute, however, does not burden the exercise of the 
right, serves a legitimate interest and is appropriately 
defined. 
4. As Texas has defined the statute, it is consistent with 
Vlandis. Texas allows a person who can show any other reason 
for being in the school district to attend the public schools. 
----------- -
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Cases relevant to Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (WJB) (one year 
durational residence requirement before eligible for public as-
sistance program). 
627: "residents who have resided less than a year" in the 
case "met the test for residence in their jurisdictions, 
as well as all other eligibility requirements except the 
requirement of residence for a full year prior to their 
applications." 
631-632: rejects argument that requirement 
state attempt to discourage those 
enter the State solely to obtain 
is "a permissible 





State may not exclude those indigents who seek higher 
benefits. 
"The residence requirement and the one-year waiting-
period requirement are distinct and independent prereq-
uisites for assistance II 
Relevant in determining if applicant is resident is "the 
statement of an applicant that he intends to remain in 
the jurisdiction." 
"We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or 
residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, 
eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a li-
cense to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so 
forth." 
• 
Martinez v. Bynum cases page 2 . 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (TM) (con't) 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (TM) (one year durational 
residence requirement in State, three months in county, before 
eligible to vote). 
334: "The subject of this lawsuit is the durational resi-
n. 4: 
n. 7: 
dence requirement. Appellee does not challenge Tennes-
see's power to restrict the vote to bona fide Tennessee 
residents. Nor has Tennessee ever disputed that appel-
lee was a bona fide resident of the State .... But Ten-
nessee insists that, in addition to being a resident, a 
would-be voter must have been a resident for a year in 
the State and three months in the county. It is this 
additional durational residence requirement that appel-
lee challenges." 
"[T]he court below specifically noted that Blumstein had 
no intention of leaving Nashville and was a bona fide 
resident of Tennessee." 
Accepts holding of Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 
(1904), that State may require a person "to make a 
'declaration of his intention to become a citizen before 
he can have the right to be registered as a voter and to 
vote in the State.' Id., at 634. In other words, the 
case simply stands for the proposition that a State may 
require voters to be bona fide residents." 
338: "Tennessee's durational residence laws classify bona 
fide residents fl 
338: "[DJ urational residence laws single out [a] class of 
bona fide state and county residents .... " 
~ 
Martinez v. Bynum cases page 3. 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (TM) (con't) 
343: "We emphasize again the difference between bona fide 
residence requirements and durational residence require-
ments •.•. States have the power to require that voters 




"In order to meet the durational residence requirement, 
one must, by definition, first establish that he is a 
resident. A durational residence requirement is a 
waiting period after residence is established." 
"Tennessee's basic test for bona fide residence is (1) 
an intention to stay indefinitely in a place ... joined 
with (2) some objective indication consistent with that 
intent .... " 
351: "The State's legitimate purpose is to determine whether 
certain persons in the community are bona fide resi-
dents." 
352: "it has always been undisputed that appellee Blumstein 
is himself a bona fide resident of Tennessee within the 
ordinary state definition of residence." 
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
(L.FP) (financing of public elementary and secondary schools in 
Texas) 
35: despite importance of education, it is not a fundamental 
right. 
48: recognizes "the vital element of local particpation" 
49: recognizes "[t]he merit of local control" 
' 
Martinez v. Bynum cases page 4. 
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (con't) 
55: recognizes "the benefits of local particpation" 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (PS) (L.FP joined) (resi-




"each appellee was a bona fide resident of Connecticut" 
"The appellees do not challenge .•. the option of the 
State to classify students as resident and nonresident 
students, thereby obligating nonresident students to pay 
higher tuition and fees than do bona fide residents. 
The State's right to make such a classification is un-
questioned here." 
"Statutes creating permanent ir rebut table presumptions 
have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses 
" 
452: recognition of State's right "to prevent abuse of the 
lower, in-state rates by students who come to Connecti-
cut solely to obtain an education." 
452: "Our holding today should in no wise be taken to mean 
that Connecticut must classify the students in its uni-
versity system as residents, for purposes of tuition and 
fees, just because they go to school there." 
452-453: "We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate inter-
est in protecting and preserving the quality of its col-
leges and universities and the right of its own bona 
fide residents to attend such institutions on a prefer-
ential tuition basis." 
Martinez v. Bynum cases page 5. 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (PS) (con't) 
453-454: "The State can establish such reasonable criteria for 
in-state status as to make virtually certain that stu-
dents who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the 
State, but who come there solely for educational pur-
poses, cannot take advantage of the in-state rates." 
454: Recognizes domicile test as reasonable: "' In general, 
the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and 
permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place 
to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of 
returning.... [R] elev ant er i ter ia include year-round 
residence, voter registration, place of filing tax re-
turns, property ownership, driver's license, car regis-
tration, marital status, vacation employment, etc.'" 
(quoting Conn. A-G opinion) 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) {TM) 
{L.FP joined) (one year durational residence requirement before 
eligible for public medical assistance). 
252: "Appellees do not dispute that Evaro ... is a bona fide 
resident of Maricopa County." 
255: implies validity of bona fide residence requirements 
267: "The Arizona State welfare agency applies criteria other 
than the duration of residency to determine whether an 
applicant is a bona fide resident." 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (CJ) {L.FP joined) 
(multi-district desegragation plan). 
Martinez v. Bynum cases page 6. 
Mi 11 i ken v • Br ad 1 e y , 418 U. S • 7 1 7 ( 19 7 4 ) ( CJ ) (con ' t ) 
741-742: "No single tradition in public education is more deeply 
rooted than local control over the operation of schools; 
local autonomy has long been thought essential both to 
the maintenance of community concern and support for 
public schools and to quality of the educational proc-
ess.... [L) ocal control over the educational process 
affords citizens an opportunity to participate in 
decis ionmak ing, permits the structuring of school pro-
grams to fit local needs, and encourages 
'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition 
for educational excellence.'" (quoting San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 
(1973)) 
McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 
( 19 76) (per cur iam) (LFP joined) ( summary af f irmance of bona fide 
continuing residence requirement). 
646: Court has not questioned "the validity of a condition 
placed upon municipal employment that a person be a res-
ident at the time of his application." 
647: There is a distinction "between a requirement of con-
tinuing residency and a requirement of prior residency 
of a given duration." A "bona fide continuing residence 
requirement" is permissible. 
Plyler v. Doe, 102 S.Ct. ?.382 (1982) (WJB) (LFP joined & con-
curred) (free public education for illegal alien children). 
\ 
Martinez v. Bynum cases page 7. 
Plyler v. Doe, 102 s.ct. 2382 (1982) (WJB) (con't) 
2397: "Public education is not a 'right' granted to individ-
uals by the Constitution." (citing San Antonio Indep. 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)) 
2398: 
n. 22: 
Costs of §21.031 so high that it cannot be considered 
rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the 
State. 
Court rejects School District's attempt to uphold alien-
age classification "as simply a test of residence." Ar-
gument was really that illegal entry prevents a person 
from becoming a resident. "Appellants have not shown 
that the families of undocumented children do not comply 
with the established standards by which the State his-
torically tests residence. ... The counties of the 
State are as free to apply to undocumented children es-
tablished criteria for determining residence as they are 
to apply those er i ter ia to any other child who seeks 
admission." 
Plyler v. Doe, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (LFP concurring). 




But not strict scrutiny. 
"Of course a school district may require that illegal 
alien children, like any other children, actually reside 
in the school district before admitting them to the 
schools. A requirement of de facto residency, uniformly 
\ 
Martinez v. Bynum cases page 8. 
Plyler v. Doe, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (LFP concurring) (con't) 





TO: Mike DATE: March 14, 198 3 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-857 Martinez v. Bynum 
Your draft opinion of 3/11 is excellent, and 
meets the points I raised with respect to the first rough 
draft. On the basis of rereading the opinions below, and 
checking the arguments of the parties, I do have some 
suggestions - none of which affects the basic structure or 
analysis of our opinion. I list the following in no 
particular order, and with the thought that - certainly 
for the most part - the additional points can be added in 
footnotes. 
1. As noted on p. 4, plaintiffs rely on the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. They rely 
primarily on the durational residency requi r ement cases 
(Shapiro, et al) for their equal protection argument, and 
on Vlandis for their due process contention. Our draft 
opinion demonstrates persuasively that none of these 
authorities supports plaintiff's position. 
But the draft does not use equal protection 
analysis, except incidentally to discussing these cases. 
- - 2. 
As noted by CAS (A21), the attack is on the "clasification 
[of] minor school children living apart from their 
parents, guardian or other person having custody under 
court order". Perhaps we should say this explicitly, say 
that in the absence of a fundamental right the rational 
basis standard applies, and that under any definition of 
that standard the state interest here is substantial and 
the classification is reasonably related to it. 
2. We say a couple of times that the state 
interest is substantial, but never say why except to the 
extent we quote from Vlandis and other cases. I know from 
my own experience (19 years in public education in 
Virginia at both the state and local levels) that absent 
residence requirements, the DC in this case is right in 
its finding: 
"Fluctuating school populations would make it 
impossie to predict enrollment figures - even on 
a semester-by-semester basis, causing over or 
underestimates on teahers, supplies, etc." 
And that "increased enrollment of students [could] cause 
overcrowding classrooms", affect teacher/pupil ratios, 
etc. See D.C. opinion, p. 13. I think we might quote 
some of the DC's findings in a note. They were accepted 
by CAS. In addition to these administrative problems, in 
- - 3. 
most cases of students moving into a district when their 
parents reside outside, bona fide residents of the 
district bear the tax burden. In this case, the children 
were living with custodians. 
A minor point: On p. 11 the draft starts the 
new paragraph with a statement that the state's interest 
is substantial. The last sentence on page 12 repeats the 
substance of this. At one of these points, you could 
expand the statement generally and buttress it in a note. 
3. I think the Due Process Clause argument (a 
secondary one) is adequately disposed of by what we say 
about Vlandis. 
4. Al though not necessary to our basis 
analysis, I would 1 i ke to add in a footnote that the 
courts below construed the Texas statute as applying on 
its face to children living anywhere in Texas, and indeed 
to transfers within different school districts (even 
within the same county), as well as to interstate or 
international transfers. See Appendix A, p. 8. I would 
not use this finding in the way that could be read as 
saying it was necessary to our decision. Rather, it can 
be added as a footnote, possibly to n. 8 on p. 13. It 
could follow the last sentence in the first full paragraph 
-
of n. 8: 
the Texas 
- 4. 
for example, "indeed, the courts below construed 
statute as applying even to interdistrict 
transfers of students within the state." {Cite the courts 
below, both DC and CA5). Incidentally, Mike, if the 
decisions below have been published, we should cite to the 
published reports rather than the appendix. 
5. When speaking of the necessity of "intent" 
to establish a permanent residence, I do not think we say 
enough to make clear that a minor is presumed to lack the 
capacity to make a domiciliary intent {see Texas cases to 
this ef feet at A, p. 25), and therefore the burden of 
showing this falls upon parents, guardians or perhaps 
custodians. 
6. I have not checked back to see how long 
§21. 031 has been in the Texas Code in substantially its 
present form. If this appears from the opinions below or 
in the AG's brief {and not contested by petitioners), it 
might be desirable to include in fn. 2, p. 2,3. 
* * * 
Mike: 
Although this memo is a bit longwinded, none of 
the points made will require substantial writing. Though 
- - 5. 
not really necessary to opinion, I do think they will 
"round it out", and evidence the fact that we have not 
overlooked anything of consequence. 
L • .F.P., Jr. 
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Dear Lewis: 
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
March 22, 1983 
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Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WM • ..J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
/ 
March 22, 1983 
Re: No. 81-857, Martinez v. Bynum 
Dear Lewis: 
As you may recall, I voted at conference to DIG this case. 
I am impressed with your opinion, however, and would like to 
suggest a few changes that might tip me toward joining you. 
? 
c)rn note 10, you point out that the plaintiffs mounted only a 
facial challenge to the statute and that we need not decide 
whether the statute has been applied uniformly. I agree, but I 
have two suggestions. First, couldn't you eliminate the last 
sentence of the first paragraph? I don't think we should be seen 
as passing in any way on this sort of challenge. I also question 
whether findings at a preliminary injunction stage are 
sufficiently reliable to support your conclusio~ econd, I 
would very much hope that we not be seen as passing on the 
constitutionality of the statute as applied to United States 
citizen children of alien, nonresident parents. Doesn't the 
procedural posture of the case preclude us from reaching that 
issue? And shouldn't we point that out? A sentence or two at the 
end of the first paragraph of note 10 might do this. For me, at 
least, a challenge to the statute as applied to United States 
citizen children of alien, nonresident parents raises far ~ ~ 
~ 
different and more difficult questions than a facial challenge  
~~ 
. .) - -2- -
and it might result in a different conclusion regarding the 
constitutionality of the statute. 
In the second full sentence on page 11, you state that "at 
the very least, a school district generally would be justified in 
requiring school-age children or their parents to satisfy the 
traditional, basic residence criteria -- i.e., to live in the 
district with the intention of remaining there indefinitely --
before it treated them as residents." Couldn't this sentence be 
dropped? First, it is clear from the rest of your opinion that 
we need not decide this issue. As you point out, the Texas 
statute is more generous than the traditional standard. Second, 
I have grave doubts whether a school district could 
constitutionally impose the traditional standard. Under the 
traditional standard, would not the children of a family that is 
transferred to a certain state to work, with the knowledge that 
there will be another transfer within six months or a year, be ~ 
unable to attend the public schools without paying tuition? To 




clerks would not be able to attend the public schools-;ithout :::,,~ 
paying tuition while the clerk was working for a year for a judge ~ 
in another circuit. In short, it seems to me that use of the 
traditional "residency" test raises some serious problems that we 
need not address or anticipate. Therefore, I would suggest 
eliminating the sentence altogether and simply adding "In any 
event," to the beginning of the first sentence of the first full 
paragraph on page 11. This change also would have to be 
reflected in the last sentence of the first paragraph on page 12 
• r- . _,, - -3- -
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March 23, 1983 
Re: 81-857 - Martinez v. Bynum 
Dear Lewis: 
In footnote 10 on page 9 you state that parents or 
guardians could not satisfy the Texas residence 
requirement "if the sole purpose of their presence in 
the district was to enable their child to attend the 
public free schools." I wonder if this is correct. I 
was under the impression that the motivational test 
applied only to minors who were living apart from their 
parents or guardians. Even if parents with children 
have moved to a particular community solely because it 
has an excellent school system, the state apparently 
assumes that they are "residents" as long as they are 
present in the district. See Reply of Respondents to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari 16 (if mother moved to 
state to take advantage of better educational 
facilities and "presented her child to the School 
Districts in this case or any school district in Texas 
for education, it would be admitted into school 
tuition-free"); Brief for Respondents 22 ("Children are 
much more susceptible to district hopping than entire 
families and their presence in a district without their 
parent or guardian gives rise to good faith doubts of 
the bona fides of their residence"); id., at 30 ("It is 
clearly rational to distinguish between children who 
reside with their parents or guardians and children who 
do not.") Moreover, I see no reason why a family that 
has moved to take advantage of a district's schools ~ 
cannot satisfy the traditional criteria for residence--
physical presence and intent to remain indefinitely. 
Maybe I am missing something. Even if there is a 
difference in the treatment of children living apart 
from their parents, however, I am not persuaded that 
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Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 
-
/ 
Attached are proposed changes in response to JUSTICE 
BRENNAN' s letter. I do not think you should make all of the 
changes he has requested, but I think these proposals should be 
acceptable to both of you. 
BRENNAN join us on this one. 
It would be good to have JUSTICE 
(1) The Textual Change. On pp. 2-3 of his letter, JUS-
TICE BRENNAN proposes a textual change to avoid the suggestion 
that a State could deny an education to the child of a person 
temporarily transferred to a jurisdiction. I see how the first 
draft could be read to make such a suggestion, and I agree with 
JUSTICE BRENNAN that the Court should not make it. But I do not / 9 
think we need to weaken the language to the extent that JUSTICE I~ 
BRENNAN proposes. Accordingly I attach a revision that preserves 
the concept of a constitutional minimum that has not been 
reached, but that should satisfy JUSTICE BRENNAN's legitimate 
concern. In the first draft, we specify what a State may do. In 
the attached proposal, I do not specify what the limits are, but 
it should be clear from the opinion as a whole (even from the 
next sentence) that they are based on the traditional criteria. 
- - 2. 
(2) The Footnote Change. On page 1 of his letter~ JUS-
TICE BRENNAN requests us to revise the first paragraph of foot-
note 10. To a certain extent, I think he identifies a legitimate 
problem. There are two "as applied" challenges that could be 
made here. First, someone could argue that the school officials 
did not uniformly apply §21.03l(d), perhaps discriminating 
against blacks. Second, someone could argue that the statute may 
not be applied validly to United States citizens who are children 
of Mexican residents, although it may be applied validly to chil-
dren of residents of other Texas school districts. The current 
draft dismisses the first argument but not the second. My pro-
posed change would apply to both types of argument. 
The new paragraph would simply say that there is no need 
to decide if §21.03l(d) is unconstitutional as applied, since 
this is a facial challenge. I do not identify or discuss the 
second type of argument, since I think it is unnecessary to "run 
up a red flag" for future litigants. If JUSTICE MARSHALL dis-
sents (I understand this is a real possibility), he might run up 
that flag. There is no reason for the majority to do so. And to 
maintain the balance, I also do not identify or discuss the first 
type of argument. But I include a cross reference to the point 
in the opinion at which we discuss the amended complaint (which 
limited the case to a facial challenge). This is the same place 
at which we discuss the DC's preliminary injunction findings, so 
I do not think the opinion loses anything (except length) from 
deleting an explicit reiteration of the findings in note 10. 
'}lb 
- - 3. 
This is well short of what JUSTICE BRENNAN requested, 
but it may be enough to satisfy him. It does give him something 
on each of his concerns. In any event, I think it is probably 
more principled to treat equally both of the "as applied" argu-
ments that are not before the Court. 
,~,,,,. 
March 25, 1983 
RIDERA GINA-POW 
NOTE X, p. 
81-857 Martinez 
Note to Mike: 
To meet WJB's concern about families that move to a 
district knowing they have to leave at some specified 
time, it may be desirable to add a note at some 
appropriate place along the following lines: 
Of course, the "intention to remain" component of the 
traditional residency standard does not imply an intention 
never to leave. Given the mobility of persons and 
families in this country, moving ones place of residence 
,/ ~✓ 
2. 
is commonplace. The standard focuses on present bona fide 
intention. This standard also would accommodate the 
familiar situation where a family moves its residence into 
a school district for a finite period of time prescribed 
without respect to school attendance. For example, a 
member of the armed services may be assigned to a 
particular location for special training or to attend a 
military school with the knowledge that at the end of the 
period he would return to a prior or different location. 
In such a situation, there would be a bona fide present 
intention to remain in the dist r ict for that period. 
\ 
M 
lfp/ss 03/25/83 DRAFT 
TL;._~ 
d~~ 
MARTB SALLY-POW p--~ 
81-857 Martinez v. Bynum 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for your personal letter, and I am 
making some changes that I hope will allay your concerns. 
On page 9 of my second draft, I will rewrite the first 
paragraph in footnote 10 to read to read as follows: 
"We need not decide whether §21.03l(d) is 
unconstitutional as applied, for the plaintiffs 
limited their complaint to a facial challenge of 
this statute. See supra, at n. 3." 
This should leave open an as applied challenge 
which, I take it, is your primary concern. 
I also am adding a footnote to make clear - as 
you point out - that a family can move to a district for a 
2. 
finite period of time and for that period be bona fide 
residents: 
(here copy the note) 
You suggest that where the child is a United 
States citizen of alien, nonresident parents, the 
traditional residency requirement may not be valid. I 
would find it difficult to draw this type of distinction. 
Your concern is that the alien, nonresident parents could 
not lawfully move into the district. But, as in this 
case, the child may do so, and the statute provides for 
the qualification of a guardian. This is a simple matter, 
and even if a relative is not available, a court has no 
problem in appointing one. 
I do not think alien, nonresident parents would 
be any more disadvantaged by their inability to move into 
3. 
the district than a widowed parent who because of some 
disability was institutionalized and could not move. 
t-breover, the guardian of an orphaned child may have 
legitimate reasons {e.g., employment) for not wishing to 
leave the state in which she resides, and yet - also for 
such reasons - may wish to have the child move to a school 
district in another state. A guardian could be appointed 
there and satisfy the statute. 
If we indicated a different standard where the 
child's parents or guardian are not able themselves to 
move into the district, an unnecessary degree of 
uncertainty - and probably litigation - would result. 
As a personal note, I acknowledge that my conern 
about the practicalities of administering a residency 
requirement for a school district are based to some extent 
4. 
on my 11 years of experience on the Richmond School Board. 
Apart from scrambling for more money for public education 
and better pay for teachers, one of our major problems 
resulted from the fact that at that time the Richmond 
schools were the best in that part of Virginia. Parents 
in neighboring counties resorted to a wide range of 
strategies - and at times outright deceit - to establish 
what appears residence for their children within the city. 
One simply cannot run a school district without having a 
large measure of control over the legitimate school 
population. 
Having said all of this, Bill, I am grateful to 
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March 28, 1982 
81-857 Martinez v. Bynum 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for your personal letter, I am making 
some changes that I hope will allay your concerns. On page 
9 of my second draft, I am rewriting the first paragraph in 
footnote 10 to read to read as follows: 
"We need not decide whether §21.03l(d) is 
unconstitutional as applied, for the plain-
tiffs limited their complaint to a facial 
challenge of this statute. See supra, at 3." 
This should leave open an as applied challenge 
which, I take it, is your primary concern. Indeed, it is 
clear from other statements in the opinion that the residen-
cy test must be "uniformly applied". Seep. 7 of text. 
, I also am adding a footnote (n. 13) to make clear 
- as you point out - that a family can move to a district 
knowing that they will later move to another district, and 
still be bona fide residents. 
m 
You suggest that where the child is a United 
States citizen of alien, nonresident parents, the tradition-
al residency requirement may not be valid. I would find it 
difficult to draw this type of distinction. I assume that 
your concern is that the alien, nonresident parents could 
not lawfully move into the district. But, as in this case, 
the child may do so. 
I do not think alien, nonresident parents would be 
any more disadvantaged by their inability to move into the 
district than a parent who, because of some disability, was 
institutionalized and could not move. Moreover, a parent 
may have legitimate reasons (e.g., employment) for not wish-
ing to leave the state in which he or she resides, and yet -
also for valid reasons - may wish to have the child move to 
a school district in another state. 
If we indicated a different standard where the 
child's parents or guardian are not able themselves to move 
into the district, an unnecessary degree of uncertainty 
and probably litigation - would result. 
As a personal note, I acknowledge that my cone.rn 
about the practicalities of administering a residency re-
quirement for a school district are based to some extent on 
my 11 years of experience on the Richmond School Board. 
Apart from scrambling for more money for public education ~ 
and better pay for teachers, one of our major problems re-
sulted from the fact that at that time the Richmond schools 
were the best in that part of Virginia. Parents in neigh-
boring counties resorted to a wide range of strategies - and 
at times outright deceit - to establish what appeared to be 
residence for their children within the city. One simply 
cannot run a school rHstr ict without having a large measure 
pf control over the legitimate school population. 
Havinq said all of this, Bill, I am grateful to 
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In keeping with our earlier 
gested minimal changes in the opinion 
respond to JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissent. 
pp. 9-12. The principal change is in 
conver!\at. -~l.t.>~ ion, I h ~- •·~ · ave i,fu.~ 
copyf to 
The 
remaining changes are either technical, or matters of emphasis. 
There is one point on which I have left the opinion the 
same, but I want to be sure that I understand your views and that 
you appreciate the effect of the opinion. Suppose that an IBM 
employee living in Armonk, New York, is assigned to an office in 
Dallas for two years. It is a temporary assignment, and he knows 
when he goes to Dallas that he will return to Armonk at the end 
of the two years. Must Texas educate his children during those 
two years? It is clear that Texas would accept them tuition-free 
under its statute. As a matter of policy, most school boards 
would reach the same posi tion~ e opinion suggests that the 
Constitution does not require that result. ) As I understand your 
position, this is what you want to sa~ Is this correct? 
~- .9 ~-1,._. ~~ ~ 
~ · j~~~ 
IJJ/11 ~~., ~,✓~,.-.< 
~ ~~~ Lc.c., I,(,,_~-
4~~-U.4 f- ckrL.L ~ 
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81-857 Martinez v. Bynum 
This case is hereETt of certiorari ee the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
Texas law requires a school distric 0 o provide 
tuition-fre~ducation for all children who are residepts of 
- - -.-, ~ ,s,,o,, 
the district. Bttt f he law permits charging tuition~ chil-
~ :..ti:,--
dren/ whose presence in the district is "for the primary pur-
poso/of attending the~~ - schools.• 
Petitioner is the custodian of a child - an Ameri-
can citizen of Mexican parentage - who was living in the 
Texas school districy'•primarily for the purpose of attend-
ing" school there. 
The custodian brought this suit to challenge the 
Texas law/ on its face. Both the District Court and the 
---,. 
Court of Appeals upheld the law. We now affirm. 
A State may ~ t /i ts free / ~ublic school education 
to residents. Thus a bona fide residence requirement/nei-
ther offends the Equal Protection Claus¥ nor burdens the 





Residence traditionally requires physical presence - -
and a present intention to remain. Therefore Texas was jus-
tified in requiring more than presence in the school dis-
tric~ l~~ ~ chools. 
Th~ effi:i-r-t:S----rorti-aa--Jl9-e-:~1---t::fta'~ ~~~~1=-e--1:-1~ te-fle-!:~ ,--> 
- · We decide only that the statute is valid on 
its face. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN filed a concurring opinion: JUS-
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This case presents a facial challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the Texas residency req~irement governing minors who 
wish to attend public free i'ch-~ ls while living apart from their 
parents or guardians. 
I 
Roberto Morales was born in 1969 in McAllen, Texas, and 
is thus a United States citizen by birth. His parents are Mexi-
can citizens who reside in Reynosa, Mexico. He left Reynosa in 
1977 and returned to McAllen to live with his sister, petitioner 
Oralia Martinez, for the primary purpose of attending school in 
the McAllen Independent School District. Although Martinez is 
now Morales's legal custodian, she is not--and does not desire to 
become--his guardian. 1 As a result, Morales is not entitled to 
tuition-free admission to the McAllen schools. Texas Educ. Code 
Ann. §21.03l{b) & {c) {Supp. 1982) would require the local school 
authorities to admit him if his parent or guardian resided in the 
school district, but §21.03l{d) denies tuition-free admission for 
minors who live apart from a parent or guardian if their presence 
in the school district is "for the primary purpose of attending 
1we use the term "guardian" to refer both to a legal guardian 
. , in the strict sense of the term and to any other person having 
~~.:bP · lawful control of a child under an order of a court. We refer to 
'YVVV' a person having lawful control of a child other than under an 
~ order of a court as a "custodian." .. ~ r.: -·. >-~;jyl'• 
V . ~ '2 - ~/'°:/"" er 
~,.,;,, \~ ✓~pY' <~t'-(~ ·~'<.,~ 7 
\ h · ~ ~y"1'· :;:~ ~ 1/.~~.,./~t .. /'.Sah' 1/ 
I~ ,OJA.. V"'r ()/ ur l'J/V / •wr~ -t 
preliminary draft: Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 page 2. 
the public free schools. 112 Respondent McAllen Independent School 
District therefore denied Morales's application for admission in 
the fall of 1977. 
In December 1977 Martinez, as next friend of Morales, 
and four other adult custodians of school-age children instituted 
the present action in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas against the Texas Commissioner of Edu-
cation, the Texas Education Agency, four local school districts, 
and various local school officials in those disticts. The plain-
tiffs alleged that §21.03l(d), both on its face and as applied by 
2section 21.031 provides, in relevant part: 
"(b) Every child in this state ••• who is over the 
age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on 
the first day of September of the year in which admis-
sion is sought shall be permitted to attend the public 
free schools of the district in which he resides or in 
which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful 
control of him resides at the time he applies for ad-
mission. 
"(c) The board of trustees of any public free school 
district of this state shall admit into the public free 
schools of the district free of tuition all persons 
who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the 
beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his 
parent, guardian or person having lawful control re-
sides within the school district. 
"(d) In order for a person under the age of 18 years 
to establish a residence for the purpose of attending 
the public free schools separate and apart from his 
parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control 
of him under an order of a court, it must be estab-
lished that his presence in the school district is not 
for the primary purpose of attending the public free 
schools. The board of trustees shall be responsible 
for determining whether an applicant for admission is a 
resident of the school district for purposes of attend-
ing the public schools." 
preliminary draft: Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 page 3. 
the defendants, violated certain provisions of the Constitution, 
including the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, 
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The plaintiffs also 
sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. 
The District Court denied a preliminary injunction in 
August 1978. It found "that the school boards ••• have been more 
than liberal in finding that certain children are not living away 
from parents and residing in the school district for the sole 
purpose of attending school." App. 20a. The evidence "conclu-
sively" showed "that children living within the school districts 
with someone other than their parents or legal guardians will be 
admitted to school if~ reason exists for such situation other 
than that of attending school only." Ibid. {emphasis in origi-
nal). 
Shortly after the denial of the preliminary injunction, 
the plaintiffs amended the complaint to narrow their claims. In 
the amended complaint, they sought only "a declaration that 
§21.03l{d) is unconstitutional on its face," App. 3a {emphasis 
added), an injunction prohibiting the defendants from denying the 
children admission to school pursuant to §21.03l{d), restitution 
of certain tuition payments, 3 costs, and attorney's fees. App. 
3a, 7 a. 
After a hearing on the merits, the District Court grant-
3Morales attended school in the McAllen district during the 
Fall, 1978 semester when Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., paid tu-
ition on his behalf. Bond has been posted to cover subsequent 
tuition payments. 
preliminary draft: Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 page 4. 
ed judgment for the defendants. Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. 
Supp. 212 (1979). The court concluded that §21.03l(d) was justi-
fied by the State's "legitimate interest in protecting and pre-
serving the quality of its educational system and the right of 
its own bona fide residents to attend state schools on a pre-
ferred tuition basis." Id., at 222. In an appeal by two of the 
plaintiffs, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed. Arredondo v. Brockette, 648 F.2d 425 (1981). We 
granted Martinez's petition for certiorari. 
We now affirm. 
II 
U.S. __ (1982). 
This Court frequently has considered constitutional 
~ Cuu-,,....,/-' ~ 
challenges to residence requirements. On several occasions we-
1 ~
~ •. "J,,,,,t...' ~ str\:1-Gk down requirements that condition receipt of a benefit 
/YJA."'~ A, " . L;t' 
~ on a minimum period of residence within a jurisdiction, butfo 
~ lways have been careful to distinguish such durational residence 
ff.A requirements from bona fide residence requirements. In ~ 
pV1 v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), for example, the Court s-t~G:k 
9 ~ ~ one-year durational residence requirements ~~ Conne: ticut, 
~r Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia ~ red applicants 
1/f for public assistance benefits to satisfy--despite the fact that 
the applicants had otherwise "met the test for residence in their 
jurisdictions," id., at 627. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the 
Court, stressed that "[t] he residence requirement and the one-
year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent pre-
requisites for assistance," id., at 636, and carefully "impl[ied] 
preliminary draft: Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 page 5. 
no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence require-
ments determining el ig ibil i ty to vote, el ig ibil i ty for tuition-
free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to 
hunt or fish, and so forth," id., at 638 n. 21. Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), was simil~ ~rt invali-
1\ 
dated Tennessee laws requiring a prospective voter to have been a 
state resident for one year and a county resident for three 
months, but t bEOWJb-O~j n i @ it ~~~tinguished 
" these durational residence requirements from bona fide residence 
requirements, id., at 334, 337 n. 7, 338, 343, 350 n. 20, 351-~ 
352. This was not an empty distinction.~ JUSTICE MA~ 
_,,,_,,,,,,,...._, ~ ~ 
the Court ~ f, spe-s1F1 caJ] y 'States have the power 
.,.)tr )- . , 
to require that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant 
political subdivision." Id., at 343. See also Memorial Hospital 
(1974) (s t~ gL.f~e-year v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 "" . 
a--s-<... ~
durational residence requirement before applicant eligible for 
I'\ " 
public medical assistance, but recognizing validity of bona fide 
residence requirements) . 4 
We also have ~ a fide residence requirements 
J\ 
in the field of public education. j "(n Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 
~ ~h,.,k~ J 
441 (1973), ,\ r 
~vt 
/\ ~ created an i rre~e:rhl.::e • e nd irrebuttable presumption of non-
residency for students in the state university system whose legal 
4 In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, 424 U.S. 
645 (1976) (per curiam), the Cg urt upheld a bona fide continuing 
residence requirement. ~ Mgain, we carefully distinguished 
this from a durational residence requirement. Id., at 646-647. 
-----
r -------------------
7L__ ~ ~ ~ lA-L 0t, 
preliminary draft: Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 page 6. 
addresses were outside of Connecticut prior to their applications 
for a:_i~ he statute violated the Due Process Clause be-
cause it classified bona fide state residents as nonresidents for 
I\ 
tuition purposes. But we "fully recognize[dJ that a State has a 
legitimate interest in protecting and preserving ••• the right of 
its own bona fide residents to attend [its colleges and universi-
ties] on a preferential tuition basis." Id., at 452-453. Be-
cause of this "legitimate interest," a "State can establish such 
reasonable criteria for in-state status as to make virtually cer-
tain that students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of 
the State, but who come there solely for educational purposes, 
cannot take advantage of the in-state rates." Id., at 453-454. 
Last Term, in Plyler v. Doe, __ U.S. __ (1982), we reviewed an 
aspect of Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §21.031: -the same statute ~ 
at issue in this case. Although we ~ portion of 
A 
the statute that excluded undocumented alien children from the 
free public schools, we recognized the school districts' right 
"to apply 
Id., at 
established er i ter ia for determining residence." 
n. 22; id., at __ n. 4 (POWELL, J., concurring) ("Of 
course a school district may require that illegal alien children, 
like any other children, actually reside in the school district 
before admitting them to the schools. A requirement of de facto 
residency, uniformly applied, would not violate any principle of 
equal protection."). 
A bona fide residence requirement is justified by a 
State's substantial interest in seeing that ~ services th a t i t:=p---
provide~ specifically for its residents are enjoyed only by ~ 
preliminary draft: Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 page 7. 
residents. 5 Unlike a durational residence requirement, this type 
of requirement does not burden or penalize the constitutional 
right to travel, for any person is free to move to a State and 
establish his residence there immediately. The bona fide resi-
dence requirement simply requires that he does establish his res-
idence there before he demands the services that are restricted 
to residents. Moreover, local residence requirements are partic-
ularly appropriate here. "No single tradition in public educa-
tion is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation 
of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both 
to the maintenance of community concern and support for public 
schools and to quality of the educational process •••. [L]ocal 
control over the educational process affords citizens an opportu-
nity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of 
school programs to fit local needs, and encourages 
'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for edu-
cational excellence.'" Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-
742 (1974) (quoting San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)). Indeed, the provision of pri-
mary and secondary education is perhaps the most important func-
5This statement assumes, of course, that the "service" pro-
vided is not a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. 
A State, for example, may not refuse to provide counsel to an 
indigent nonresident defendant at a criminal trial where a depri-
vation of liberty occurs. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 
(1972). As we previously have recognized, however, "[p] ublic 
education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Consti-
tution." Plyler v. Doe, __ U.S. __ , __ (1982) (citing San 
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tion of local government today. The State has a substantial in-
terest in ensuring that local public schools are maintained for 
the benefit of local residents. 
III 
The central question we must decide here is whether 
§21.03l(d} is a bona fide residence requirement. While the mean-
ing may vary according to context, "residence" generally requires 
both physical presence and an intention to remain. 6 One defini-
tion of "residence," for example, is "[p]ersonal presence at some 
place of abode with no present intention of definite and early 
removal and with purpose to remain for undetermined period, not 








6several States have recognized the "intention to remain';-2~ 
requirement in the context of public school admissions. See, ~
~, Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-253(d} (Supp. 1982} ("Children resid- ~/- '-
1ng with relatives or nonrelatives, when it is the intention of 
such relatives or nonrelatives and of the children or their par-
ents or guardians that such residence is to be permanentfa nd pro-
vided without pay ;J shall be entitled to all free schoo1: privi-
leges accorded to resident children of the school district in 
which they then reside."}; s. Dak. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 76-94 (in-
tent is key factor in determining residency for school purposes}; 
[1969-70] s. Car. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 2825, at 39 (student gener-
ally is A"resident" of school district if he and his parents are 
actually residents in the district with apparently no present 
~ 
purpose of removal}; Ariz. Att'y Gen. Op. No.59-146 (For parents 
to establish residence or domicile in State sufficient to entitle 
children to tuition-free schooling, there must be actual presence 
in State coupled with intention to remain in State and make it 
their home, abandoning former residence}; N.Y. Comm'r Educ. Op., 
18 Educ. Dept. Rep. 523 (1979} (For student to establish resi- J 
dence in school district sufficient to entitle her to tuition- /'.,,,,...,_J 
free schooling, she must show that her residence in district is 7vv-) 
her actual and only place of domicile and that it is intended to 
be permanent). 
. 
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permanently." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979}. In Vlandis 
v. Kline, supra, we approved a domicile test as a "reasonable 
standard for determining the residential status of a student." 
412 U.S., at 454. That standard was described as follows: "'In 
reviewing a claim of in-state status, the issue becomes essen-
tially one of domicile. In general, the domicile of an individ-
ual is his true, fixed and permanent home and place of habita-
tion. It is the place to which, whenever he is absent, he has 
the intention of returning.'" Ibid. (quoting Opinion of the At-
torney General of the State of Connecticut Regarding Non-Resident 
Tuition, Sept. ~, 1972}. This standard could not be applied in 
the same way to school-age children that it was applied to col-
lege students. But at the very least, a school district general-
ly would be justified in requiring school-age children or their 
parents to satisfy the traditional, basic residence requirements-
-Le., to live in the district with the intention of remaining 
there indefinitely--before it treated them as residents. 
~ - Section 21.031 is far more generous than this tradition-
,J~tandard. As :r read the statute, it requires a school dis-
~ t;c_~~ trict to permit a child such as Morales to attend school without 
~ . t "t' "f h ~~ ~~h , h 1 d" . paying ui ion i ex:e~ to remain in t e sc oo istrict 
___... ~ / ·t:"· ( - - '9--e,+ ..--fii\t:z::a;sr d 6• PL) )£Pii .~ 
5 fGf • indefinitely/\ fie.r ~ e then would have a reason for being there 
-- ) t? 
other than his desire to attend school: his /\desi N to make his 
home in the district. 7 Thus §21.031 grants the benefits of resi-
7The respondents have conceded that "the statute permits any 
child to attend school in a district in which he is present for 
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dency to all who satisfy the traditional requirements. The stat-
ute ~~e~ efits to many children even if they (or 
~ . 
their families) do not intend to remain in the district indefi-
nitely. For example, if a child comes to Texas for six months 
for health reasons, he will be eligible for tuition-free admis-
sion to the public schools. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Or if a person 
comes to Texas to work for a year, his children would qualify for 
tuition-free education. See id., at 37. In short, §21.031 
grants the benefits of residency to everyone who satisfies the 
traditional residence requirements and to some who legitimately 
could be classified as nonresidents. Since there is no indica-
tion that this extension of the traditional definition has any ~ .= ~•~--~1-~ H..,µ/......,., 
impermissible basis, 8 we/\Mil h ow §21.03l(d) eettM violatefS-
the purpose of 'establishing a home.'" Brief for Respondents 25. 
See App. 20a ("[C]hildren living within the school districts with 
someone other than their parents or legal guardians will be ad-
mitted to school if~ reason exists for such situation other 
than that of attending school only.") (District Court finding) 
(emphasis in original). Even if §21.03l(d) could be read to ex-
clude a child who moves to a school district with the intent of 
making his home there when the desire to make the new home is 
motivated solely by the desire to attend school, Martinez does 
not have standing to raise such a claim. The record shows that 
Morales does not intend to make his home in McAllen. "Morales 
only intends to reside in the McAllen Independent School District 
until he completes his education." 482 F. Supp., at 214. He 
thus fails to satisfy even the most basic requirements of resi-
dence. 
__ ~e a <Hfferent case if, for example;~ Texas 1:_j-z::r-
resident benefits to those wh9 s 9 tisJ i e d the tradition 
g to non=- Mex i c a n s . Her aj ! he ex tsnsion of the tradi-
tional definition is racially neutral. - This ;«puld ~ be a dif- L,,,,-"" J/ 
ferent case if the respondents applied §21.03l(d) 1n a discrimi-
natory manner. The plaintiffs, however, decided to limit their 
complaint to a facial challenge of §21.03l(d). In any event, the 
District Court found "that the school boards •.. have been more 
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the Constitution when a more restrictive statute would be permis-
sible.9 
IV 
The Constitution permits a State to restrict eligibility 
for tuition-free education to its bona fide residents. We hold 
that §21.031 is a bona fide residence requirement that satisfies 
constitutional standards. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
than liberal in finding that certain children are not living away 
from parents and residing in the school district for the sole 
purpose of attending school." App. 20a. 
~ .LL~ 9we reject M.il. rt i Ae ~• s argument that §21.03l(d) creates an 
irrebuttable presumption of non-residence in violation of the Due 
Process Clause. Brief for Petitioner~ 46-49. · See Vlandis v. 
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973) ("Statutes creating permanent 
irrebuttable presumptions have log ~ en disfavored under the Due 
Process Clauses ..•• "). Morales ou ~ rebut any "presump-
tion" of non-r · c if he were, in fact, a resident. o t e 
n .03l(d) ny u a e presumption," it 











JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion Court . VJ-> ~ 
~/w-~ 
/4f!-qk,1-,~ 
This case involves a facial challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the Texas residency requirement governing minors who 
wish to attend public 
parents or guardians. 





Roberto Morales was born in 1969 in McAllen, Texas, and 
is thus a United States citizen by birth. His parents are Mexi-
can citizens who reside in Reynosa, Mexico. He left Reynosa in 
1977 and returned to McAllen to live with his sister, petitioner 
Oralia Martinez, for the primary purpose of attending school in 
the McAllen Independent School District. Although Martinez is 
now Morales's custodian, she is not--and does not desire to 
./ 
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become--his guardian. 1 As a result, Morales is not entitled to 
tuition-free admission to the McAllen schools. Section 21.03l(b) 
and (c) of the Texas Education Code would require the local 
school authorities to admit him if he or "his parent, guardian, 
or the person having lawful control of him" resided in the school 
district, Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §21.03l(b) & (c) (Supp. 1982), but 
§21.03l(d) denies tuition-free admission for a minor who lives 
apart from a "parent, guardian, or other person having lawful 
· control of him under an order of a court" if his presence in the 
school district is "for the primary purpose of attending the pub-
lie free schools. 112 Respondent McAllen Independent School Dis-
1section 51.02(4) of the Texas .Family Code defines "custodi-
an" as "the adult with whom the child resides." Tex . .Fam. Code 
Ann. §51.02(4) (1975). "Guardian" is defined as "the person who, 
under court order, is the guardian of the person of the child or 
the public or private agency with whom the child has been placed 
by a court." §51.02 (3). 
2section 21.031 provides, in relevant part: 
"(b) Every child in this state ... who is over the 
age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on 
.Footnote continued on next page. 
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trict therefore denied Morales's application for admission in the 
fall of 1977. 
In December 1977 Martinez, as next friend of Morales, 
the first day of September of the year in which admis-
sion is sought shall be permitted to attend the public 
free schools of the district in which he resides or in 
which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful 
control of him resides at the time he applies for ad-
mission. 
"(c) The board of trustees of any public free school 
district of this state shall admit into the public free 
schools of the district free of tuition all persons 
who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the 
beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his 
parent, guardian or person having lawful control re-
sides within the school district. 
"(d) In order for a person under the age of 18 years 
to establish a residence for the purpose of attending 
the public free schools separate and apart from his 
parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control 
of him under an order of a court, it must be estab-
1 ished that his presence in the school district is not 
for the primary purpose of attending the public free 
schools. The board of trustees shall be responsible 
for determining whether an applicant for admission is a 
resident of the school district for purposes of attend-
ing the public schools." 
-
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and four other adult custodians of school-age children instituted 
the present action in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas against the Texas Commissioner of Edu-
cation, the Texas Education Agency, four local school districts, 
and various local school officials in those disticts. The plain-
tiffs initially alleged that §21.03l(d), both on its face and as 
applied by the defendants, violated certain provisions of the 
Cons ti tut ion, including the Equal Protection Clause, the Due 
Process Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The 
plaintiffs also sought preliminary and permanent injunctive re-
lief. 
The District Court denied a preliminary injunction in 
August 1978. It found "that the school boards ... have been more 
than liberal in finding that certain children are not living away 
from parents and residing in the school district for the sole 
purpose of attending school." App. 20a. The evidence "conclu-
sively" showed "that children living within the school districts 
with someone other than their parents or legal guardians will be 
first draft: Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 page 5. 
admitted to school if~ reason exists for such situation other 
than that Ibid. 
amended the complaint to narrow 
their claims. They now seek only "a declaration that 
§21.03l(d) is unconstitutional on its face," App. 3a, an injunc-
tion prohibiting defendants from denying the children admission 
to school pursuant to §21.03l(d), restitution of certain tuition 
payments, 3 costs, and attorney's fees. App. 3a, 7a. After a 
hearing on the merits, the District Court granted judgment for 
the defendants. Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212 (1979). 
The court concluded that §21.03l(d) was justified by the State's 
"legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of 
its educational system and the right of its own bona fide resi-
dents to attend state schools on a preferred tuition basis." 482 
3Morales attended school in the McAllen school district dur-
ing the Fall, 1978 semester when Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 
paid tuition on his behalf. Bond has been posted to cover subse-
quent tuition payments. 
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F. Supp., at 222. In an appeal by two of the plaintiffs, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 
648 F.2d 425 (1981). In view of the importance of the issue, 4 we 
~ granted Martinez's 
l We now affirm. 
petition for certiorari. 457 U.S. (1982). 
~ 
II 
~ ~I This Court frequently has considered constitutional 
to residence requirements. On several occasions the 1 ~ challenges 
._J -!j Court has invalidated requirements that condition receipt of a 
benefit on a minimum period of residence within a jurisdiction, 
but it always has been careful to distinguish such durational 
residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements. In 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), for example, the Court 
4 1 drj:o' ~ ,Lo 41•any States have statutes substantially the -.ame- as 
§21.03l(d). See, e.g., Ind. Code §20-8.1-6.1-l(c) (Supp. 1982); 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20, §859(3) (B) (2) (Supp. 1982); Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 76, §6 (West 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws 
§380.1148 (Supp. 1981); Ore. Rev. Stat. §332.595(5) (1981). 
~ ! Ji.p.vt c~tkld.. f>r~ V~. sr().t'4H' a .. l.. rt ls ""t "~fAbsto,f,-4.t(r_ $IA1i/a.r To 
( ,.... 521.b'Jl(d)," J;t i> siJYilFtca.tltlt stNefer f1-ta"' "1~ ~-'4$ -s~t"'~-
_ / 
~ : ~f-~~ ti~, s-~ ~~ ~ 
/I /I q <1- / ~ q. 
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invalidated one-year durational residence requirements th ~ ap-
plicants for public assistance benefits in Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, and the District of Columbia were forced to satisfy--
despite the fact that they {ha~ otherwi s ~ "me t the test for res i-
dence in their jurisdictions," id., at 627. JUSTICE BRENNAN, 
writing for the Court, stressed that "[t]he residence requirement 
and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and in-
dependent prerequisites for assistance," id., at 636, and care-
fully "impl[ied] no view of the validity of waiting-period or 
residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibil-
ity for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a 
profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth," id., at 638 n. 21. 
In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the Court similarly 
invalidated Tennessee laws requiring a prospective voter to have 
been a state resident for one year and a county resident for 
three months, but it explicitly distinguished these durational 
residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements, 
id., at 334, 337 n. 7, 338, 343, 350 n. 20, 351-352. This was 
first draft: Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 page 8. 
not an empty distinction. JUSTICE MARSHALL, writing for the 
Court, again emphasized that "States have the power to require 
that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political sub-
division." Id., at 343. See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
County, 415 U.S. 250, 255, 267 (1974) (invalidating one-year 
durational residence requirement before an applicant became eli-
gible for public medical assistance, but recognizing validity of 
appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence 
requirements) . 5 
We specifically have approved bona fide residence re-
quirements in the field of public education. The Connecticut 
statute before us in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), for 
example, was constitutionally infirm because it created an 
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for state university 
5 In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, 424 U.S. 
645 (1976) (per curiam), the Court upheld a bona fide continuing-
residence requirement. Again, we carefully distinguished this 
from a durational residence requirement. Id., at 646-647. 
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students whose legal addresses were outside of the State before 
they applied for admission. The statute violated the Due Process 
Clause because it in effect classified bona fide state residents 
as nonresidents for tuition purposes. But we "fully recognize[d] 
that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserv-
ing ..• the right of its own bona fide residents to attend [its 
colleges and universities] on a preferential tuition basis." 
Id., at 452-453. This "legitimate interest" permits a "State 
[to] establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status as to 
make virtually certain that students who are not, in fact, bona 
fide residents of the State, but who have come there solely for 
educational purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-state . . z .!!!,_, at 4 53-454. 6 Last Term, in Plyler v. Doe, 457 u.s. 
~ 6Two years before Vlandis, the Court upheld a domicile re-
z quirement for resident tuition rates at the University of Minne-s~=a~ ~ Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), summarily aff'g ii' ... / .. / y . Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970) (three-judge court). The governing 
~ ~ ~ gulations declared: "No student is eligible for resident clas-
~ ,)f"' sifica) ion in the University ... unless he has been a bona fide 
_/ 
_,,,,,--
~ •~· ~omi ~ ary of the state for at least a year immediately prior 
V'~iJ'I X' _0_/.9,\ ~ ~tnote continued on next page. 
~-,~ ,.,. 
1
/¼ t jltt> wa,1hl11f/1Jn case w«~ aff;rmeJ u.F"r ..;.V..:..la..;.n=J ..... 1 ._.s ) so 
~ r /v) ,;r J-,; ✓.; ;t- Ytl<ASf- ha~ he~11 (hc<AJ'1t Cln1srs'fel'1't, 77,,~ /Jc 
/\.Y _ fl/ v; vfV tv./ Jr~,~""- V/a,111.is . flte l'trnnesoto l'Ase rs t:J.,scus.se.JR 
'V-,JJI r/" 7A A ~ VtanJ.ls ~()Tho~, '11'2.. U,S.
1 
a.t 4~2-"153 /I· GJ . 
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(1982), we reviewed an aspect of Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 
§21.031--the statute at issue in this case. Although we invali-
dated the portion of the statute that excluded undocumented alien 
children from the public free schools, we recognized the school 
districts' right "to apply established criteria for determin-
ing residence." Id., at n. 22. See id., at n. 4 (POW-
ELL, J., concurring) ( "Of course a school district may require 
that illegal alien children, like any other children, actually 
thereto .... For University purposes, a student does not acquire 
a domicile in Minnesota until he has been here for at least a 
year primarily as a permanent resident and not merely as a stu-
dent; this involves the probability of his remaining in Minnesota 
beyond his completion of school." 326 F. Supp., at 235-236. 
Shortly after Vlandis, we upheld a domicile requirement for 
resident tuition rates at the University of Washington. Sturgis 
v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057, summarily aff'g 368 F. Supp. 38 (WD 
Wash. 1973) (three-judge court). The relevant statute declared: 
"The term 'resident student' shall mean a student who has a domi-
cile in the state of Washington for ... one vear ... and has in 
fact established a bona fide domicile in this state for other 
than educational purposes .... " 368 F. Supp., at 39 n. 1. "Domi-
cile" was defined as "a person's true, fixed and permanent home 
and place of habitation. It is the place where he intends to 
remain, and to which he expects to return when he leaves without 
intending to establish a new domicile elsewhere." Ibid. 
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ride in the school district before admitting them to the 
A requirement of de facto residency, uniformly applied, 
i would not violate any principle of equal protection."). 
i · l 
le- 1 tate' s substantial interest in seeing that services provided 
~ d pecifically for its residents are enjoyed only bv residents. 7 
A bona fide residence requirement is justified by a 
~ s -
I • 1'. 
"' ~ .. Unlike a durational residence requirement, such a requirement 
:f !Joes not burden or penalize the constitutional right[~= 
~ 
j 
~ for any person is free to move to a State and to establish resi-
i 'l ~dence. i111meil-i<tl·d;>. A bona fide residence requirement simply re-
quires that the person does establish residence before demanding 
7The statement in the text assumes, of course, that the 
"service" provided is not a fundamental right protected by the 
Constitution. A State, for example, may not refuse to provide 
counsel to an indigent nonresident defendant at a criminal trial 
where a deprivation of liberty occurs. See Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). As we previously have recognized, how-
ever, "[p]ublic education is not a 'right' granted to individuals 
by the Constitution." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. __ , __ (1982) 
(citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 35 (1973)). 
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the services that are restricted to residents. Moreover, local 
residence requirements are particularly appropriate here. 
~~ ,~ 
lo/ ./ 
"No single tradition in public education is more deeply 
rooted than local control over the operation of 
schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential 
both to the maintenance of community concern and sup-
port for public schools and to quality of the educa-
tional process .... [L]ocal control over the education-
al process affords citizens an opportunity to partici-
pate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of 
school programs to fit local needs, and encourages 
'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition 
for educational excellence.'" Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U.S. 717, 741-742 (1974) (quoting San Antonio Independ-
ent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 
(1973)). 
r:,r 
~ r 1'1D<1"t (Z,irs 
w~ fkt t,,e~t' 
p,.rr- .f 
tJ..; II i Ile" , 
Indeed, the provision of primary and secondary education is per-
haps the most important function of local government today. The 
State has a substantial interest in ensuring that local public 
schools are maintained for the benefit of local residents. 
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III 
The central question we must decide here is whether 
§21.03l(d) is a bona fide residence requirement. 8 Although the 
~~ 
8we need not decide _f-£ §21.03l(d) has been [0iifo..i_§ applief, 
see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 
(1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 n. 13 (1972); Plyler 
v. Doe, 457 U.S., at n. 4 (POWELL, J., concurring), for the 
plaintiffs ~ limit~ eir complaint to a facial challenge 
A 
of §21. 031 (d) • In any event, the District Court's findings at 
the preliminary injunction stage, App. 20a, appear to preclude 
any claim that §21.031 (d) has been applied in a discriminatory 
fashion. 
We reject Martinez's argument that §21.03l(d) violates the Due 
Process Clause because it creates an irrebuttable presumption of 
nonresidence. Brief for Petitioner 46-49. See Vlandis v. Kline, 
412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973) ("Statutes creating permanent 
irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due 
Process Clauses .... "). Morales easily could rebut any "presump-
tion" of nonresidence if he were, in fact, a resident. See App. 
20a. ~ ~ ~I -La 
We also l:cQJQCt Martinez's argument that §21.03l(d) constitutes 
I\ 
an impermissible burden on children who chose to adopt a nontra-
ditional family-living arrangement. Brief for Petitioner 23-24. 
See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) 
(plurality opinion) ("[T]he Constitution prevents [a city] from 
standardizing its chi ldren--and its adults--by forcing all to 
live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."). Although 
§21.03l(d) applies only to children who live "separate and apart 
from" a parent or guardian, subsections (b) and (c) impose a res-
idence requirement on parents and guardians. Parents or guard-
Footnote continued on next page. 
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meaning may vary according to context, "residence" generally re-
quires both physical presence and an intention to . 9 remain. As 
ians could not satisfy this requirement if the sole purpose of 
their presence in the district was to enable their child to at-
tend the public free schools. Such "residence" would not satisfy 
the traditional criteria, see infra, at , and n. 10, that the 
Texas courts fi av.§ frequently,Z recognize~ See, e.g., Mills v. 
Bartlett, 377 S.W.2d 636, 637 {Tex. 1964) (residence determined 
by presence and intention); Whitney v. State, 472 S.W.2d 524, 
525-526 {Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (same); Harrison v. Chesshir, 316 
S.W.2d 909, 915 {Tex. Civ. App. 1958) ("A residence is estab-
lished by personal presence in a fixed and permanent abode with 
intention of remaining there. The fundamental elements necessary 
to create a residence in a particular place are actual bodily 
presence in the place combined with a freely exercised intention 
of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time without 
any present intention to remove from the same."), rev'd on other 
grounds, 159 Tex. 359 320 S.W.2d 814 (1959) ,~-- - ··-~--' t"""" --- ·--
280 S.W.2d 779, 78 {Tex. p. 
intention 
time, or to speak more 
abode in a given pla 
therefrom, s ~ e of 
person takes up his 
any present intention to remove 
abode becomes his residence .... ") . 
does not impose any unique burden on nontradi-
s. 
9several States have recognized the "intention to remain" 
requirement in the context of public school admissions. See, 
~, Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-253(d) (Supp. 1981) ("Children resid-
ing with relatives or nonrelatives, when it is the intention of 
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the Supreme Court of Maine explained over a century ago, 
"When ... a person voluntarily takes up his abode in 
a given place, with intention to remain permanently, or 
for an indefinite period of time; or, to speak more 
accurately, when a person takes up his abode in a given 
such relatives or nonrelatives and of the children or their par-
ents or guardians that such residence is to be permanent ... , 
shall be entitled to all free school privileges accorded to resi-
dent children of the school district in which they then 
reside."); Colo. Rev. Stat. §22-1-102 (2) {g) (1973) {child deemed 
resident of school district if "the child adopts a dwelling place 
within the district with the intent to remain there indefinitely 
and with the intent not to return to the dwelling place from 
which he came"); Op. No. 76-94, 1975-1976 Biennial Report of the 
Atty. Gen. of S.D. 660, 662 (1976) {intent is "the key factor in 
determining . . . res id ency for school purposes") ; Op. No. 2825, 
1969-1970 Annual Report & Official Opinions of the Atty. Gen. of 
s.c. 39, 40 (1970) {student may attend school in district if he 
and his parent are "'actually resident in the district, with ap-
parently no present purpose of removal'") {quoting 79 C.J .s., 
Schools and School Districts, §449, at 356 (1952)); Op. No. 59-
146, 1915-1971 Ariz. Atty. Gen. Reports & Opinions 218, 220 
(1959) {.For parents to establish residence or domicile in Arizona 
sufficient to entitle children to tuition-free schooling, there 
must be "an actual presence in the state, coupled with an inten-
tion to remain in the state and make [it] their home," abandoning 
their former residence.); In re VanCurran, 18 Ed. Dept. Rep. 523, 
524 {N.Y. Comm'r Educ. 1979) {"In order for [student] to be con-
sidered a resident of the [school] district, she must establish 
that her residence there is her actual and only place of domicile 
and that it is intended to be permanent."). 
~ 
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place, without any present intention to remove there-
from, such place of abode becomes his residence .•.. " 
Inhabitants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 43 
Me . 4 0 6 , 4 18 { 18 5 7) • 
This classic two-part definition of residence has been recognized 
as a minimum standard in a wide range of contexts time and time 
again.lo 
~ : ~ vz..uu-~ ~ ~ 
~J,,v..., ~-r~f- ~q_ ~ 
A-I- , '?J. ~~/-~~~ 
~-1-~~- 9/-~ 
lOSee, e.g., Kiehne v. Atwood, 93 N.M. 657, 662, 604 P.2d 123, ~-
128 { 1979) {" [A] change of residence is accomplished only by the ~ , 
act of moving to another place coupled with the intent to remain ~ 
in the other place."): Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 
261, 269-270, 501 P.2d 266, 272 (1972) {"residence ... acquired 
, 
.fd~ 
by actual presence in the state, coupled with the intention to ,,,f.,o 
remain there permanently or for an indefinite period"): Estate of ~ 
Schoof v. Schoof, 193 Kan. 611, 614, 396 P.2d 329, 331-332 (1964) ~/.,e..,_ 
{"There must be bodily presence at a location coupled with intent J .df!..o 
to remain there either permanently or for an indefinite period, ~ 
before residence can be said to have been acquired."): Hughes v. r, ~ 
Ill. Pub. Aid Comm'n, 2 Ill.2d 374, 380, 118 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1954 ~ ~ 
{"Two elements are necessary to create a residence, (1) bodi~ 
presence in that place and (2) the intention of remaining in that ~-
place .... "): Spratt v. Spratt, 210 La. 370, 371, 27 So.2d 154, 
154 { 1946) { "Residence ... means actual residence coupled with 
the intention to make the place of residence a permanent place of 
abode."): Appeal of Lawrence County, 71 S.D. 49, 51, 21 N.W.2d 
57, 58 (1945) {"A residence is established by personal presence 
in a fixed and permanent abode, with the intent of remaining 
there."): Jenkins v. North Shore Dye House, Inc., 277 Mass. 440, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
~ 
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In Vlandis v. Kline, supra, we approved a more rigorous 
domicile test as a "reasonable standard for determining the resi-
dential status of a student." 412 U.S., at 454. That standard 
was described as follows: "' In reviewing a claim of in-state 
status, the issue becomes essentially one of domicile. In gener-
al, the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and perma-
nent home and place of habitation. It is the place to which, 
whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.'" 
Ibid. (quoting Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of 
Connecticut Regarding Non-Resident Tuition, Sept. 6, 1972); cf. 
n. 6, supra. This standard could not be applied to school-age 
children in the same way that it was applied to college students. 
444, 178 N.E. 644, 646 (1931) ("'Residence' means in general a 
personal presence at some place of abode with no present inten-
tion of definite and early removal and with a purpose to remain 
for an undetermined period, not infrequently but not necessarily 
combined with a design to stay permanently."); Thomas v. Warner, 
83 Md. 14, 20, 34 A. 830, 831 (1896) ( "The idea of residence is 
compounded of fact and intention .... "); Pfoutz v. Cornford, 36 
Pa. 420, 422 (1860) ("Residence is •.. made up of fact and inten-
tion; that is, of abode with intention of remaining."). 
~ 
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But at the very least, a school district generally would be jus-
tified in requiring school-age children or their parents to sat-
isfy the traditional, basic residence criteria--i.e., to live in 
the district with the intention of remaining there indefinitely--
before it treated them as residents. 
Section 21.031 is far more generous than this tradition-
al standard. It compels a school district to permit a child such 
as Morales to attend school without paying tuition if he has a 
bona fide intention to remain in the school district indefinite-
ly, 11 for he then would have a reason for being there other than 
his desire to attend school: his intention to make his home in 
the district. 12 Thus §21.031 grants the benefits of residency to 
11rn most cases, of course, it is the intention of the parent 
or guardian on behalf of the child that is relevant, but for con-
venience we speak of the child's intention. 
12Respondents have conceded that "the statute permits any 
child to attend school in a district in which he is present for 
the purpose of 'establishing a home.'" Brief for Respondents 25. 
But even if §21.03l(d) could be read to exclude a child who moves 
to a school district with the intent of making his home there 
Footnote continued on next page. 
• 
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all who satisfy the traditional requirements. The statute goes 
further and extends these benefits to many children even if they 
(or their families) do not intend to remain in the district in-
definitely. For example, if a child comes to Texas for six 
months for health reasons, he will be eligible for tuition-free 
admission to the public schools. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Or if 
a person comes to Texas to work for a year, his children would 
qualify for tuition-free education. See id., at 37. In short, 
§21.031 grants the benefits of residency to everyone who satis-
fies the traditional residence definition and to some who legiti-
mately could be classified as nonresidents. Since there is no 
indication that this extension of the traditional definition has 
when the desire to make the new home is motivated solely by the 
desire to attend school, Martinez does not have standing to raise 
such a claim. The record shows that Morales does not intend to 
make his home in McAllen: "Morales only intends to reside in the 
McAllen Independent School District until he completes his educa-
tion." Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212, 214 (SD Tex. 
1979). He thus fails to satisfy even this most basic criterion 
of residence. 
• 
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any impermissible basis, 13 we certainly cannot say that 
§21.03l(d} violates the Constitution when a more restrictive 
statute would be permissible. 
IV 
The Constitution permits a State to restrict eligibility 
for tuition-free education to its bona fide residents. We hold 
that §21.031 is a bona fide residence requirement that satisfies 
constitutional standards. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
accordingly is 
Affirmed. 
13The ex tens ion of the traditional definition implicates no 
suspect classification. As the case now stands, there is also no 
_question of any discriminatory application of the statute. See 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves a facial challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the Texas residency requirement governing minors who 
wish to attend public free schools while living apart from their 
parents or guardians. 
I 
Roberto Morales was born in 1969 in McAllen, Texas, and 
is thus a United States citizen by birth. His parents are Mexi-
can citizens who reside in Reynosa, Mexico. He left Reynosa in 
1977 and returned to McAllen to live with his sister, petitioner 
Oralia Martinez, for the primary purpose of attending school in 
the McAllen Independent School District. Although Martinez is 
now Morales's custodian, she is not--and does not desire to 
become--his guardian. 1 As a result, Morales is not entitled to 
1section 51.02(4) of the Texas Family Code defines "custodi-
an" as "the adult with whom the child resides." Tex . .Pam. Code 
Footnote continued on next page. 
LFP 
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tuition-free admission to the McAllen schools. Section 21.03l(b) 
and (c) of the Texas Education Code would require the local 
school authorities to admit him if he or "his parent, guardian, 
or the person having lawful control of him" resided in the school 
district, Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §21.03l(b) & (c) (Supp. 1982), but 
§21.03l(d) denies tuition-free admission for a minor who lives 
apart from a "parent, guardian, or other person having lawful 
control of him under an order of a court" if his presence in the 
school district is "for the primary purpose of attending the pub-
lie free schools." 2 Respondent McAllen Independent School Dis-
Ann. §51.02(4) (1975). "Guardian" is defined as "the person who, 
under court order, is the guardian of the person of the child or 
the public or private agency with whom the child has been placed 
by a court." §51.02(3). 
2section 21.031 provides, in relevant part: 
"(b) Every child in this state .•. who is over the 
age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on 
the first day of September of the year in which admis-
sion is sought shall be permitted to attend the public 
free schools of the district in which he resides or in 
which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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trict therefore denied Morales's application for admission in the 
control of him resides at the time he applies for ad-
mission. 
"(c) The board of trustees of any public free school 
district of this state shall admit into the public free 
schools of the district free of tuition all persons 
who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the 
beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his 
parent, guardian or person having lawful control re-
sides within the school district. 
"(d) In order for a person under the age of 18 years 
to establish a residence for the purpose of attending 
the public free schools separate and apart from his 
parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control 
of him under an order of a court, it must be estab-
lished that his presence in the school district is not 
for the primary purpose of attending the public free 
schools. The board of trustees shall be responsible 
for determining whether an applicant for admission is a 
resident of the school district for purposes of attend-
ing the public schools." 
Although the "special purpose" test was not codified in 
§21.03l(d) until 1977, it had been a feature of Texas common law 
since at least 1905. See, e.g., De Leon v. Harlingen Consolidat-
ed Independent School District, 552 S.W.2d 922, 924-925 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1977); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. H-63 (1973); Tex. Atty. 
Gen. Op. No. 0-586 (1939); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. ___ (1905). 
Prior to 1905, courts in several States had ruled that a child 
could not acquire residence for school purposes if his presence 
in the school district was for the sole purpose of attending 
school. See, e.g., Yale v. West Middle School District, 59 Conn. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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fall of 1977. 
In December 1977 Martinez, as next friend of Morales, 
and four other adult custodians of school-age children instituted 
the present action in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas against the Texas Commissioner of Edu-
cation, the Texas Education Agency, four local school districts, 
and various local school officials in those disticts. The plain-
tiffs initially alleged that §21.03l(d), both on its face and as 
applied by the defendants, violated certain provisions of the 
Cons ti tut ion, including the Equal Protection Clause, the Due 
Process Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The 
plaintiffs also sought preliminary and permanent injunctive re-
lief. 
The District Court denied a preliminary injunction in 
489, 491, '12 A. 215' , 1.16 (1890); State ex rel. School-District 
Board v. Thayer, 3:1_ Wis. '-fe , ~-Sf, 41 N.W. 1014, 1017 (1889); 
Wheeler v. Burrow, 18 Ind. 14, 17 (1862); School District No. 1 
v. Bragdon, 23 N.H. 507, 510, 516 (1851). 
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August 1978. It found "that the school boards ... have been more 
than liberal in finding that certain children are not living away 
from parents and residing in the school district for the sole 
purpose of attending school." App. 20a. The evidence "conclu-
sively" showed "that children living within the school districts 
with someone other than their parents or legal guardians will be 
admitted to school if~ reason exists for such situation other 
than that of attending school only." Ibid. (emphasis in origi-
nal) . 
Plaintiffs subsequently amended the complaint to narrow 
their claims. They now seek only "a declaration that 
§21.03l(d) is unconstitutional on its face," App. 3a, an injunc-
tion prohibiting defendants from denying the children admission 
to school pursuant to §21.03l(d), restitution of certain tuition 
payments, 3 costs, and attorney's fees. App. 3a, 7a. After a 
3Morales attended school in the McAllen school district dur-
ing the Fall, 1978 semester when Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 
paid tuition on his behalf. Bond has been posted to cover subse-
Footnote continued on next page. 
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hearing on the merits, the District Court granted judgment for 
the defendants. Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212 (1979). 
The court concluded that §21.03l(d) was justified by the State's 
"legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of 
its educational system and the right of its own bona fide resi-
dents to attend state schools on a preferred tuition basis." 482 
F. Supp., at 222. In an appeal by two of the plaintiffs, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 
648 F.2d 425 (1981). In view of the importance of the issue, 4 we 
granted Martinez's petition for certiorari. 457 U.S. (1982). 
We now affirm. 
quent tuition payments. 
4
The vast majority of the States have some residence require- I 
ments governing entitlement to tuition-free public schooling. 
Many States have statutes substantially similar to §21.03l(d). 
See, e.g., Ind. Code §20-8.1-6.1-l(c) (Supp. 1982); Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann., Tit. 20, §859(3) (B) (2) (Supp. 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann., ch. 76, §6 (West 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws §380.1148 (Supp. 
19 81) ; Ore. Rev. St at . § 3 3 2 . 5 9 5 ( 5 ) ( 19 81) . 
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II 
This Court frequently has considered constitutional 
challenges to residence requirements. On several occasions the 
Court has invalidated requirements that condition receipt of a 
benefit on a minimum period of residence within a jurisdiction, 
but it always has been careful to distinguish such durational 
residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements. In 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), for example, the Court 
invalidated one-year durational residence requirements that ap-
plicants for public assistance benefits in Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, and the District of Columbia were forced to satisfy--
despite the fact that they otherwise had "met the test for resi-
dence in their jurisdictions," id., at 627. JUSTICE BRENNAN, 
writing for the Court, stressed that "[t]he residence requirement 
and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and in-
dependent prerequisites for assistance," id., at 636, and care-
fully "impl [ ied] no view of the val id i ty of waiting-period or 
residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibil-
second draft: Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 page 8. 
ity for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a 
profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth," id., at 638 n. 21. 
In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the Court similarly 
invalidated Tennessee laws requiring a prospective voter to have 
been a state resident for one year and a county resident for 
three months, but it explicitly distinguished these durational 
residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements, 
id., at 334, 337 n. 7, 338, 343, 350 n. 20, 351-352. This was 
not an empty distinction. JUSTICE MARSHALL, writing for the 
Court, again emphasized that "States have the power to require 
that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political sub-
division." Id., at 343. See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
County, 415 U.S. 250, 255, 267 (1974) (invalidating one-year 
durational residence requirement before an applicant became eli-
gible for public medical assistance, but recognizing validity of 
appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence 
requirements) • 5 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
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We specifically have approved bona fide residence re-
quirements in the field of public education. The Connecticut 
statute before us in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), for 
example, was constitutionally infirm because it created an 
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for state university 
students whose legal addresses were outside of the State before 
they applied for admission. The statute violated the Due Process 
Clause because it in effect classified bona fide state residents 
as nonresidents for tuition purposes. But we "fully recognize[d] 
that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserv-
ing ... the right of its own bona fide residents to attend [its 
colleges and universities] on a preferential tuition basis." 
Id., at 452-453. This "legitimate interest" permits a "State 
[to] establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status as to 
5In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, 424 U.S. 
645 (1976) (per curiam), the Court upheld a bona fide continuing-
residence requirement. Again, we carefully distinguished this 
from a durational residence requirement. Id., at 646-647. 
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make virtually certain that students who are not, in fact, bona 
fide residents of the State, but who have come there solely for 
educational purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-state 
rates." Id., at 453-454. 6 Last Term, in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
6Two years before Vlandis, the Court upheld a domicile re-
quirement for resident tuition rates at the University of Minne-
sota. Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), summarily aff'g 
326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970) (three-judge court). The governing 
regulations declared: "No student is eligible for resident clas-
sification in the University ... unless he has been a bona fide 
domiciliary of the state for at least a year immediately prior 
thereto ...• For University purposes, a student does not acquire 
a domicile in Minnesota until he has been here for at least a 
year primarily as a permanent resident and not merely as a stu-
dent: this involves the probability of his remaining in Minnesota 
beyond his completion of school." 326 F. Supp., at 235-236. 
Shortly after Vlandis, we upheld a domicile requirement for 
resident tuition rates at the University of Washington. Sturgis 
v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057, summarily aff'g 368 F. Supp. 38 (WD 
Wash. 1973) (three-judge court). The relevant statute declared: 
"The term 'resident student' shall mean a student who has a domi-
cile in the state of Washington for ... one year ... and has in 
fact established a bona fide domicile in this state for other 
than educational purposes ...• " 368 F. Supp., at 39 n. 1. "Domi-
cile" was defined as "a person's true, fixed and permanent home 
and place of habitat ion. It is the place where he intends to 
remain, and to which he expects to return when he leaves without 
intending to establish a new domicile elsewhere." Ibid. 
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(1982), we reviewed an aspect of Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 
§21.031--the statute at issue in this case. Although we invali-
dated the portion of the statute that excluded undocumented alien 
children from the public free schools, we recognized the school 
districts' right "to apply established criteria for determin-
ing residence." Id., at n. 22. See id., at n. 4 (POW-
ELL, J., concurring) ("Of course a school district may require 
that illegal alien children, like any other children, actually 
reside in the school district before admitting them to the 
schools. A requirement of de facto residency, uniformly applied, 
would not violate any principle of equal protection."). 
A bona fide residence requirement, uniformly applied, 
generally is justified under the Equal Protection Clause by a 
State's substantial interest in seeing that services provided 
specifically for its residents are enjoyed only by residents. 7 
~~~ 
7A bona fide f residence requirement implicates no "suspect" 
classification,) so wg eo not subject it to strict scrutiny. In-
deed, there is nothing discriminatory about a bona fide residence 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Unlike a durational residence requirement, 
; ::,e ~ n or penalize the constitutional right of inter-
state travel, 8 for any person is free to move to a State and to 
./ 
establish residence. A bona fide residence requirement simply 
requires that the person does establish residence before demand-
ing the services that are restricted to residents. 
~ ~ ~ 
requirement if it is l\~rop9 r1'y applied. Thus "'wem~ e 
simply whether there is a rational basis for it. 
This ~ mes, of course, that the "service" that the 
I\ 
State would deny to nonresidents is not a fundamental right pro-
tected by the Constitution. A State, for example, may not refuse 
to provide counsel to 
criminal trial where 
an 
a 
indigent nonresident defendant at a 
deprivation of liberty occurs. See 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). As we previously have 
recognized, however, "[p]ublic education is not a 'right' granted 
to individuals by the Constitution." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
__ , __ (1982) (citing San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)). 
8The courts below construed §21. 031 (d) to apply to children 
entering a Texas school district not only from other States or 
countries, but also from other school districts within Texas. 
648 .F.2d, at 428; 482 .F. Supp., at 222. Thus there are 
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of the statute that do not ~ invo ve interstate 
alone burden or penalize it. Since the complaint -l s a~ 
facial challenge of §21.03l(d), this construction~is 
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There is a further, independent justification for local 
residence requirements in the public school context. As we ex-
plained in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974): 
"No single tradition in public education is more deeply 
rooted than local control over the operation of 
schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential 
both to the maintenance of community concern and sup-
port for public schools and to quality of the educa-
tional process.... [L] ocal control over the education-
al process affords citizens an opportunity to partici-
pate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of 
school programs to fit local needs, and encourages 
'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition 
for educational excellence.'" 418 U.S., at 741-742 
( quoting San Antonio Independent School Di strict v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)}. 
Indeed, the provision of primary and secondary education is per-
haps the most important function of local government today. Ab-
sent residence requirements, there can be little doubt that the 
~ .. a1a,~~ ~~~ 
would suffer significantly. 9 The State 
/\ 
9The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's findings 
on the adverse impact that invalidating §21.03l(d} would have on 
the quality of education in Texas. 648 F.2d, at 428-429. The 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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thus has a substantial interest in imposing bona fide residence 
requirements to maintain the quality of the local public schools. 
III 
District Court explicitly found: 
"26. If [§21.03l(d)] were declared unconstitutional, 
it would, in all probability, cause the immediate en-
rollment of thousands of children from other states and 
countries who are United States citizens whose parents 
do not reside within the relevant school district. 
Furthermore, the enrollment would probably increase 
significantly each year. 
"28. Declaring the statute unconstitutional would 
cause substantial numbers of int [er] -district trans-
fers, which would further cause school populations to 
fluctuate •... 
"29. Fluctuating school populations would make it 
impossible to predict enrollment f igures--even on a 
semester-by-semester 
estimates on teachers, 
"30. The increased 
basis, causing over-or-under-
supplies, materials, etc. 
enrollment of students would 
cause overcrowded classrooms and related facilities; 
over-large teacher-pupil ratios; expansion of bilingual 
programs; the purchase of books, equipment, supplies 





i would require a substantial increase in the budget of the school d ~ ricts." 482 F. Supp., at 215. 
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The central question we must decide here is whether 
§21.03l(d) is a bona fide residence requirement. 10 Although the 
10we need not decide whether §21.03l(d) has been applied uni-
formly, see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 
255 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 n. 13 (1972); 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S., at __ n. 4 (POWELL, J., concurring), 
for the plaintiffs limited their complaint to a facial challenge 
of §21. 031 (d) . In any event, the District Court's findings at 
the preliminary injunction stage, App. 20a, appear to preclude 
any claim that §21.03l(d) has been applied in a discriminatory 
fashion. 
We reject Martinez's argument that §21.03l(d) violates the Due 
Process Clause because it creates an irrebuttable presumption of 
nonresidence. Brief for Petitioner 46-49. See Vlandis v. Kline, 
412 U. S . 4 41 , 4 4 6 ( 19 7 3 ) ( "St at u t es c re at in g permanent 
irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due 
Process Clauses .•.. "). ~rales easily could rebut any "presump-
tion" of nonresidence if he were, in fact, a resident. See App. 
20a. 
We also find no merit to Martinez's argument that §21.03l(d) 
constitutes an impermissible burden on children who chose to 
adopt a nontraditional family-living arrangement. Brief for Pe-
titioner 23-24. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he Constitution prevents 
[a city] from standardizing its children--and its adults--by 
forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family 
patterns."). Although §21.031 (d) applies only to children who 
live "separate and apart from" a parent or guardian, subsections 
(b) and (c) impose a residence requirement on parents and guard-
ians. Parents or guardians could not satisfy this requirement if 
the sole purpose of their presence in the district was to enable 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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meaning may vary according to context, "residence" generally re-
quires both physical presence and an intention to remain. 11 As 
their child to attend the public free schools. Such "residence" 
would not satisfy the traditional criteria, see infra, at __ , 
and n. 12, that the Texas courts frequently have recognized. 
See, e.g., Mills v. Bartlett, 377 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1964) 
(residence determined by presence and in tent ion) ; Whitney v. 
State, 472 S.W.2d 524, 525-526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (same); 
Harrison v. Chesshir, 316 S.W.2d 909, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) 
("A residence is established by personal presence in a fixed and 
permanent abode with intention of remaining there. The fundamen-
tal elements necessary to create a residence in a particular 
place are actual bodily presence in the place combined with a 
freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for 
an indefinite time without any present intention to remove from 
the same."), rev'd on other grounds, 159 Tex. 359, 320 S.W.2d 814 
( 19 5 9 ) ( pe r cur i am) . 
11several States have recognized the "intention to remain" 
requirement in the context of public school admissions. See, 
~, Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-253 (d) (Supp. 1981) ("Children resid-
ing with relatives or nonrelatives, when it is the intention of 
such relatives or nonrelatives and of the children or their par-
ents or guardians that such residence is to be permanent ... , 
shall be entitled to all free school privileges accorded to resi-
dent children of the school district in which they then 
reside."); Colo. Rev. Stat. §22-1-102 (2) (g) (1973) (child deemed 
resident of school district if "the child adopts a dwelling place 
within the district with the intent to remain there indefinitely 
and with the intent not to return to the dwelling place from 
which he came"); Op. No. 76-94, 1975-1976 Biennial Report of the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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the Supreme Court of Maine explained over a century ago, 
"When ... a person voluntarily takes up his abode in 
a given place, with intention to remain permanently, or 
for an indefinite period of time; or, to speak more 
accurately, when a person takes up his abode in a given 
place, without any present intention to remove there-
from, such place of abode becomes his residence •... " 
Inhabitants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 43 
Me . 4 0 6 , 4 18 ( 18 5 7) . 
This classic two-part definition of residence has been recognized 
Atty. Gen. of S.D. 660, 662 (1976) (intent is "the key factor in 
determining residency for school purposes"); Op. No. 2825, 
1969-1970 Annual Report & Official Opinions of the Atty. Gen. of 
S.C. 39, 40 (1970) (student may attend school in district if he 
and his parent are "'actually resident in the district, with ap-
parently no present purpose of removal'") (quoting 79 C.J .s., 
Schools and School Districts, §449, at 356 (1952)); Op. No. 59-
146, 1915-1971 Ariz. Atty. Gen. Reports & Opinions 218, 220 
(1959) (For parents to establish residence or domicile in Arizona 
sufficient to entitle children to tuition-free schooling, there 
must be "an actual presence in the state, coupled with an inten-
tion to remain in the state and make [it] their home," abandoning 
their former residence.); In re VanCurran, 18 Ed. Dept. Rep. 523, 
524 (N.Y. Comm'r Educ. 1979) ("In order for [student] to be con-
sidered a resident of the [school] district, she must establish 
that her residence there is her actual and only place of domicile 
and that it is intended to be permanent."). 
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as a minimum standard in a wide range of contexts time and time 
again.12 
In Vlandis v. Kline, supra, we approved a more rigorous 
domicile test as a "reasonable standard for determining the resi-
dential status of a student." 412 U.S., at 454. That standard 
was described as follows: "' In reviewing a claim of in-state 
status, the issue becomes essentially one of domicile. In gener-
al, the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and perma-
nent home and place of habitation. It is the place to which, 
whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.'" 
Ibid. (quoting Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of 
12see, e.g., Kiehne v. Atwood, 93 N.M. 657, 662, 604 P.2d 123, 
12 8 ( 19 7 9 ) ; Bu 11 frog Mar in a , Inc • v . Lentz , 2 8 u ta h 2 d 2 61 , 2 6 9 -
270, 501 P.2d 266, 272 (1972); Estate of Schoof v. Schoof, 193 
Kan. 611, 614, 396 P.2d 329, 331-332 (1964); Hughes v. Ill. Pub. 
Aid Comm'n, 2 Ill.2d 374, 380, 118 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1954); Spratt 
v. Spratt, 210 La. 370, 371, 27 So.2d 154, 154 (1946); Appeal of 
Lawrence County, 71 S.D. 49, 51, 21 N.W.2d 57, 58 (1945); Jenkins 
v. North Shore Dye House, Inc., 277 Mass. 440, 444, 178 N.E. 644, 
646 (1931); Thomas v. Warner, 83 Md. 14, 20, 34 A. 830, 831 
(1896); Pfoutz v. Cornford, 36 Pa. 420, 422 (1860). 
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Connecticut Regarding Non-Resident Tuition, Sept. 6, 1972); cf. 
n. 6, supra. This standard could not be applied to school-age 
children in the same way that it was applied to college students. 
But at the very least, a school district generally would be jus-
tified in requiring school-age children or their parents to sat-
isfy the traditional, basic residence criteria--i.e., to live in 
the district with the intention of remaining there indefinitely--
before it treated them as residents. 
Section 21.031 is far more generous than this tradition-
al standard. It compels a school district to permit a child such 
as Morales to attend school without paying tuition if he has a 
bona fide intention to remain in the school district indefinite-
ly, 13 for he then would have a reason for being there other than 
131n most cases, of course, it is the intention of the parent 
or guardian on behalf of the child that is relevant. See Deterly 
v. Wells, 53 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (minor pre-
sumed to lack capacity to form requisite intention necessary to 
establish separate domicile). But for convenience we speak of 
the child's intention. 
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his desire to attend school: his intention to make his home in 
h d
. . 14 
t e 1str1ct. Thus §21.031 grants the benefits of residency to 
all who satisfy the traditional requirements. The statute goes 
further and extends these benefits to many children even if they 
(or their families) do not intend to remain in the district in-
definitely. For example, if a child comes to Texas for six 
months for health reasons, he will be eligible for tuition-free 
admission to the public schools. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Or if 
a person comes to Texas to work for a year, his children would 
qualify for tuition-free education. See id., at 37. In short, 
14Respondents have conceded that "the statute permits any 
child to attend school in a district in which he is present for 
the purpose of 'establishing a home.'" Brief for Respondents 25. 
But even if §21.03l(d) could be read to exclude a child who moves 
to a school district with the intent of making his home there 
when the desire to make the new home is motivated solely by the 
desire to attend school, Martinez does not have standing to raise 
such a claim. The record shows that Morales does not intend to 
make his home in McAllen: "Mor ales only intends to reside in the 
McAllen Independent School District until he completes his educa-
tion." Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212, 214 (SD Tex. 
1979). He thus fails to satisfy even this most basic criterion 
of residence. 
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§21.031 grants the benefits of residency to everyone who satis-
fies the traditional residence definition and to some who legiti-
mately could be classified as nonresidents. Since there is no 
indication that this extension of the traditional definition has 
any impermissible basis, we certainly cannot say that §21.03l(d) 
violates the Constitution when a more restrictive statute would 
be permissible. 
IV 
The Constitution permits a State to restrict eligibility 
for tuition-free education to its bona fide residents. We hold 
that §21.031 is a bona fide residence requirement that satisfies 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves a facial challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the Texas residency requirement governing minors who 
wish to attend public free schools while living apart from their 
parents or guardians. 
I 
Roberto Morales was born in 1969 in McAllen, Texas, and 
is thus a United States citizen by birth. His parents are Mexi-
can citizens who reside in Reynosa, Mexico. He left Reynosa in 
1977 and returned to McAllen to live with his sister, petitioner 
Oralia Martinez, for the primary purpose of attending school in 
the McAllen Independent School District. Although Martinez is 
now Morales's custodian, she is not--and does not desire to 
become--his guardian. 1 As a result, Morales is not entitled to 
tuition-free admission to the McAllen schools. Section 21.03l(b} 
and (c} of the Texas Education Code would require the local 
school authorities to admit him if he or "his parent, guardian, 
or the person having lawful control of him" resided in the school 
district, Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §21.03l(b} & (c} (Supp. 1982), but 
§ 21. 0 31 (d} denies tuition-free admission for a minor who 1 ives 
1section 51.02 (4) of the Texas Family Code defines "custodi-
an" as "the adult with whom the child resides." Tex. Pam. Code 
Ann. §51.02(4) (1975). "Guardian" is defined as "the person who, 
under court order, is the guardian of the person of the child or 
the public or private agency with whom the child has been placed 
by a court. 11 §51.02 (3). 
LPf 
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apart from a "parent, guardian, or other person having lawful 
control of him under an order of a court" if his presence in the 
school district is "for the primary purpose of attending the pub-
lic free schools. 112 Respondent McAllen Independent School Dis-
2section 21.031 provides, in relevant part: 
"(b) Every child in this state ... who is over the 
age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on 
the first day of September of the year in which admis-
sion is sought shall be permitted to attend the public 
free schools of the district in which he resides or in 
which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful 
control of him resides at the time he applies for ad-
mission. 
"(c) The board of trustees of any public free school 
district of this state shall admit into the public free 
schools of the district free of tuition all persons 
who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the 
beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his 
parent, guardian or person having lawful control re-
sides within the school district. 
"(d) In order for a person under the age of 18 years 
to establish a residence for the purpose of attending 
the public free schools separate and apart from his 
parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control 
of him under an order of a court, it must be estab-
lished that his presence in the school district is not 
for the primary purpose of at tending the public free 
schools. The board of trustees shall be responsible 
for determining whether an applicant for admission is a 
resident of the school district for purposes of attend-
ing the public schools." 
Although the "special purpose" test was not codified in 
§21.03l(d) until 1977, it had been a feature of Texas common law 
since at least 1905. See, e.g., De Leon v. Harlingen Consolidat-
ed Independent School District, 552 S.W.2d 922, 924-925 {Tex. 
Civ. App. 1977); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. H-63 (Jul. 12, 1973); 
Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 0-586 (___ , 1939); Tex. Atty. Gen. 
Op. No. ____ ( ______ , 1905). Before 190S, courts in sever-
al States had ruled that a child could not acquire residence for 
school purposes if his presence in the school district was for 
the sole purpose of attending school. See, e.g., Yale v. West 
Middle School District, 59 Conn. 489, 491, 22 A. 295, 296 (1890); 
State ex rel. School District Board v. Thayer, 74 Wis. 48, 58-59, 
41 N.W. 1014, 1017 (1889); Wheeler v. Burrow, 18 Ind. 14, 17 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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trict therefore denied Morales's application for admission in the 
fall of 1977. 
In December 1977 Martinez, as next friend of Morales, 
and four other adult custodians of school-age children instituted 
the present action in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas against the Texas Commissioner of Edu-
cation, the Texas Education Agency, four local school districts, 
and various local school officials in those disticts. The plain-
tiffs initially alleged that §21.03l(d), both on its face and as 
applied by the defendants, violated certain provisions of the 
Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause, the Due 
Process Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The 
plaintiffs also sought preliminary and permanent injunctive re-
lief. 
The District Court denied a preliminary injunction in 
August 1978. It found "that the school boards ... have been more 
than liberal in finding that certain children are not living away 
from parents and residing in the school district for the sole 
purpose of attending school." App. 20a. The evidence "conclu-
sively" showed "that children living within the school districts 
with someone other than their parents or legal guardians will be 
admitted to school if i!.!!.Y.. reason exists for such situation other 
than that of attending school only." Ibid. (emphasis in origi-
nal) . 
(1862); School District No. 1 v. Bragdon, 23 N.H. S07, 510, 516 
(1851). 
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Plaintiffs subsequently amended the complaint to narrow 
their claims. They now seek only "a declaration that 
§21.03l(d) is unconstitutional on its face," App. 3a, an injunc-
tion prohibiting defendants from denying the children admission 
to school pursuant to §21.03l(d), restitution of certain tuition 
payments, 3 costs, and attorney's fees. App. 3a, 7 a. After a 
hearing on the merits, the District Court granted judgment for 
the defendants. Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 P. Supp. 212 (1979). 
The court concluded that §21.03l(d) was justified by the State's 
"legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of 
its educational system and the right of its own bona fide resi-
dents to attend state schools on a preferred tuition basis." 482 
P. Supp., at 222. In an appeal by two of the plaintiffs, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 
648 P.2d 425 (1981). In view of the importance of the issue, 4 we 
granted Martinez's petition for certiorari. 457 U.S. 
We now affirm. 
(1982). 
3Morales attended school in the McAllen school district dur-
ing the Pall, 1978 semester when Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 
paid tuition on his behalf. Bond has been posted to cover subse-
quent tuition payments. 
4The vast majority of the States have some residence require-
ments governing entitlement to tuition-free public schooling. 
Many States have statutes substantially similar to §21.03l(d). 
See, e.g., Ind. Code §20-8.1-6.1-l(c) (Supp. 1982); Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann., Tit. 20, §859(3) (B) (2) (Supp. 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann., ch. 76, §6 (West 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws §380.1148 (Supp. 
1981); Ore. Rev. Stat. §332.595(5) (1981). 
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II 
This Court frequently has considered constitutional 
challenges to residence requirements. On several occasions the 
Court has invalidated requirements that condition receipt of a 
benefit on a minimum period of residence within a jurisdiction, 
but it always has been careful to distinguish such durational 
residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements. In 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), for example, the Court 
invalidated one-year durational residence requirements that ap-
plicants for public assistance benefits in Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, and the District of Columbia were forced to satisfy--
despite the fact that they otherwise had "met the test for resi-
dence in their jurisdictions," id., at 627. JUSTICE BRENNAN, 
writing for the Court, stressed that "[t]he residence requirement 
and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and in-
dependent prerequisites for assistance," id., at 636, and care-
fully "impl [ied] no view of the validity of waiting-period or 
residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibil-
ity for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a 
profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth," id., at 638 n. 21. 
In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the Court similarly 
invalidated Tennessee laws requiring a prospective voter to have 
been a state resident for one year and a county resident for 
three months, but it explicitly distinguished these durational 
residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements, 
id., at 334, 337 n. 7, 338, 343, 350 n. 20, 351-352. This was 
not an empty distinction. JUSTICE MARSHALL, writing for the 
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Court, again emphasized that "States have the power to require 
that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political sub-
division." Id., at 343. See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
County, 415 U.S. 250, 255, 267 (1974) (invalidating one-year 
durational residence requirement before an applicant became eli-
gible for public medical assistance, but recognizing validitv of 
appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence 
requirements) . 5 
We specifically have approved bona fide residence re-
quirements in the field of public education. The Connecticut 
statute before us in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), for 
example, was constitutionally infirm because it created an 
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for state university 
students whose legal addresses were outside of the State before 
they applied for admission. The statute violated the Due Process 
Clause because it in effect classified bona fide state residents 
as nonresidents for tuition purposes. But we "fully recognize[d] 
that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserv-
ing ... the right of its own bona fide residents to attend [its 
colleges and universities] on a preferential tuition basis." 
Id., at 452-453. This "legitimate interest" permits a "State 
[to] establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status as to 
make virtually certain that students who are not, in fact, bona 
5 In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, 424 U.S. 
645 (1976) (per curiam), the Court upheld a bona fide continuing-
residence requirement. Again, we carefully distinguished this 
from a durational residence requirement. Id., at 646-647. 
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fide residents of the State, but who have come there solely for 
educational purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-state 
r ates . " I d . , at 4 5 3 -4 5 4 • 6 Las t Term , in P 1 y 1 er v • Doe , 4 5 7 U. S . 
(1982), we reviewed an aspect of Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 
§21.031--the statute at issue in this case. Although we invali-
dated the portion of the statute that excluded undocumented alien 
children from the public free schools, we recognized the school 
districts' right "to apply ••. established criteria for determin-
ing residence." Id. , at n. 22. See id., at n. 4 (POW-
ELL, J., concurring) ("Of course a school district may require 
that illegal alien children, like any other children, actually 
reside in the school district before admitting them to the 
schools. A requirement of de facto residency, uniformly applied, 
6Two years before Vlandis, the Court upheld a domicile re-
quirement for resident tuition rates at the University of Minne-
sota. Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), summarily aff'g 
326 .P. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970) (three-judge court). The governing 
regulations declared: "No student is eligible for resident clas-
sification in the University ... unless he has been a bona fide 
domiciliary of the state for at least a year immediately prior 
thereto .••• .For University purposes, a student does not acquire 
a domicile in Minnesota until he has been here for at least a 
year primarily as a permanent resident and not merely as a stu-
dent; this involves the probability of his remaining in Minnesota 
beyond his completion of school." 326 .P. Supp., at 235-236. 
Shortly after Vlandis, we upheld a domicile requirement for 
resident tuition rates at the University of Washington. Sturgis 
v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057, summarily aff'g 368 .P. Supp. 38 (WD 
Wash. 1973) (three-judge court). The relevant statute declared: 
"The term 'resident student' shall mean a student who has a domi-
cile in the state of Washington for .•. one year ••. and has in 
fact established a bona fide domicile in this state for other 
than educational purposes .•.• " 368 .P. Supp., at 39 n. 1. "Domi-
cile" was defined as "a person's true, fixed and permanent home 
and place of habitat ion. It is the place where he intends to 
remain, and to which he expects to return when he leaves without 
intending to establish a new domicile elsewhere." Ibid. 
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would not violate any principle of equal protection."). 
A bona fide residence requirement, uniformly applied, 
generally is justified under the Equal Protection Clause by a 
State's substantial interest in seeing that services provided 
specifically for its residents are enjoyed only by residents. 7 
Unlike a durational residence requirement, such a requirement 
imposes no mandatory period of residence. It therefore does not l 
burden or penalize the constitutional right of interstate 
travel, 8 for any person is free to move to a State and to estab-
lish residence. A bona fide residence requirement simply re-
quires that the person does establish residence before demanding 
the services that are restricted to residents. 
7A bona fide residence requirement implicates no "suspect" 
classification, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny. 
Indeed, there is nothing invidiously discriminatory about a bona 
fide residence requirement if it is uniformly applied. Thus the 
question is simply whether there is a rational basis for it. 
This view assumes, of course, that the "service" that the State 
would deny to nonresidents is not a fundamental right protected 
by the Constitution. A State, for example, may not refuse to 
provide counsel to an indigent nonresident defendant at a crimi-
nal trial where a deprivation of liberty occurs. See Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). As we previously have recognized, 
however, "[p]ublic education is not a 'right' granted to individ-
uals by the Constitution." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. __ , __ 
(1982) (citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)). 
8The courts below construed §21.03l(d) to apply to children 
entering a Texas school district not only from other States or 
countries, but also from other school districts within Texas. 
648 F.2d, at 428; 482 F. Supp., at 222. Thus there are applica-
tions of the statute that do not even involve interstate travel, 
let alone burden or penalize it. This construction alone is 
fatal to any argument based on the right of interstate travel, 
because the complaint is limited to a facial challenge of 
§21.03l(d). 
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There is a further, independent justification for local 
residence requirements in the public school context. As we ex-
plained in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974): 
"No single tradition in public education is more deeply 
rooted than local control over the operation of 
schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential 
both to the maintenance of community concern and sup-
port for public schools and to quality of the educa-
tional process .... (L]ocal control over the education-
al process affords citizens an opportunity to partici-
pate in decisionrnaking, permits the structuring of 
school programs to fit local needs, and encourages 
'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition 
for educational excellence.'" 418 U.S., at 741-742 
( quoting San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)). 
Indeed, the provision of primary and secondary education is per-
haps the most important function of local government today. Ab-
sent residence requirements, there can be little doubt that the 
proper planning and operation of the schools would suffer signif-
icantly.9 The State thus has a substantial interest in imposing 
9The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's findings 
on the adverse impact that invalidating §21.03l(d) would have on 
the quality of education in Texas. 648 .F.2d, at 428-429. The 
District Court explicitly found: 
"28. Declaring the statute unconstitutional would 
cause substantial numbers of int [er] -district trans-
fers, which would ... cause school populations to fluc-
tuate .... 
"29. .Fluctuating school populations would make it 
impossible to predict enrollment f igures--even on a 
semester-by-semester basis, causing over-or-under-
estimates on teachers, supplies, materials, etc. 
"30. The increased enrollment of students would 
cause overcrowded classrooms and related facilities; 
over-large teacher-pupil ratios; expansion of bilingual 
programs; the purchase of books, equipment, supplies 
and other customary i terns of support; all of which 
.Footnote continued on next page. 
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bona fide residence requirements to maintain the quality of local 
public schools. 
III 
The central question we must decide here is whether 
§21.03l(d} is a bona fide residence requirement. 10 Although the 
would require a substantial increase in the budget of 
the school districts." 482 F. Supp., at 215. 
We do not suggest that findings of this degree of specificity are 
necessary in every case. But they do illustrate the problems 
that prompt States to adopt regulations such as §21.031. 
10we need not decide whether §21.03l(d} has been applied uni-
formly, see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 
255 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 n. 13 (1972); 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S., at __ n. 4 (POWELL, J., concurring}, 
for the plaintiffs limited their complaint to a facial challenge 
of §21. 031 (d} . In any event, the District Court's findings at 
the preliminary injunction stage, App. 20a, appear to preclude 
any claim that §21.03l(d} has been applied in a discriminatory 
fashion. 
We reject Martinez's argument that §21.03l(d} violates the Due 
Process Clause because it creates an irrebuttable presumption of 
nonresidence. Brief for Petitioner 46-49; see Vlandis v. Kline, 
412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973). Morales easily could rebut any "pre-
sumption" of nonresidence if he were, in fact, a resident. See 
App. 20a. 
We also find no merit to Martinez's argument that §21.03l(d} 
constitutes an impermissible burden on children who chose to 
adopt a nontraditional family-living arrangement. Brief for Pe-
titioner 23-24; see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 506 (1977) {plurality opinion}. Although §21.03l(d} applies 
only to children who live "separate and apart from" a parent or 
guardian, subsections (b} and (c) impose a residence requirement 
on parents and guardians. Parents or guardians could not satisfy 
this requirement if the sole purpose of their presence in the 
district was to enable their child to attend the public free 
schools. Such "residence" would not satisfy the traditional cri-
teria, see infra, at , and n. 12, that the Texas courts fre-
quently have recognizea. See, e.g., Mills v. Bartlett, 377 
S.W.2d 636, 637 {Tex. 1964); Whitney v. State, 472 S.W.2d 524, 
525-526 {Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Harrison v. Chesshir, 316 S.W.2d 
909, 915 {Tex. Civ. App. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 159 Tex. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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meaning may vary according to context, "residence" generally re-
quires both physical presence and an intention to rernain. 11 As 
the Supreme Court of Maine explained over a century ago, 
"When .•. a person voluntarily takes up his abode in 
a given place, with intention to remain permanently, or 
for an indefinite period of t irne; or, to speak more 
accurately, when a person takes up his abode in a given 
place, without any present intention to remove there-
from, such place of abode becomes his residence ...• " 
Inhabitants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 43 
Me . 4 0 6 , 418 { 18 5 7 ) . 
This classic two-part definition of residence has been recognized 
as a minimum standard in a wide range of contexts time and time 
again. 12 
In Vlandis v. Kline, supra, we approved a more rigorous 
domicile test as a "reasonable standard for determining the resi-
359, 320 S.W.2d 814 (1959) {per curiarn); Prince v. Inman, 280 \ 
S.W.2d 779, 782 {Tex. Civ. App. 1955). 
11several States have recognized the "intention to remain" 
requirement in the context of public school admissions. See, 
~, Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-253 {d) {Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§22-1-102 (2) {g) (1973); Op. No. 76-94, 1975-1976 Biennial Report 
of the Atty. Gen. of S. D. 66 0, 66 2 { 197 6) ; Op. No. 282 5, 19 6 9-
1970 Annual Report & Official Opinions of the Atty. Gen. of S.C. 
39, 40 (1970); Op. No. 59-146, 1915-1971 Ariz. Atty. Gen. Reports 
& Opinions 218, 220 (1959); In re VanCurran, 18 Ed. Dept. Rep. 
523, 524 {N.Y. Cornrn'r Educ. 1979). 
12see, e.g., Kiehne v. Atwood, 93 N.M. 657, 662, 604 P.2d 123, 
12 8 { 19 7 9 ) ; Bu 11 frog Mar in a , Inc . v . Lentz , 2 8 Utah 2 d 2 61 , 2 6 9 -
270, 501 P.2d 266, 272 (1972); Estate of Schoof v. Schoof, 193 
Kan. 611, 614, 396 P.2d 329, 331-332 (1964); Hughes v. Ill. Pub. 
Aid Cornrn'n, 2 Ill.2d 374, 380, 118 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1954); Spratt 
v. Spratt, 210 La. 370, 371, 27 So.2d 154, 154 (1946); Appeal of 
Lawrence County, 71 S.D. 49, 51, 21 N.W.2d 57, 58 (1945); Jenkins 
v. North Shore Dye House, Inc., 277 Mass. 440, 444, 178 N.E. 644, 
646 (1931); Thomas v. Warner, 83 Md. 14, 20, 34 A. 830, 831 
(1896); Pfoutz v. Cornford, 36 Pa. 420, 422 (1860). 
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dential status of a student." 412 U.S., at 454. That standard 
was described as follows: "' In reviewing a claim of in-state 
status, the issue becomes essentially one of domicile. In gener-
al, the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and perma-
nent home and place of habitat ion. It is the place to which, 
whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.'" 
Ibid. (quoting Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of 
Connecticut Regarding Non-Resident Tuition, Sept. 6, 1972); cf. 
n. 6, supra. This standard could not be applied to school-age 
children in the same way that it was applied to college students. 
But at the very least, a school district generally would be jus-
tified in requiring school-age children or their parents to sat-
isfy the traditional, basic residence criteria--i.e., to live in 
the district with the intention of remaining there indefinitely--
before it treated them as residents. 
Section 21.031 is far more generous than this tradition-
al standard. It compels a school district to permit a child such 
as Morales to attend school without paying tuition if he has a 
bona fide intention to remain in the school district indefinite-
ly,13 for he then would have a reason for being there other than 
his desire to attend school: his intention to make his home in 
the district. 14 Thus §21.031 grants the benefits of residency to 
13 In most cases, of course, it is the intention of the parent 
or guardian on behalf of the child that is relevant. See Deterly 
v. Wells, 53 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (minor pre-
sumed to lack capacity to form requisite intention necessary to 
establish separate domicile). But for convenience we speak of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Pootnote(s) 14 will appear on following pages. 
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all who satisfy the traditional requirements. The statute goes 
further and extends these benefits to many children even if they 
(or their families) do not intend to remain in the district in-
definitely. For example, if a child comes to Texas for six 
months for health reasons, he will be eligible for tuition-free 
admission to the public schools. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Or if 
a person comes to Texas to work for a year, his children would 
qualify for tuition-free education. See id., at 37. 
. -- In short, 
§21.031 grants the benefits of residency to everyone who satis-
fies the traditional residence definition and to some who legiti-
ma tely could be classified as nonresidents. Since there is no 
indication that this extension of the traditional definition has 
any impermissible basis, we certainly cannot say that §21.03l(d) 
violates the Constitution when a more restrictive statute would 
be permissible. 
IV 
the child's intention. 
14Respondents have conceded that "the statute permits any 
child to attend school in a district in which he is present for 
the purpose of 'establishing a home."' Brief for Respondents 25. 
But even if §21.03l(d) could be read to exclude a child who moves 
to a school district with the intent of making his home there 
when the desire to make the new home is motivated solely by the 
desire to attend school, Martinez does not have standing to raise 
such a claim. The record shows that Morales does not intend to 
make his home in McAllen: "Morales only intends to reside in the 
McAllen Independent School District until he completes his educa-
tion." Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 .F. Supp. 212, 214 (SD Tex. 
1979). He thus fails to satisfy even this most basic criterion 
of residence. 
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The Constitution permits a State to restrict eligibility 
for tuition-free education to its bona fide residents. We hold 
that §21.031 is a bona fide residence requirement that satisfies 











W Y-: r 
O::: W -· -
C::: ·-
Q_ ( " 
::> :::, 
(/') (.L 
mfs 03/16/83 11 oras-=r & Mrc~ae{ Sturl7 
2so73 
CHAMBERS DRAFT: Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 Cha.»1hers tJraF+ 
r copies 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves a facial challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the Texas residency requirement governing minors who 
wish to attend public free schools while living apart from their 





Roberto Morales was born in 1969 in McAllen, Texas, and 
is~ thus a United States citizen by birth. His parents are Mexi-
cc{Q citizens who reside in Reynosa, Mexico. He left Reynosa in 
:z: 
19JJ and returned to McAllen to live with his sister, petitioner 
co -Oralia Martinez, for the primary purpose of attending school in 
the McAllen Independent School District. Although Martinez is 
now Morales's custodian, she is not--and does not desire to 
become--his guardian. 1 As a result, Morales is not entitled to 
tuition-free admission to the McAllen schools. Section 21.03l(b) 
and (c) of the Texas Education Code would require the local 
school authorities to admit him if he or "his parent, guardian, 
or the person having lawful control of him" resided in the school 
district, Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §21.03l(b) & (c) (Supp. 1982), but 
§21.03l(d) denies tuition-free admission for a minor who lives 
1section 51.02(4) of the Texas Family Code defines "custodi-
an" as "the adult with whom the child resides." Tex. Fam. Code 
Ann. §51.02(4) (1975). "Guardian" is defined as "the person who, 
under court order, is the guardian of the person of the child or 
the public or private agency with whom the child has been placed 
by a court. " § 51. 0 2 ( 3) . 
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apart from a "parent, guardian, or other person having lawful 
control of him under an order of a court" if his presence in the 
school district is "for the primary purpose of attending the pub-
lic free schools." 2 Respondent McAllen Independent School Dis-
2section 21.031 provides, in relevant part: 
"(b) Every child in this state •.. who is over the 
age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on 
the first day of September of the year in which admis-
sion is sought shall be permitted to attend the public 
free schools of the district in which he resides or in 
which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful 
control of him resides at the time he applies for ad-
mission. 
"(c) The board of trustees of any public free school 
district of this state shall admit into the public free 
schools of the district free of tuition all persons 
who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the 
beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his 
parent, guardian or person having lawful control re-
sides within the school district. 
"(d) In order for a person under the age of 18 years 
to establish a residence for the purpose of attending 
the public free schools separate and apart from his 
parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control 
of him under an order of a court, it must be estab-
lished that his presence in the school district is not 
for the primary purpose of attending the public free 
schools. The board of trustees shall be responsible 
for determining whether an applicant for admission is a 
resident of the school district for purposes of attend-
ing the public schools." 
Although the "special purpose" test was not codified in 
§21.03l(d) until 1977, it had been a feature of Texas common law 
since at least 1905. See, e.g., De Leon v. Harlingen Consolidat-
ed Independent School District, 552 S.W.2d 922, 924-925 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1977); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. H-63 (Jul. 12, 1973); 
Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 0-586 (•--=---=- , 1939); Tex. Atty. Gen. 
Op. No. - (____ , 1905). Before 1905, courts in sever-
al States had ruled that a child could not acquire residence for 
school purposes if his presence in the school district was for 
the sole purpose of attending school. See, e.g., Yale v. West 
Middle School District, 59 Conn. 489, 491, 22 A. 295, 296 (1890); 
State ex rel. School District Board v. Thayer, 74 Wis. 48, 58-59, 
41 N.W. 1014, 1017 (1889); Wheeler v. Burrow, 18 Ind. 14, 17 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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trict therefore denied Morales's application for admission in the 
fall of 1977. 
In December 1977 Martinez, as next fr iena of Morales, 
and four other adult custodians of school-age children instituted 
the present action in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas against the Texas Commissioner of Edu-
cation, the Texas Education Agency, four local school districts, 
and various local school officials in those disticts. The plain-
tiffs initially alleged that §21.03l(d), both on its face and as 
applied by the defendants, violated certain prov is ions of the 
Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause, the Due 
Process Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The 
plaintiffs also sought preliminary and permanent injunctive re-
lief. 
The District Court denied a preliminary injunction in 
August 1978. It found "that the school boards ... have been more 
than liberal in finding that certain children are not living away 
from parents and residing in the school district for the sole 
purpose of attending school." App. 20a. The evidence "conclu-
sively" showed "that children living within the school districts 
with someone other than their parents or legal guardians will be 
admitted to school if~ reason exists for such situation other 
than that of attending school only." Ibid. (emphasis in origi-
nal) . 
(1862); School District No. 1 v. Bragdon, 23 N.H. 507, 510, 516 
(1851). 
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Plaintiffs subsequently amended the complaint to narrow 
their claims. They now seek only "a declaration that 
§21.03l(d} is unconstitutional on its face," App. 3a, an injunc-
tion prohibiting defendants from denying the children admission 
to school pursuant to §21.03l(d}, restitution of certain tuition 
payments, 3 costs, and attorney's fees. App. 3a, 7a. After a 
hearing on the merits, the District Court granted judgment for 
the defendants. Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212 (1979). 
The court concluded that §21.03l(d} was justified by the State's 
"legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of 
its educational system and the right of its own bona fide resi-
dents to attend state schools on a preferred tuition basis." 482 
F. Supp., at 222. In an appeal by two of the plaintiffs, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 
648 F.2d 425 (1981). In view of the importance of the issue, 4 we 
granted Martinez's petition for certiorari. 457 U.S. 
We now affirm. 
(1982). 
3Morales attended school in the McAllen school district dur-
ing the Fall, 1978 semester when Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 
paid tuition on his behalf. Bond has been posted to cover subse-
quent tuition payments. 
4The vast majority of the States have some residence require-
ments governing entitlement to tuition-free public schooling. 
Many States have statutes substantially similar to §21.03l(d}. 
See, e.g., Ind. Code §20-8.1-6.1-l(c} (Supp. 1982); Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann., Tit. 20, §859(3) (B} (2) (Supp. 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann., ch. 76, §6 (West 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws §380.1148 (Supp. 
19 81} ; Ore. Rev. St at. § 3 3 2 . 5 9 5 ( 5 } ( 19 81} . 
CHAHBERS DRAFT: Martinez v. Bynum, No. 81-857 page 5. 
II 
This Court frequently has considered constitutional 
challenges to residence requirements. On several occasions the 
Court has invalidated requirements that condition receipt of a 
benefit on a minimum period of residence within a jurisdiction, 
but it always has been careful to distinguish such durational 
residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements. In 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), for example, the Court 
invalidated one-year durational residence requirements that ap-
plicants for public assistance benefits in Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, and the District of Columbia were forced to satisfy--
despite the fact that they otherwise had "met the test for resi-
dence in their jurisdictions," id., at 627. JUSTICE BRENNAN, 
writing for the Court, stressed that "[t]he residence requirement 
and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and in-
dependent prerequisites for assistance," id., at 636, and care-
fully "impl [ ied] no view of the validity of waiting-period or 
residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibil-
ity for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a 
profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth," id., at 638 n. 21. 
In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the Court similarly 
invalidated Tennessee laws requiring a prospective voter to have 
been a state resident for one year and a county resident for 
three months, but it explicitly di st ingui shed these duration al 
residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements, 
id., at 334, 337 n. 7, 338, 343, 350 n. 20, 351-352. This was 
not an empty distinction. JUSTICE MARSHALL, writing for the 
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Court, again emphasized that "States have the power to require 
that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political sub-
division." Id., at 343. See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
County, 415 U.S. 250, 255, 267 (1974) (invalidating one-year 
durational residence requirement before an applicant became eli-
gible for public medical assistance, but recognizing validity of 
appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence 
requirements) . 5 
We specifically have approved bona fide residence re-
quirements in the field of public education. The Connecticut 
statute before us in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), for 
example, was constitutionally infirm because it created an 
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for state university 
students whose legal addresses were outside of the State before 
they applied for admission. The statute violated the Due Process 
Clause because it in effect classified bona fide state residents 
as nonresidents for tuition purposes. But we "fully recognize[d] 
that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserv-
ing ... the right of its own bona fide residents to attend [its 
colleges and universities] on a preferential tuition basis." 
Id., at 452-453. This "legitimate interest" permits a "State 
[to] establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status as to 
make virtually certain that students who are not, in fact, bona 
5 In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, 424 U.S. 
645 (1976) (per curiam), the Court upheld a bona fide continuing-
residence requirement. Again, we carefully distinguished this 
from a durational residence requirement. Id., at 646-647. 
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fide residents of the State, but who have come there solely for 
educational purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-state 
r ates . " Id . , a t 4 5 3-4 5 4 • 6 Las t Term , in P 1 y 1 er v • Doe , 4 5 7 U. S • 
(1982), we reviewed an aspect of Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 
§21.031--the statute at issue in this case. Although we invali-
dated the portion of the statute that excluded undocumented alien 
children from the public free schools, we recognized the school 
districts' right "to apply ..• established criteria for determin-
ing residence." Id., at n. 22. See id., at n. 4 (POW-
ELL, J., concurring) ( "Of course a school district may require 
that illegal alien children, like any other children, actually 
reside in the school district before admitting them to the 
schools. A requirement of de facto residency, uniformly applied, 
6Two years before Vlandis, the Court upheld a domicile re-
quirement for resident tuition rates at the University of Minne-
sota. Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), summarily aff'g 
326 .F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970) (three-judge court). The governing 
regulations declared: "No student is eligible for resident clas-
sification in the University ..• unless he has been a bona fide 
domiciliary of the state for at least a year immediately prior 
thereto .... .For University purposes, a student does not acquire 
a domicile in Minnesota until he has been here for at least a 
year primarily as a permanent resident and not merely as a stu-
dent~ this involves the probability of his remaining in Minnesota 
beyond his completion of school." 326 .F. Supp., at 235-236. 
Shortly after Vlandis, we upheld a domicile requirement for 
resident tuition rates at the University of Washington. Sturgis 
v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057, summarily aff'g 368 .F. Supp. 38 (WD 
Wash. 1973) (three-judge court). The relevant statute declared: 
"The term 'resident student' shall mean a student who has a domi-
cile in the state of Washington for ..• one year ... and has in 
fact established a bona fide domicile in this state for other 
than educational purposes ...• " 368 .F. Supp., at 39 n. 1. "Domi-
cile" was defined as "a person's true, fixed and permanent home 
and place of habitat ion. It is the place where he intends to 
remain, and to which he expects to return when he leaves without 
intending to establish a new domicile elsewhere." Ibid. 
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would not violate any principle of equal protection."}. 
A bona fide residence requirement, uniformly applied, 
generally is justified under the Equal Protection Clause by a 
State's substantial interest in seeing that services provided 
specifically for its residents are enjoyed only by residents. 7 
Unlike a durational residence requirement, such a requirement 
imposes no mandatory period of residence. It therefore does not 
burden or penalize the constitutional right of interstate 
travel, 8 for any person is free to move to a State and to estab-
1 ish residence. A bona fide residence requirement simply re-
quires that the person does establish residence before demanding 
the services that are restricted to residents. 
7A bona fide residence requirement implicates no "suspect" 
classification, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny. 
Indeed, there is nothing invidiously discriminatory about a bona 
fide residence requirement if it is uniformly applied. Thus the 
question is simply whether there is a rational basis for it. 
This view assumes, of course, that the "service" that the State 
would deny to nonresidents is not a fundamental right protected 
by the Cons ti tut ion. A State, for example, may not refuse to 
provide counsel to an indigent nonresident defendant at a crimi-
nal trial where a deprivation of liberty occurs. See Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). As we previously have recognized, 
however, "[p]ublic education is not a 'right' granted to individ-
uals by the Constitution." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. , 
(1982) (citing San Antonio Independent School District ~odrT=-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)). 
8The courts below construed §21.03l(d} to apply to children 
entering a Texas school district not only from other States or 
countries, but also from other school districts within Texas. 
648 F.2d, at 428; 482 F. Supp., at 222. Thus there are applica-
tions of the statute that do not even involve interstate travel, 
let alone burden or penalize it. This construction alone is 
fatal to any argument based on the right of interstate travel, 
because the complaint is limited to a facial challenge of 
§21.03l(d}. 
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There is a further, independent justification for local 
residence requirements in the public school context. As we ex-
plained in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974): 
"No single tradition in public education is more deeply 
rooted than local control over the operation of 
schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential 
both to the maintenance of community concern and sup-
pert for public schools and to quality of the educa-
tional process •... [L]ocal control over the education-
al process affords citizens an opportunity to partici-
pate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of 
school programs to fit local needs, and encourages 
'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition 
for educational excellence.'" 418 U.S., at 741-742 
(quoting San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)). 
Indeed, the provision of primary and secondary education is per-
haps the most important function of local government today. Ab-
sent residence requirements, there can be little doubt that the 
proper planning and operation of the schools would suffer signif-
icantly.9 The State thus has a substantial interest in imposing 
9The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's findings 
on the adverse impact that invalidating §21.03l(d) would have on 
the quality of education in Texas. 648 F.2d, at 428-429. The 
District Court explicitly found: 
"28. Declaring the statute unconstitutional would 
cause substantial numbers of int [er] -district trans-
fers, which would ... cause school populations to fluc-
tuate .... 
"29. Fluctuating school populations would make it 
impossible to predict enrollment f igures--even on a 
semester-by-semester basis, causing over-or-under-
estimates on teachers, supplies, materials, etc. 
"30. The increased enrollment of students would 
cause overcrowded classrooms and related facilities; 
over-large teacher-pupil ratios; expansion of bilingual 
programs; the purchase of books, equipment, supplies 
and other customary i terns of support; all of which 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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bona fide residence requirements to maintain the quality of local 
public schools. 
III 
The central question we must decide here is whether 
§21.03l(d) is a bona fide residence requirement. 10 Although the 
would require a substantial increase in the budget of 
the school districts." 482 F. Supp., at 215. 
We do not suggest that findings of this degree of specificity are 
necessary in every case. But they do illustrate the problems 
that prompt States to adopt regulations such as §21.031. 
10we need not decide whether §21.03l(d) has been applied uni-
formly, see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 
255 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 n. 13 (1972); 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S., at n. 4 (POWELL, J., concurring), 
for the plaintiffs limited theircomplaint to a facial challenge 
of §21. 031 ( d) . In any event, the District Court's findings at 
the preliminary injunction stage, App. 20a, appear to preclude 
any claim that §21.031 (d) has been applied in a discriminatory 
fashion. 
We reject Martinez's argument that §21.03l(d) violates the Due 
Process Clause because it creates an irrebuttable presumption of 
nonresidence. Brief for Petitioner 46-49; see Vlandis v. Kline, 
412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973). Morales easily could rebut any "pre-
sumption" of nonresidence if he were, in fact, a resident. See 
App. 20a. 
We also find no merit to Martinez's argument that §21.03l(d) 
constitutes an impermissible burden on children who chose to 
adopt a nontraditional family-living arrangement. Brief for Pe-
titioner 23-24; see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 506 (1977) {plurality opinion). Although §21.03l(d) applies 
only to children who live "separate and apart from" a parent or 
guardian, subsections {b) and (c) impose a residence requirement 
on parents and guardians. Parents or guardians could not satisfy 
this requirement if the sole purpose of their presence in the 
district was to enable their child to attend the public free 
schools. Such "residence" would not satisfy the traditional cri-
teria, see infra, at , and n. 12, that the Texas courts fre-
quently have recognized. See, e.g., Mills v. Bartlett, 377 
S.W.2d 636, 637 {Tex. 1964); Whitney v. State, 472 S.W.2d 524, 
525-526 {Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Harrison v. Chesshir, 316 S.W.2d 
909, 915 {Tex. Civ. App. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 159 Tex. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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meaning may vary according to context, "residence" generally re-
quires both physical presence and an intention to remain. 11 As 
the Supreme Court of Maine explained over a century ago, 
"When •.. a person voluntarily takes up his abode in 
a given place, with intention to remain permanently, or 
for an indefinite period of time; or, to speak more 
accurately, when a person takes up his abode in a given 
place, without any present intention to remove there-
from, such place of abode becomes his residence .••. " 
Inhabitants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 43 
Me • 4 0 6 , 4 18 ( 18 5 7) • 
This classic two-part definition of residence has been recognized 
as a minimum standard in a wide range of contexts time and time 
again. 12 
In Vlandis v. Kline, supra, we approved a more rigorous 
domicile test as a "reasonable standard for determining the resi-
359, 320 S.W.2d 814 (1959) (per curiam); Prince v. Inman, 280 
S.W.2d 779, 782 {Tex. Civ. App. 1955). 
11several States have recognized the "intention to remain" 
requirement in the context of public school admissions. See, 
~, Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-253 (d) (Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§22-1-102 (2) (g) (1973); Op. No. 76-94, 1975-1976 Biennial Report 
of the Atty. Gen. of S.D. 660, 662 (1976); Op. No. 2825, 1969-
1970 Annual Report & Official Opinions of the Atty. Gen. of S.C. 
39, 40 (1970); Op. No. 59-146, 1915-1971 Ariz. Atty. Gen. Reports 
& Opinions 218, 220 (1959); In re VanCurran, 18 Ed. Dept. Rep. 
523, 524 (N.Y. Comm'r Educ. 1979). 
12see, e.g., Kiehne v. Atwood, 93 N.M. 657, 662, 604 P.2d 123, 
12 8 ( 19 7 9 ) ; Bu 11 frog Mar in a , Inc • v . Lentz , 2 8 u ta h 2 d 2 61 , 2 6 9 -
270, 501 P.2d 266, 272 (1972); Estate of Schoof v. Schoof, 193 
Kan. 611, 614, 396 P.2d 329, 331-332 (1964); Hughes v. Ill. Pub. 
Aid Comm'n, 2 Ill.2d 374, 380, 118 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1954); Spratt 
v. Spratt, 210 La. 370, 371, 27 So.2d 154, 154 (1946); Ap~eal of 
Lawrence County, 71 S.D. 49, 51, 21 N.W.2d 57, 58 (1945) ;enkins 
v. North Shore Dye House, Inc., 277 Mass. 440, 444, 178 N.E. 644, 
6 4 6 ( 19 31 ) ; Thomas v . Warner , 8 3 Md . 14 , 2 0 , 3 4 A . 8 3 0 , 8 31 
(1896); Pfoutz v. Cornford, 36 Pa. 420, 422 (1860). 
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dential status of a student." 412 U.S., at 454. That standard 
was described as follows: 111 In reviewing a claim of in-state 
status, the issue becomes essentially one of domicile. In gener-
al, the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and perma-
nent home and place of habitat ion. It is the place to which, 
whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.'" 
Ibid. (quoting Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of 
Connecticut Regarding Non-Resident Tuition, Sept. 6, 1972); cf. 
n. 6, supra. This standard could not be applied to school-age 
children in the same way that it was applied to college students. 
But at the very least, a school district generally would be jus-
tified in requiring school-age children or their parents to sat-
isfy the traditional, basic residence criteria--i.e., to live in 
the district with the intention of remaining there indefinitely--
before it treated them as residents. 
Section 21.031 is far more generous than this tradition-
al standard. It compels a school district to permit a child such 
as Morales to attend school without paying tuition if he has a 
bona fide intention to remain in the school district indefinite-
ly,13 for he then would have a reason for being there other than 
his desire to attend school: his intention to make his home in 
the district. 14 Thus §21.031 grants the benefits of residency to 
13In most cases, of course, it is the intention of the parent 
or guardian on behalf of the child that is relevant. See Deterly 
v. Wells, 53 S.W.2d 847, 848 {Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (minor pre-
sumed to lack capacity to form requisite intention necessary to 
establish separate domicile). But for convenience we speak of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 14 will appear on following pages. 
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all who satisfy the traditional requirements. The statute goes 
further and extends these benefits to many children even if they 
(or their families) do not intend to remain in the district in-
definitely. For example, if a child comes to Texas for six 
months for health reasons, he will be eligible for tuition-free 
admission to the public schools. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Or if 
a person comes to Texas to work for a year, his children would 
qualify for tuition-free education. See id., at 37. In short, 
§21.031 grants the benefits of residency to everyone who satis-
fies the traditional residence definition and to some who legiti-
mately could be classified as nonresidents. Since there is no 
indication that this extension of the traditional definition has 
any impermissible basis, we certainly cannot say that §21.03l(d) 
violates the Constitution when a more restrictive statute would 
be permissible. 
IV 
the child's intention. 
14Respondents have conceded that "the statute permits any 
child to attend school in a district in which he is present for 
the purpose of 'establishing a home.'" Brief for Respondents 25. 
But even if §21.03l(d) could be read to exclude a child who moves 
to a school district with the intent of making his home there 
when the desire to make the new home is motivated solely by the 
desire to attend school, Martinez does not have standing to raise 
such a claim. The record shows that Morales does not intend to 
make his home in McAllen: "Morales only intends to reside in the 
McAllen Independent School District until he completes his educa-
tion." Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212, 214 (SD Tex. 
1979). He thus fails to satisfy even this most basic criterion 
of residence. 
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The Constitution permits a State to restrict eligibility 
for tuition-free education to its bona fide residents. We hold 
that §21.031 is a bona fide residence requirement that satisfies 
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Unlike the housing ordinance we invalidated in Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, the statute before us imposes rational residence 
requirements both on children who live apart from their parents, 
§21.03l(d}, and on children who live with their parents, 
§§21.03l(b} and (c}: see 
~ 
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be applied to school-age children in the same way that it was 
lied to college students, it does of fer us some guidance on 
limitations on bona fide residence reguire-
ments. And it is clear that we have not reached the limits here. 
9 •!JL,t}3ttt-et-the-¥ery-least,-e-seheel-distriet-generally-wettld-be-jtts-
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~-? tional standard. Section 21.031 is far more generous than ehis the tradi-
proposed changes to text on page 12: 1#... 
In short, §21.031 grants the benefits of residency to everyone 
who satisfies the traditional residence definition and to some 
who legitimately could be classified as nonresidents. Since 
there is no indication that this extension of the traditional 
definition has any impermissible basis, we certainly cannot say 
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No. 81-857 
ORALIA MARTINEZ, AS NEXT FRIEND OF ROBERT 
MORALES, PETITIONER v. RAYMON L. BYNUM, 
ETC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves a facial challenge to the constitutionality 
of the Texas residency requirement governing minors who 
wish to attend public free schools while living apart from 
their parents or guardians. 
I 
Roberto Morales was born in 1969 in McAllen, Texas, and 
is thus a United States citizen by birth. His parents are 
Mexican citizens who reside in Reynosa, Mexico. He left 
Reynosa in 1977 and returned to McAllen to live with his sis-
ter, petitioner Oralia Martinez, for the primary purpose of at-
tending school in the McAllen Independent School District. 
Although Martinez is now Morales's custodian, she is not-
and does not desire to become-his guardian. 1 As a result, 
Morales is not entitled to tuition-free admission to the McAl-
len schools. Section 21.031(b) and (c) of the Texas Education 
Code would require the local school authorities to admit him 
1 Section 51.02(4) of the Texas Family Code defines "custodian" as ''the 
adult with whom the child resides." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.02(4) 
(1975). "Guardian" is defined as "the person who, under court order, is 
the guardian of the person of the child or the public or private agency with 
whom the child has been placed by a court. " § 51.02(3). 
2 
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if he or "his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful 
control of him" resided in the school district, Tex. Educ. 
Code Ann. §21.031(b) and (c) (Supp. 1982), but §21.031(d) 
denies tuition-free admission for a minor who lives apart from 
a "parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of 
him under an order of a court" if his presence in the school 
district is "for the primary purpose of attending the public 
free schools." 2 Respondent McAllen Independent School 
2Section 21.031 provides, in relevant part: 
"(b) Every child in this state ... who is over the age of five years and 
not over the age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in 
which admission is sought shall be permitted to attend the public free 
schools of the district in which he resides or in which his parent, guardian, 
or the person having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for 
admission. 
"(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state 
shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all per-
sons ... who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of 
the scholastic year if such person or his parent, guardian or person having 
lawful control resides within the school district. 
"(d) In order for a person under the age of 18 years to establish a resi-
dence for the purpose of attending the public free schools separate and 
apart from his parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of 
him under an order of a court, it must be established that his presence in 
the school district is not for the primary purpose of attending the public 
free schools. The board of trustees shall be responsible for determining 
whether an applicant for admission is a resident of the school district for 
purposes of attending the public schools." 
Although the "special purpose" test was not codified in§ 21.031(d) until 
1977, it had been a feature of Texas common law since at least 1905. See, 
e. g., De Leon v. Harlingen Consolidated Independent School District, 552 
S.W. 2d 922, 924-925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. H--03 
(Jul. 12, 1973); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 0-586 (-, -, 1939); Tex. 
Atty. Gen. Op. No. --(-- , - , 1905). Before 1905, courts in several 
States had ruled that a child could not acquire residence for school pur-
poses if his presence in the school district was for the sole purpose of at-
tending school. See, e. g. , Yale v. West Middle School District, 59 Conn. 
489, 491, 22 A. 295, 296 (1890); State ex rel. School District Board v. 
Thayer, 74 Wis. 48, 58-59, 41 N. W. 1014, 1017 (1889); Wheeler v. Burrow, 
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District therefore denied Morales's application for admission 
in the fall of 1977. 
In December 1977 Martinez, as next friend of Morales, and 
four other adult custodians of school-age children instituted 
the present action in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas against the Texas Commissioner 
of Education, the Texas Education Agency, four local school 
districts, and various local school officials in those disticts. 
The plaintiffs initially alleged that§ 21.031(d), both on its face 
and as applied by the defendants, violated certain provisions 
of the Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Due Process Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. The plaintiffs also sought preliminary and perma-
nent injunctive relief. 
The District Court denied a preliminary injunction in Au-
gust 1978. It found "that the school boards ... have been 
more than liberal in finding that certain children are not liv-
ing away from parents and residing in the school district for 
the sole purpose of attending school." App. 20a. The evi-
dence "conclusively'' showed "that children living within the 
school districts with someone other than their parents or 
legal guardians will be admitted to school if any reason exists 
for such situation other than that of attending school only." 
Ibid. (emphasis in original). 
Plaintiffs subsequently amended the complaint to narrow 
their claims. They now seek only "a declaration that . . . 
§ 21.031(d) is unconstitutional on its face," App. 3a, an injunc-
tion prohibiting defendants from denying the children admis-
sion to school pursuant to § 21.031(d), restitution of certain 
tuition payments, 3 costs, and attorney's fees. App. 3a, 7a. 
18 Ind. 14, 17 (1862); School District No. 1 v. Bragdon, 23 N. H. 507, 510, 
516 (1851). 
3 Morales attended school in the McAllen school district during the Fall, 
1978 semester when Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., paid tuition on his be-
half. Bond has been posted to cover subsequent tuition payments. 
4 
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After a hearing on the merits, the District Court granted 
judgment for the defendants. Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 
F. Supp. 212 (1979). The court concluded that §21.031(d) 
was justified by the State's "legitimate interest in protecting 
and preserving the quality of its educational system and the 
right of its own bona fide residents to attend state schools on 
a preferred tuition basis." 482 F. Supp., at 222. In an ap-
peal by two of the plaintiffs, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 648 F. 2d 425 (1981). 
In view of the importance of the issue, 4 we granted Marti-
nez's petition for certiorari. 457 U. S. -- (1982). We now 
affirm. 
II 
This Court frequently has considered constitutional chal-
lenges to residence requirements. On several occasions the 
Court has invalidated requirements that condition receipt of 
a benefit on a minimum period of residence within a jurisdic-
tion, but it always has been careful to distinguish such 
durational residence requirements from bona fide residence 
requirements. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 
(1969), for example, the Court invalidated one-year 
durational residence requirements that applicants for public 
assistance benefits in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the 
District of Columbia were forced to satisfy-despite the fact 
that they otherwise had "met the test for residence in their 
jurisdictions," id. , at 627. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for 
the Court, stressed that "[t]he residence requirement and the 
one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and inde-
pendent prerequisites for assistance," id., at 636, and care-
• The vast majority of the States have some residence requirements 
governing entitlement to tuition-free public schooling. Many States have 
statutes substantially similar to § 21.031(d). See, e. g., Ind. Code 
§ 20-8.1-6.1-l(c) (Supp. 1982); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. , Tit. 20, § 859(3)(B)(2) 
(Supp. 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. , ch. 76, § 6 (West 1982); Mich. Comp. 
Laws § 380.1148 (Supp. 1981); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 332.595(5) (1981). 
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fully "impl[ied] no view of the validity of waiting-period or 
residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligi-
bility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice 
a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth," id. , at 638, n. 21. 
In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), the Court simi-
larly invalidated Tennessee laws requiring a prospective 
voter to have been a state resident for one year and a county 
resident for three months, but it explicitly distinguished 
these durational residence requirements from bona fide resi-
dence requirements, id., at 334, 337, n. 7, 338, 343, 350, n. 
20, 351-352. This was not an empty distinction. JUSTICE 
MARSHALL, writing for the Court, again emphasized that 
"States have the power to require that voters be bona fide 
residents of the relevant political subdivision." Id., at 343. 
See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 
250, 255, 267 (1974) (invalidating one-year durational resi-
dence requirement before an applicant became eligible for 
public medical assistance, but recognizing validity of appro-
priately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence 
requirements). 5 
We specifically have approved bona fide residence require-
ments in the field of public education. The Connecticut stat-
ute before us in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), for 
example, was constitutionally infirm because it created an 
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for state university 
students whose legal addresses were outside of the State be-
fore they applied for admission. The statute violated the 
Due Process Clause because it in effect classified bona fide 
state residents as nonresidents for tuition purposes. But we 
"fully recognize[d] that a State has a legitimate interest in 
protecting and preservin~ ... the right of its o~ bona fide 
5 ln McCarthy v. Philadelphi,a Civil Service Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 
(1976) (per curiam), the Court upheld a bona fide continuing-residence re-
quirement. Again, we carefully distinguished this from a durational resi-
dence requirement. Id., at 646--647. 
6 
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residents to attend [its colleges and universities] on a pref-
erential tuition basis." Id., at 452--453. This "legitimate in-
terest" permits a "State [to] establish such reasonable crite-
ria for in-state status as to make virtually certain that 
students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the State, 
but who have come there solely for educational purposes, 
cannot take advantage of the in-state rates." Id., at 
453-454. 6 Last Term, in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. --
(1982), we reviewed an aspect of Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 
§ 21.031-the statute at issue in this case. Although we in-
validated the portion of the statute that excluded undocu-
mented alien children from the public free schools, we recog-
nized the school districts' right "to apply . . . established 
criteria for determining residence." Id., at--, n. 22. See 
id., at --, n. 4 (POWELL, J., concurring) ("Of course a 
school district may require that illegal alien children, like any 
other children, actually reside in the school district before ad-
6 Two years before Vlandis, the Court upheld a domicile requirement for 
resident tuition rates at the University of Minnesota. Srorns v. 
Malkerson, 401 U. S. 985 (1971), summarily aff'g 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 
1970) (three-judge court). The governing regulations declared: "No stu-
dent is eligible for resident classification in the University ... unless he 
has been a bona fide domiciliary of the state for at least a year immediately 
prior thereto. . . . For University purposes, a student does not acquire 
a domicile in Minnesota until he has been here for at least a year primarily 
as a permanent resident and not merely as a student; this involves the 
probability of his remaining in Minnesota beyond his completion of school." 
326 F. Supp., at 235-236. 
Shortly after Vlandis, we upheld a domicile requirement for resident tu-
ition rates at the University of Washington. Sturgis v. Washington, 414 
U. S. 1057, summarily aff'g 368 F. Supp. 38 (WD Wash. 1973) (three-
judge court). The relevant statute declared: "The term 'resident student' 
shall mean a student who has a domicile in the state of Washington for ... 
one year . . . and has in fact established a bona fide domicile in this state 
for other than educational purposes .... " 368 F. Supp., at 39, n. 1. "Do-
micile" was defined as "a person's true, fixed and permanent home and 
place of habitation. It is the place where he intends to remain, and to 
which he expects to return when he leaves without intending to establish a 
new domicile elsewhere." Jbi,d. 
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mitting them to the schools. A requirement of def acto resi-
dency, uniformly applied, would not violate any principle of 
equal protection."). 
A bona fide residence requirement, uniformly applied, gen-
erally is justified under the Equal Protection Clause by a 
State's substantial interest in seeing that services provided 
specifically for its residents are enjoyed only by residents. 7 
Unlike a durational residence requirement, such a require-
ment imposes no mandatory period of residence. It there-
fore does not burden or penalize the constitutional right of in-
terstate travel, 8 for any person is free to move to a State and 
to establish residence. A bona fide residence requirement 
simply requires that the person does establish residence be-
fore demanding the services that are restricted to residents. 
There is a further, independent justification for local resi-
dence requirements in the public school context. As we ex-
plained in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974): 
7 A bona fide residence requirement implicates no "suspect" classifica-
tion, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, there is noth-
ing invidiously discriminatory about a bona fide residence requirement if it 
is uniformly applied. Thus the question is simply whether there is a ratio-
nal basis for it. 
This view assumes, of course, that the "service" that the State would 
deny to nonresidents is not a fundamental right protected by the Constitu-
tion. A State, for example, may not refuse to provide counsel to an indi-
gent nonresident defendant at a criminal trial where a deprivation of lib-
erty occurs. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). As we 
previously have recognized, however, "[p]ublic education is not a 'right' 
granted to individuals by the Constitution." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 
--, -- (1982) (citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Ro-
driguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35 (1973)). 
8 The courts below construed ,§21.031(d) to apply to children entering a 
Texas school district not only from other States or countries, but also from 
other school districts within Texas. 648 F. 2d, at 428; 482 F. Supp., at 
222. Thus there are applications of the statute that do not even involve 
interstate travel, let alone burden or penalize it. This construction alone 
is fatal to any argument based on the right of interstate travel, because the 
complaint is limited to a facial challenge of § 21.031(d). 
8 
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"No single tradition in public education is more deeply 
rooted than local control over the operation of schools; 
local autonomy has long been thought essential both to 
the maintenance of community concern and support for 
public schools and to quality of the educational process. 
. . . [L]ocal control over the educational process affords 
citizens an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, 
permits the structuring of school programs to fit local 
needs, and encourages 'experimentation, innovation, and 
a healthy competition for educational excellence.'" 418 
U. S., at 741-742 (quoting San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 50 (1973)). 
Indeed, the provision of primary and secondary education is 
perhaps the most important function of local government to-
day. Absent residence requirements, there can be little 
doubt that the proper planning and operation of the schools 
would suffer significantly. 9 The State thus has a substantial 
interest in imposing bona fide residence requirements to 
maintain the quality of local public schools. 
9 The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's findings on the ad-
verse impact that invalidating§ 21.031(d) would have on the quality of edu-
cation in Texas. 648 F. 2d, at 428-429. The District Court explicitly 
found: 
"28. Declaring the statute unconstitutional would cause substantial 
numbers ofint[er]-district transfers, which would ... cause school popula-
tions to fluctuate. . . . 
"29. Fluctuating school populations would make it impossible to predict 
enrollment figures--even on a semester-by-semester basis, causing over-
or-under-estimates on teachers, supplies, materials, etc. 
"30. The increased enrollment of students would cause overcrowded 
classrooms and related facilities; over-large teacher-pupil ratios; expansion 
of bilingual programs; the pw;chase of books, equipment, supplies and 
other customary items of support; all of which would require a substantial 
increase in the budget of the school districts." 482 F. Supp., at 215. 
We do not suggest that findings of this degree of specificity are necessary 
in every case. But they do illustrate the problems that prompt States to 
adopt regulations such as § 21.031. 
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III 
9 
The central question we must decide here is whether 
§ 21.031(d) is a bona fide residence requirement. 10 Although 
the meaning may vary according to context, "residence" gen-
erally requires both physical presence and an intention to re-
main. 11 As the Supreme Court of Maine explained over a 
century ago, 
10 We need not decide whether § 21.031(d) has been applied uniformly, 
see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 255 (1974); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 342 n. 13 (1972); Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U. S., at --, n. 4 (POWELL, J., concurring), for the plaintiffs limited their 
complaint to a facial challenge of§ 21.03l(d). In any event, the District 
Court's findings at the preliminary injunction stage, App. 20a, appear to 
preclude any claim that § 21.031(d) has been applied in a discriminatory 
fashion. 
We reject Martinez's argument that§ 21.03l(d) violates the Due Process 
Clause because it creates an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence. 
Brief for Petitioner 46-49; see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441,446 (1973). 
Morales easily could rebut any "presumption" of nonresidence if he were, 
in fact, a resident. See App. 20a. 
We also find no merit to Martinez's argument that§ 21.031(d) constitutes 
an impermissible burden on children who chose to adopt a nontraditional 
family-living arrangement. Brief for Petitioner ~24; see Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion). Although 
§ 21.031(d) applies only to children who live "separate and apart from" a 
parent or guardian, subsections (b) and (c) impose a residence requirement 
on parents and guardians. Parents or guardians could not satisfy this re-
quirement if the sole purpose of their presence in the district was to enable 
their child to attend the public free schools. Such "residence" would not 
satisfy the traditional criteria, see infra, at --, and n. 12, that the Texas 
courts frequently have recognized. See, e. g., Mills v. Bartlett, 377 S.W. 
2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1964); Whitney v. State, 472 S. W. 2d 524, 52fh526 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1971); Harrison v. Chesshir, 316 S.W. 2d 909, 915 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 159 Tex. 359, 320 S. W. 2d 814 (1959) 
(per curiam); Prince v. Inman, 280 S.W. 2d 779, 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1955). 
11 Several States have recognized the "intention to remain" requirement 
in the context of public school admissions. See, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 10-253(d) (Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-l-102(2)(g) (1973); Op. No. 
10 
81-857-OPINION 
MARTINEZ v. SHORES 
''When . . . a person voluntarily takes up his abode in a 
given place, with intention to remain permanently, or for 
an indefinite period of time; or, to speak more accu-
rately, when a person takes up his abode in a given 
place, without any present intention to remove there-
from, such place of abode becomes his residence .... " 
Inhabitants of Warren v. / nhabitants of Thomaston, 43 
Me. 406, 418 (1857). 
This classic two-part definition of residence has been recog-
nized as a minimum standard in a wide range of contexts time 
and time again. 12 
In Vlandis v. Kline, supra, we approved a more rigorous 
domicile test as a "reasonable standard for determining the 
residential status of a student." 412 U. S., at 454. That 
standard was described as follows: " 'In reviewing a claim of 
in-state status, the issue becomes essentially one of domicile. 
In general, the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and 
permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place to 
which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of return-
ing.'" Ibid. (quoting Opinion of the Attorney General of the 
State of Connecticut Regarding Non-Resident Tuition, Sept. 
6, 1972); cf. n. 6, supra. This standard could not be applied 
76-94, 1975-1976 Biennial Report of the Atty. Gen. ofS. D. 660,662 (1976); 
Op. No. 2825, 1969-1970 Annual Report & Official Opinions of the Atty. 
Gen. of S. C. 39, 40 (1970); Op. No. 59-146, 1915-1971 Ariz. Atty. Gen. 
Reports & Opinions 218, 220 (1959); In re VanCurran, 18 Ed. Dept. Rep. 
523, 524 (N. Y. Comm'r Educ. 1979). 
12 See, e.g., Kiehne v. Atwood, 93 N.M. 657, 662, 604 P. 2d 123, 128 
(1979); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 269-270, 501 P. 2d 
266, 272 (1972); Estate of Schoof v. Schoof, 193 Kan. 611, 614, 396 P. 2d 
329, 331-332 (1964); Hughes v. ,Ill. Pub. Aid Comm'n, 2 Ill. 2d 374, 380, 
118 N. E.2d 14, 17 (1954); Spratt v. Spratt, 210 La. 370,371, 27 So. 2d 154, 
154 (1946); Appeal of Lawrence County, 71 S.D. 49, 51, 21 N. W.2d 57, 58 
(1945); Jenkins v. North Shore Dye House, Inc., 277 Mass. 440, 444, 178 
N. E. 644, 646 (1931); Thomas v. Warner, 83 Md. 14, 20, 34 A. 830, 831 
(1896); Pfoutz v. Comford, 36 Pa. 420, 422 (1860). 
81-857-OPINION 
MARTINEZ v. SHORES 11 
to school-age children in the same way that it was applied to 
college students. But at the very least, a school district gen-
erally would be justified in requiring school-age children or 
their parents to satisfy the traditional, basic residence crite-
ria-i. e., to live in the district with the intention of remain-
ing there indefinitely-before it treated them as residents. 
Section 21.031 is far more generous than this traditional 
standard. It compels a school district to permit a child such 
as Morales to attend school without paying tuition if he has a 
bona fide intention to remain in the school district indefi-
nitely, 13 for he then would have a reason for being there other 
than his desire to attend school: his intention to make his 
home in the district. 14 Thus § 21.031 grants the benefits of 
residency to all who satisfy the traditional requirements. 
The statute goes further and extends these benefits to many 
children even if they (or their families) do not intend to re-
main in the district indefinitely. For example, if a child 
comes to Texas for six months for health reasons, he will be 
eligible for tuition-free admission to the public schools. See 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Or if a person comes to Texas to work 
for a year, his children would qualify for tuition-free educa-
13 In most cases, of course, it is the intention of the parent or guardian on 
behalf of the child that is relevant. See Deterly v. Wells , 53 S. W. 2d 847, 
848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (minor presumed to lack capacity to form requi-
site intention necessary to establish separate domicile). But for conve-
nience we speak of the child's intention. 
" Respondents have conceded that "the statute permits any child to at-
tend school in a district in which he is present for the purpose of 'establish-
ing a home.'" Brief for Respondents 25. But even if§ 21.031(d) could be 
read to exclude a child who moves to a school district with the intent of 
making his home there when the desire to make the new home is motivated 
solely by the desire to attend school, Martinez does not have standing to 
raise such a claim. The record shows that Morales does not intend to 
make his home in McAllen: "Morales only intends to reside in the McAllen 
Independent School District until he completes his education." Arredondo 
v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212, 214 (SD Tex. 1979). He thus fails to sat-
isfy even this most basic criterion of residence. 
12 
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tion. See id., at 37. In short, §21.031 grants the benefits 
of residency to everyone who satisfies the traditional resi-
dence definition and to some who legitimately could be classi-
fied as nonresidents. Since there is no indication that this 
extension of the traditional definition has any impermissible 
basis, we certainly cannot say that § 21.031(d) violates the 
Constitution when a more restrictive statute would be 
permissible. 
IV 
The Constitution permits a State to restrict eligibility for 
tuition-free education to its bona fide residents. We hold 
that § 21.031 is a bona fide residence requirement that satis-
fies constitutional standards. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals accordingly is 
Affirmed. 
